**WARNING:**
The proper policy document is located
[on the CAcert
website](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CertificationPracticeStatement.html)
.
This document is a **working draft** to include
future revisions only, and is currently
only relevant for the \[policy\] group.
Suggested additions in BLUE, strikes in blue.
Michael Tänzer 20111113: CPS \#7.1.2
"Certificate Extensions" adjustments
Ulrich Schroeter 20130309: several minor
fixes according to [PoP
2.5](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/PolicyOnPolicy.html) and
[Bug \#1131](https://bugs.cacert.org/view.php?id=1131)
- 20111113 changes are still incorporated
in the revision on main website but not in the svn revision, so
therefor copied over CPS revision from CAcert main website to SVN
policy working directory as source of changes
- header reformated to reflect new header style
- http to https fixes
- full url fixes
- wiki.cacert.org/wiki/ to wiki.cacert.org/ fixes
- wiki redirects to redirected link fixes
- img src images/ fixes
- .php to .html fixes per [Bug
\#1131](https://bugs.cacert.org/view.php?id=1131)
- replace all NRP-DaL references with text Root Distribution License
and RootDistributionLicense.html link
- fix of ~65 html errors and ~14 html warnings
------------------------------------------------------------------------
# CAcert CPS and CP
1. [INTRODUCTION](#p1)
- [1.1. Overview](#p1.1)
- [1.2. Document name and identification](#p1.2)
- [1.3. PKI participants](#p1.3)
- [1.4. Certificate usage](#p1.4)
- [1.5. Policy administration](#p1.5)
- [1.6. Definitions and acronyms](#p1.6)
2. [PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES](#p2)
- [2.1. Repositories](#p2.1)
- [2.2. Publication of certification information](#p2.2)
- [2.3. Time or frequency of publication](#p2.3)
- [2.4. Access controls on repositories](#p2.4)
3. [IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (I&A)](#p3)
- [3.1. Naming](#p3.1)
- [3.2. Initial Identity Verification](#p3.2)
- [3.3. I&A for Re-key Requests](#p3.3)
- [3.4. I&A for Revocation Request](#p3.4)
4. [CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS](#p4)
- [4.1. Certificate Application](#p4.1)
- [4.2. Certificate application processing](#p4.2)
- [4.3. Certificate issuance](#p4.3)
- [4.4. Certificate acceptance](#p4.4)
- [4.5. Key pair and certificate usage](#p4.5)
- [4.6. Certificate renewal](#p4.6)
- [4.7. Certificate re-key](#p4.7)
- [4.8. Certificate modification](#p4.8)
- [4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension](#p4.9)
- [4.10. Certificate status services](#p4.10)
- [4.11. End of subscription](#p4.11)
- [4.12. Key escrow and recovery](#p4.12)
5. [FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS](#p5)
- [5.1. Physical controls](#p5.1)
- [5.2. Procedural controls](#p5.2)
- [5.3. Personnel controls](#p5.3)
- [5.4. Audit logging procedures](#p5.4)
- [5.5. Records archival](#p5.5)
- [5.6. Key changeover](#p5.6)
- [5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery](#p5.7)
- [5.8. CA or RA termination](#p5.8)
6. [TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS](#p6)
- [6.1. Key pair generation and installation](#p6.1)
- [6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
Engineering Controls](#p6.2)
- [6.3. Other aspects of key pair management](#p6.3)
- [6.4. Activation data](#p6.4)
- [6.5. Computer security controls](#p6.5)
- [6.6. Life cycle technical controls](#p6.6)
- [6.7. Network security controls](#p6.7)
- [6.8. Time-stamping](#p6.8)
7. [CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES](#p7)
- [7.1. Certificate profile](#p7.1)
- [7.2. CRL profile](#p7.2)
- [7.3. OCSP profile](#p7.3)
8. [COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS](#p8)
- [8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment](#p8.1)
- [8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor](#p8.2)
- [8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity](#p8.3)
- [8.4. Topics covered by assessment](#p8.4)
- [8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency](#p8.5)
- [8.6. Communication of results](#p8.6)
9. [OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS](#p9)
- [9.1. Fees](#p9.1)
- [9.2. Financial responsibility](#p9.2)
- [9.3. Confidentiality of business information](#p9.3)
- [9.4. Privacy of personal information](#p9.4)
- [9.5. Intellectual property rights](#p9.5)
- [9.6. Representations and warranties](#p9.6)
- [9.7. Disclaimers of warranties](#p9.7)
- [9.8. Limitations of liability](#p9.8)
- [9.9. Indemnities](#p9.9)
- [9.10. Term and termination](#p9.10)
- [9.11. Individual notices and communications with
participants](#p9.11)
- [9.12. Amendments](#p9.12)
- [9.13. Dispute resolution provisions](#p9.13)
- [9.14. Governing law](#p9.14)
- [9.15. Compliance with applicable law](#p9.15)
- [9.16. Miscellaneous provisions](#p9.16)
## 1. INTRODUCTION
### 1.1. Overview
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of CAcert,
the Community Certification Authority (CA). It describes rules and
procedures used by CAcert for operating its CA, and applies to all
CAcert PKI Participants, including Assurers, Members, and CAcert itself.
