From cf1f2eeabfb2aa43c55ae9148588f1245a9b1007 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ian Grigg Date: Wed, 5 May 2010 01:32:04 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] adopted 2 of Andreas Baess's suggested changes git-svn-id: http://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies@1894 14b1bab8-4ef6-0310-b690-991c95c89dfd --- ConfigurationControlSpecification.html | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ConfigurationControlSpecification.html b/ConfigurationControlSpecification.html index ea5b5aa..f324320 100644 --- a/ConfigurationControlSpecification.html +++ b/ConfigurationControlSpecification.html @@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ th { color : blue; font-weight: bold; } +.strike { + color : blue; + text-decoration:line-through; +} a:hover { color : gray; @@ -78,7 +82,14 @@ is derivative and is ruled by the CCS.

CCS is formated, inspired and designed to meet the needs of -DRC-A.1. + +David Ross Criteria - +Certificate Authority Review Checklist +- section A.1 +( + +DRC-A.1 +). CCS may be seen as the index to systems audit under DRC.

@@ -162,7 +173,13 @@ Critical systems are defined by Security Policy.

3.3 Control

-

+

+Security Policy places executive responsibility for Hardware with the Board of CAcert Inc. +Access is delegated to Access Engineers (SP 2) and Systems Administrators (SP 3). +Legal ownership may be delegated by agreement to other organisations (SP 9.4). +

+ +

Control of Hardware is the ultimate responsibility of the Board of CAcert Inc. The responsibility for acts with hardware is delegated to Access Engineers and Systems Administrators as per