### 1.2. Document name and identification
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of CAcert.
The CPS also fulfills the role of the Certificate Policy (CP) for each
class of certificate.
- This document is COD6 under CAcert Official Documents numbering
scheme.
- The document is structured according to Chokhani, et al,
[RFC3647](http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3647.txt), [chapter
4](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3647#section-4). All headings
derive from that Chapter.
- It has been improved and reviewed (or will be reviewed) to meet or
exceed the criteria of the Certificate Authority Review Checklist
from *David E. Ross* ("DRC") and Mozilla Foundation's CA policy.
- OID assigned to this document: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.4.4.x (x=approved
Version)
([iana.org](http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers))
.x will change to .1 in the first approved instance.
- © CAcert Inc. 2006-2009.
- Issued under the CAcert document licence policy, as and when made
policy. See
[PolicyDrafts/DocumentLicence](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDrafts/DocumentLicence).
- The cited page discusses 2 options: CCau Attribute-Share-alike
and GNU Free Document License. Refer to that.
- Note that the noun Licence in Australian English has two Cs. The
verb License is spelt the same way as American English.
- Earlier notes were written by Christian Barmala in a document placed
under GNU Free Document License and under FSF copyright. However
this clashed with the control provisions of Configuration-Control
Specification (COD2) within Audit criteria.
- In this document:
- green text refers to questions that seek
answers,
- red text refers to probably audit
fails or serious errors.
- blue text refers to changes written
after the document got seriously reviewed.
None is to be considered part of the policy, and
they should disappear in the DRAFT and must disappear in the POLICY.
The CPS is an authoritive document, and rules other documents except
where explicitly deferred to. See also [1.5.1 Organisation Administering
the Document](#p1.5.1).
### 1.3. PKI participants
The CA is legally operated by CAcert Incorporated, an Association
registered in 2002 in New South Wales, Australia, on behalf of the wider
Community of Members of CAcert. The Association details are at the
[CAcert wiki](https://wiki.cacert.org/CAcertInc).
CAcert is a Community formed of Members who agree to the [CAcert
Community
Agreement](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html).
The CA is technically operated by the Community, under the direction of
the Board of CAcert Incorporated. (The Members of the Community are not
to be confused with the *Association Members*, which latter are not
referred to anywhere in this CPS.)
#### 1.3.1. Certification authorities
CAcert does not issue certificates to external intermediate CAs under
the present CPS.
#### 1.3.2. Registration authorities
Registration Authorities (RAs) are controlled under Assurance Policy
([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)).
#### 1.3.3. Subscribers
CAcert issues certificates to Members only. Such Members then become
Subscribers.
#### 1.3.4. Relying parties
A relying party is a Member, having agreed to the CAcert Community
Agreement
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)),
who, in the act of using a CAcert certificate, makes a decision on the
basis of that certificate.
#### 1.3.5. Other participants
**Member.** Membership of the Community is as defined in the
[COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html).
Only Members may RELY or may become Subscribers. Membership is free.
**Arbitrator.** A senior and experienced Member of the CAcert Community
who resolves disputes between Members, including ones of certificate
reliance, under Dispute Resolution Policy
([COD7](https://www.cacert.org/policy/DisputeResolutionPolicy.html)).
**Vendor.** Software suppliers who integrate the root certificates of
CAcert into their software also assume a proxy role of Relying Parties,
and are subject to another licence. At the time of
writing, the "3rd Party Vendor - Disclaimer and Licence" is being worked
upon, but is neither approved nor offered.
**Non-Related Persons** (NRPs). These are users of browsers and similar
software who are unaware of the CAcert certificates they may use, and
are unaware of the ramifications of usage. Their relationship with
CAcert is described by the Root Distribution License
([COD14](https://www.cacert.org/policy/RootDistributionLicense.html)).
No other rights nor relationship is implied or offered.
### 1.4. Certificate usage
CAcert serves as issuer of certificates for individuals, businesses,
governments, charities, associations, churches, schools,
non-governmental organisations or other groups. CAcert certificates are
intended for low-cost community applications especially where volunteers
can become Assurers and help CAcert to help the Community.
Types of certificates and their appropriate and corresponding
applications are defined in [§1.4.1](#p1.4.1). Prohibited applications
are defined in [§1.4.2](#p1.4.2). Specialist uses may be agreed by
contract or within a specific environment, as described in
[§1.4.4](#p1.4.4). Note also the unreliable applications in
[§1.4.3](#p1.4.3) and risks, liabilities and obligations in [§9](#p9).
| Type |
Appropriate Certificate uses |
| General |
Protocol |
Description |
Comments |
| Server |
TLS |
web server encryption |
enables encryption |
| embedded |
embedded server authentication |
mail servers, IM-servers |
| Client |
S/MIME |
email encryption |
"digital signatures" employed in S/MIME are not legal / human
signatures, but instead enable the encryption mode of S/MIME |
| TLS |
client authentication |
the nodes must be secure |
| TLS |
web based signature applications |
the certificate authenticates only. See §1.4.3. |
| "Digital Signing" |
for human signing over documents |
Only within a wider application and rules such as by separate
policy, as agreed by contract, etc. See §1.4.4. |
| Code |
Authenticode, ElfSign, Java |
Code Signing |
Signatures on packages are evidence of their Membership and
indicative of Identity |
| PGP |
OpenPGP |
Key Signing |
Signatures on Member Keys are evidence of their Membership and
indicative of Identity |
| Special |
X.509 |
OCSP, Timestamping |
Only available to CAcert Systems Administrators, as controlled by
Security Policy |
Table 1.4. Types of Certificate
#### 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses
General uses.
- CAcert server certificates can be used to enable encryption
protection in web servers. Suitable applications include webmail and
chat forums.
- CAcert server certificates can be used to enable encryption in
SSL/TLS links in embedded protocols such as mail servers and
IM-servers.
- CAcert client certificates can be used to enable encryption
protection in email clients. (See [§1.4.3](#p1.4.3) for caveat on
signatures.)
- CAcert client certificates can be used to replace password-based
authentication to web servers.
- OpenPGP keys with CAcert signatures can be used to encrypt and sign
files and emails, using software compatible with OpenPGP.
- CAcert client certificates can be used in web-based authentication
applications.
- CAcert code signing certificates can be used to sign code for
distribution to other people.
- Time stamping can be used to attach a time record to a digital
document.
#### 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses
CAcert certificates are not designed, intended, or authorised for the
following applications:
- Use or resale as control equipment in hazardous circumstances or for
uses requiring fail-safe performance such as the operation of
nuclear facilities, aircraft navigation or communication systems,
air traffic control systems, or weapons control systems, where
failure could lead directly to death, personal injury, or severe
environmental damage.
#### 1.4.3. Unreliable Applications
CAcert certificates are not designed nor intended for use in the
following applications, and may not be reliable enough for these
applications:
- **Signing within Protocols.** Digital signatures made by CAcert
certificates carry NO default legal or human meaning. See
[§9.15.1](#p9.15.1). Especially, protocols such as S/MIME commonly
will automatically apply digital signatures as part of their
protocol needs. The purpose of the cryptographic signature in S/MIME
and similar protocols is limited by default to strictly protocol
security purposes: to provide some confirmation that a familiar
certificate is in use, to enable encryption, and to ensure the
integrity of the email in transit.
- **Non-repudiation applications.** Non-repudiation is not to be
implied from use of CAcert certificates. Rather, certificates may
provide support or evidence of actions, but that evidence is
testable in any dispute.
- **Ecommerce applications.** Financial transactions or payments or
valuable e-commerce.
- Use of anonymous (Class 1 or Member SubRoot) certificates in any
application that requires or expects identity.
#### 1.4.4. Limited certificate uses
By contract or within a specific environment (e.g. internal to a
company), CAcert Members are permitted to use Certificates for higher
security, customised or experimental applications. Any such usage,
however, is limited to such entities and these entities take on the
whole responsible for any harm or liability caused by such usage.
**Digital signing applications.** CAcert client certificates may be used
by Assured Members in applications that provide or support the human
signing of documents (known here as "digital signing"). This must be
part of a wider framework and set of rules. Usage and reliance must be
documented either under a separate CAcert digital signing policy or
other external regime agreed by the parties.
#### 1.4.5. Roots and Names
**Named Certificates.** Assured Members may be issued certificates with
their verified names in the certificate. In this role, CAcert operates
and supports a network of Assurers who verify the identity of the
Members. All Names are verified, either by Assurance or another defined
method under policy (c.f. Organisations).
**Anonymous Certificates.** Members can be issued certificates that are
anonymous, which is defined as the certificate with no Name included, or
a shared name such as "Community Member". These may be considered to be
somewhere between Named certificates and self-signed certificates. They
have serial numbers in them which is ultimately traceable via dispute to
a Member, but reliance is undefined. In this role, CAcert provides the
infrastructure, saving the Members from managing a difficult and messy
process in order to get manufactured certificates.
**Psuedonymous Certificates.** Note that CAcert does not currently issue
pseudonymous certificates, being those with a name chosen by the Member
and not verifiable according to documents.
**Advanced Certificates.** Members who are as yet unassured are not
permitted to create advanced forms such as wildcard or subjectAltName
certificates.
**Roots.** The (new) CAcert root layout is as
below. These roots are pending Audit, and will be submitted to vendors
via the (Top-level) Root.
- **(Top-level) Root.** Used to sign on-line CAcert SubRoots only.
This Root is kept offline.
- **Member SubRoot.** For Community Members who are new and unassured
(some restrictions exist). Reliance is undefined. (Replacement for
the Class 1 root, matches "Domain Validation" type.)
- **Assured SubRoot.** Only available for Assured individual Members,
intended to sign certificates with Names. Suitable for Reliance
under this and other policies. Approximates the type known as
Individual Validation.
- **Organisation SubRoot.** Only available for Assured Organisation
Members. Suitable for Reliance under this and other policies.
Approximates the type known as Organisational Validation.
|
Level of Assurance |
|
|
|
Members † |
Assured Members |
Assurers |
|
| Class of Root |
Anon |
Name |
Anon |
Name |
Name+Anon |
Remarks |
Top level
Root |
• |
• |
• |
• |
• |
Signs other CAcert SubRoots only. |
Member
SubRoot |
✔ |
✘ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
† For Members meeting basic checks in §4.2.2
(Reliance is undefined.) |
Assured
SubRoot |
✘ |
✘ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
Assured Members only.
Fully intended for reliance. |
Organisation
SubRoot |
✘ |
✘ |
✔ |
✔ |
✔ |
Assured Organisation Members only.
Fully intended for reliance. |
| Expiry of Certificates |
6 months |
24 months |
|
|
| Types |
client, server |
wildcard, subjectAltName |
code-signing |
(Inclusive to the left.) |
Table 1.4.5.b Certificate under Audit Roots
Following information on OLD roots here for descriptive and historical
purposes only. When CPS goes to DRAFT, this needs to be converted into a
short summary of the way OLD roots are used and its relationship to this
CPS. E.g., "OLD roots are used for testing and other purposes outside
this CPS." Because ... they still exist, and people will look at the CPS
to figure it out.
|
Level of Assurance |
|
|
|
Members |
Assured Members |
|
|
| Class of Root |
Anonymous |
Named |
Anonymous |
Named |
Remarks |
Class
1 |
✔ |
✘ |
✔ |
✔ |
Available for all Members,
reliance is undefined. |
Class
3 |
✘ |
✘ |
✔ |
✔ |
Assured Members only.
Intended for Reliance. |
| Expiry of Certificates |
6 months |
24 months |
|
|
| Types available |
simple only |
wildcard, subjectAltName |
|
|
Table 1.4.5. Certificates under Old Roots - **Audit
Fail**
**Old Roots.** The old CAcert root layout is as below. These roots are
**Audit Fail** and will only be used where new roots do not serve:
- (old) **Class 1 root.** Used primarily for certificates with no
names and by unassured Members. For compatibility only, Assured
Members may also use this root.
- (old) **Class 3 root.** Used primarily for certificates including
the names of Assured Members. Signed by Class 1 root. Members can
decide to rely on these certificates for Assured Members by
selecting the Class 3 root for Assured Members as trust anchor.
- Current Mozilla position has drifted from Class 1,2,3s to DV, IV+OV
and EV posture. Except, the actual posture is either unstated or
difficult to fathom.
- scheme for future roots is at
[NewRootsTaskForce](https://wiki.cacert.org/Roots/NewRootsTaskForce).
- END OLD ROOTS
### 1.5. Policy administration
See [1.2 Document Name and Identification](#p1.2) for general scope of
this document.
#### 1.5.1. Organization administering the document
This document is administered by the policy group of the CAcert
Community under Policy on Policy
([COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html)).
#### 1.5.2. Contact person
For questions including about this document:
- Join the policy group, by means of the discussion forum at
[lists.cacert.org](https://lists.cacert.org/wws/lists) .
- Send email to \< support AT cacert DOT org \>
- IRC: irc.cacert.org \#CAcert (ssl port 7000, non-ssl port 6667)
#### 1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy
This CPS and all other policy documents are managed by the policy group,
which is a group of Members of the Community found at policy forum. See
discussion forums above.
#### 1.5.4. CPS approval procedures
CPS is controlled and updated according to the Policy on Policy
([COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html)) which is
part of Configuration-Control Specification (COD2).
In brief, the policy forum prepares and discusses. After a last call,
the document moves to DRAFT status for a defined period. If no
challenges have been received in the defined period, it moves to POLICY
status. The process is modelled after some elements of the RFC process
by the IETF.
#### 1.5.5 CPS updates
As per above.
### 1.6. Definitions and acronyms
**Certificate**. A certificate is a piece of
cryptographic data used to validate certain statements, especially those
of identity and membership.
**CAcert**. CAcert is a Community certificate
authority as defined under [§1.2 Identification](#p1.2).
**Member**. Everyone who agrees to the CAcert
Community Agreement
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)).
This generally implies having an account registered at CAcert and making
use of CAcert's data, programs or services. A Member may be an
individual ("natural person") or an organisation (sometimes, "legal
person").
****. The group of Members who
agree to the CAcert Community Agreement
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)) or
equivalent agreements.
**Unassured Member**. A Member who has not
yet been Assured.
**Subscriber**. A Member who requests and
receives a certificate.
**Assured Member**. A Member whose identity
has been sufficiently verified by Assurers or other approved methods
under Assurance Policy.
**Assurer**. An Assured Member who is
authorised under Assurance Policy to verify the identity of other
Members.
**Name**. As defined in the Assurance Policy
([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)), to
describe a name of a Member that is verified by the Assurance process.
**Organisation Administrator**. ("O-Admin")
An Assurer who is authorised to act for an Organisation. The O-Admin is
authorised by an organisation to vouch for the identity of other users
of the organisation.
**Organisation Assurer**. An Assurer who is
authorised to conduct assurances on organisations.
**Non-Related Persons**. ("NRPs") are general
users of browsers and similar software. The NRPs are generally unaware
of CAcert or the certificates that they may use, and are unaware of the
ramifications of usage. They are not permitted to RELY, but may USE,
under the Root Distribution License
([COD14](https://www.cacert.org/policy/RootDistributionLicense.html)).
**Reliance**. An industry term referring to
the act of making a decision, including taking a risk, which decision is
in part or in whole informed or on the basis of the contents of a
certificate.
**Relying Party**. An industry term
refering to someone who relies (that is, makes decisions or takes risks)
in part or in whole on a certificate.
**Subscriber Naming.** The term used in this CPS to describe all naming
data within a certificate. Approximately similar terms from Industry
such as "Subject naming" and "Distinguished Name" are not used here.
**Verification**. An industry term
referring to the act of checking and controlling the accuracy and
utility of a single claim.
**Validation**. An industry term
referring to the process of inspecting and verifying the information and
subsidiary claims behind a claim.
**Usage**. The event of allowing a certificate
to participate in a protocol, as decided and facilitated by a user's
software. Generally, Usage does not require significant input, if any,
on the part of the user. This defers all decisions to the user software,
thus elevating the software as user's only and complete Validation
Authority or Agent.
**CAcert Relying Party**. CAcert Members who make
decisions based in part or in whole on a certificate issued by CAcert.
Only CAcert Members are permitted to Rely on CAcert certificates,
subject to the CAcert Community Agreement.
**Vendors**. Non-members who distribute CAcert's
root or intermediate certificates in any way, including but not limited
to delivering these certificates with their products, e.g. browsers,
mailers or servers. Vendors are covered under a separate licence. As of the moment, this licence is not written.
**Configuration-Control Specification** "CCS".
The audit criteria that controls this CPS. The CCS is documented in
COD2, itself a controlled document under CCS.
**CAcert Official Document** (COD). Controlled
Documents that are part of the CCS.
## 2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES
### 2.1. Repositories
CAcert operates no repositories in the sense of lookup for
non-certificate-related information for the general public.
Under the Assurance Policy
([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)), there are
means for Members to search, retrieve and verify certain data about
themselves and others.
### 2.2. Publication of certification information
CAcert publishes:
- A repository of CRLs. An OCSP responder is in operation.
- The root certificate and intermediate certificates.
CAcert does not expressly publish information on issued certificates.
However, due to the purpose of certificates, and the essential public
nature of Names and email addresses, all information within certificates
is presumed to be public and published, once issued and delivered to the
Member.
### 2.3. Time or frequency of publication
Root and Intermediate Certificates and CRLs are made available on
issuance.
### 2.4. Access controls on repositories
No stipulation.
## 3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
### 3.1. Naming
#### 3.1.1. Types of names
**Client Certificates.** The Subscriber Naming consists of:
- subjectAltName= One, or more, of the Subscriber's verified email
addresses, in rfc822Name format.
- SSO in subjectAltName?.
- EmailAddress= One, or more, of the Subscriber's verified email
addresses. This is deprecated under RFC5280 [4
.1.2.6](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.6) and is
to be phased out. Also includes a SHA1 hash of a random number if
the member selects SSO (Single Sign On ID) during submission of CSR.
- CN= The common name takes its value from one of:
- For all Members, the string "CAcert WoT Member" may be used for
anonymous certificates.
- For individual Members, a Name of the Subscriber, as Assured
under AP.
- For Organisation Members, an organisation-chosen name, as
verified under OAP.
- [bug 672](https://bugs.cacert.org/view.html?id=672) filed on
subjectAltName.
- O-Admin must verify as per
[p20081016](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDecisions#p20081016).
- it is a wip for OAP to state how this is done.
- curiously, (RFC5280) verification is only mandated for
subjectAltName not subject field.
- what Directory String is used in above? UTF8String is specified by
RFC52804.1.2.6? is this important for the CPS to state?
**Individual Server Certificates.** The Subscriber Naming consists of:
- CN= The common name is the host name out of a domain for which the
Member is a domain master.
- subjectAltName= Additional host names for which the Member is a
domain master may be added to permit the certificate to serve
multiple domains on one IP number.
- All other fields are optional and must either match the CN or they
must be empty
**Certificates for Organisations.** In addition to the above, the
following applies:
- OU= organizationalUnitName (set by O-Admin, must be verified by
O-Admin).
- O= organizationName is the fixed name of the Organisation.
- L= localityName
- ST= stateOrProvinceName
- C= countryName
- contact= EMail Address of Contact.
Except for the OU and CN, fields are taken from the Member's account and
are as verified by the Organisation Assurance process. Other Subscriber
information that is collected and/or retained does not go into the
certificate.
#### 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful
Each Member's Name (CN= field) is assured under the Assurance Policy
([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)) or
subsidiary policies (such as Organisation Assurance Policy). Refer to
those documents for meanings and variations.
Anonymous certificates have the same `subject` field common name. See
[§1.4.5.](#p1.4.5).
Email addresses are verified according to [§4.2.2.](#p4.2.2)
#### 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
See [§1.4.5](#p1.4.5).
#### 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms
Interpretation of Names is controlled by the Assurance Policy, is
administered by means of the Member's account, and is subject to change
by the Arbitrator. Changes to the interpretation by means of Arbitration
should be expected as fraud (e.g., phishing) may move too quickly for
policies to fully document rules.
#### 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names
Uniqueness of Names within certificates is not guaranteed. Each
certificate has a unique serial number which maps to a unique account,
and thus maps to a unique Member. See the Assurance Statement within
Assurance Policy
([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)).
Domain names and email address can only be registered to one Member.
#### 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
Organisation Assurance Policy
([COD11](https://www.cacert.org/policy/OrganisationAssurancePolicy.html))
controls issues such as trademarks where applicable. A trademark can be
disputed by filing a dispute. See [§9.13](#adr).
#### 3.1.7. International Domain Names
Certificates containing International Domain Names, being those
containing a ACE prefix ([RFC3490 Section
5](http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3490#section-5)), will only be issued to
domains satisfying one or more of the following conditions:
- The Top Level Domain (TLD) Registrar associated with the domain has
a policy that has taken measures to prevent two homographic domains
being registered to different entities down to an accepted level.
- Domains contain only code points from a single unicode character
script, excluding the "Common" script, with the additionally allowed
numberic characters \[0-9\], and an ACSII hyphen '-'.
Email address containing International Domain Names in the domain
portion of the email address will also be required to satisfy one of the
above conditions.
The following is a list of accepted TLD Registrars:
This criteria will apply to the email address and server host name
fields for all certificate types.
The CAcert Inc. Board has the authority to decide to add or remove
accepted TLD Registrars on this list.
### 3.2. Initial Identity Verification
Identity verification is controlled by the [Assurance
Policy](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)
([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)). The
reader is refered to the Assurance Policy, the following is
representative and brief only.
#### 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key
CAcert uses industry-standard techniques to prove the possession of the
private key.
For X.509 server certificates, the stale digital signature of the CSR is
verified. For X.509 client certificates for "Netscape" browsers, SPKAC
uses a challenge-response protocol to check the private key dynamically.
For X.509 client certificates for "explorer" browsers, ActiveX uses a
challenge-response protocol to check the private key dynamically.
#### 3.2.2. Authentication of Individual Identity
**Agreement.** An Internet user becomes a Member by agreeing to the
CAcert Community Agreement
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html))
and registering an account on the online website. During the
registration process Members are asked to supply information about
themselves:
- A valid working email.
- Full Name and Date of Birth such as is found on Identity documents.
- Personal Questions used only for Password Retrieval.
The online account establishes the method of authentication for all
service requests such as certificates.
**Assurance.** Each Member is assured according to Assurance Policy
([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)).
**Certificates.** Based on the total number of Assurance Points that a
Member (Name) has, the Member can get different levels of certificates.
See [§1.4.5](#p1.4.5). See Table 3.2.b. When Members have 50 or more
points, they become *Assured Members* and may then request certificates
that state their Assured Name(s).
| 0 |
Unassured Member |
Anonymous |
Certificates with no Name, under Class 1 Root. Limited to 6 months
expiry. |
| 1-49 |
Unassured Member |
Anonymous |
Certificates with no Name under Member SubRoot. Limited to 6 months
expiry. |
| 50-99 |
Assured Member |
Verified |
Certificates with Verified Name for S/MIME, web servers, "digital
signing." Expiry after 24 months is available. |
| 100++ |
Assurer |
Code-signing |
Can create Code-signing certificates |
Table 3.2.b - How Assurance Points are used in
Certificates
#### 3.2.3. Authentication of organization identity
Verification of organisations is delegated by the Assurance Policy to
the Organisation Assurance Policy
([COD11](https://www.cacert.org/policy/OrganisationAssurancePolicy.html)).
The reader is refered to the Organisation Assurance Policy, the
following is representative and brief only.
Organisations present special challenges. The Assurance process for
Organisations is intended to permit the organisational Name to appear in
certificates. The process relies heavily on the Individual process
described above.
Organisation Assurance achieves the standard stated in the OAP, briefly
presented here:
1. the organisation exists,
2. the organisation name is correct and consistent,
3. signing rights: requestor can sign on behalf of the organisation,
and
4. the organisation has agreed to the terms of the CAcert Community
Agreement
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)),
and is therefore subject to Arbitration.
- As of the current time of writing, OA lacks critical documentation
and there are bugs identified with no response.
- [documented
bugs](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDrafts/OrganisationAssurance).
- Therefore Organisations will not participate in the current audit
cycle of roots.
- See [wiki](https://wiki.cacert.org/OrganisationAssurance) for any
progress on this.
#### 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information
All information in the certificate is verified, see Relying Party
Statement, §4.5.2.
#### 3.2.5. Validation of authority
The authorisation to obtain a certificate is established as follows:
**Addresses.** The member claims authority over a domain or email
address when adding the address, [§4.1.2](#p4.1.2). (Control is tested
by means described in [§4.2.2](#p4.2.2).)
**Individuals.** The authority to participate as a Member is established
by the CAcert Community Agreement
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)).
Assurances are requested by means of the signed CAP form.
**Organisations.** The authority for Organisation Assurance is
established in the COAP form, as signed by an authorised representative
of the organisation. The authority for the Organisation Administrator
(O-Admin) is also established on the COAP form. See Organisation
Assurance Policy.
#### 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation
CAcert does not currently issue certificates to subordinate CAs or other
PKIs. Other CAs may become Members, and are then subject to the same
reliance provisions as all Members.
### 3.3. Re-key Requests
Via the Member's account.
### 3.4. Revocations Requests
Via the Member's account. In the event that the Member has lost the
password, or similar, the Member emails the support team who either work
through the lost-password questions process or file a dispute.
## 4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The general life-cycle for a new certificate for an Individual Member
is:
1. Member adds claim to an address (domain/email).
2. System probes address for control.
3. Member creates key pair.
4. Member submits CSR with desired options (Anonymous Certificate, SSO,
Root Certificate) .
5. System validates and accepts CSR based on known information: claims,
assurance, controls, technicalities.
6. System signs certificate.
7. System makes signed certificate available to Member.
8. Member accepts certificate.
(Some steps are not applicable, such as anonymous certificates.)
### 4.1. Certificate Application
#### 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application
Members may submit certificate applications. On issuance of
certificates, Members become Subscribers.
#### 4.1.2. Adding Addresses
The Member can claim ownership or authorised control of a domain or
email address on the online system. This is a necessary step towards
issuing a certificate. There are these controls:
- The claim of ownership or control is legally significant and may be
referred to dispute resolution.
- Each unique address can be handled by one account only.
- When the Member makes the claim, the certificate application system
automatically initiates the check of control, as below.
#### 4.1.3. Preparing CSR
Members generate their own key-pairs. The CAcert Community Agreement
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html))
obliges the Member as responsible for security. See CCA2.5, §9.6.
The Certificate Signing Request (CSR) is prepared by the Member for
presentation to the automated system.
### 4.2. Certificate application processing
The CA's certificate application process is completely automated.
Requests, approvals and rejections are handled by the website system.
Each application should be processed in less than a minute.
Where certificates are requested for more than one purpose, the
requirements for each purpose must be fulfilled.
#### 4.2.1. Authentication
The Member logs in to her account on the CAcert website and thereby
authenticates herself with username and passphrase or with her CAcert
client-side digital certificate.
#### 4.2.2. Verifying Control
In principle, at least two controls are placed on each address.
**Email-Ping.** Email addresses are verified by
means of an *Email-Ping test*:
- The system generates a cookie (a random, hard-to-guess code) and
formats it as a string.
- The system sends the cookie to the Member in an email.
- Once the Member receives the email, she enters the cookie into the
website.
- The entry of the code verifies control of that email account.
**Email Control.** Email addresses for client
certificates are verified by passing the following checks:
1. An Email-ping test is done on the email address.
2. The Member must have signed a CAP form or equivalent, and been
awarded at least one Assurance point.
**Domain Control.** Domains addresses for
server certificates are verified by passing two of the following checks:
1. An Email-ping test is done on an email address chosen from *whois*
or interpolated from the domain name.
2. The system generates a cookie which is then placed in DNS by the
Member.
3. The system generates a cookie which is then placed in HTTP headers
or a text file on the website by the Member.
4. Statement by at least 2 Assurers about ownership/control of the
domain name.
5. The system generates a cookie which is then placed in whois registry
information by the Member.
Notes.
- Other methods can be added from time to time by CAcert.
- Static cookies should remain for the duration of a certificate for
occasional re-testing.
- Dynamic tests can be repeated at a later time of CAcert's choosing.
- Domain control checks may be extended to apply to email control in
the future.
- As of the time of writing, only a singular Email-ping is implemented
in the technical system.
- A further approved check is the 1 pt Assurance.
- Practically, this would mean that certificates can only be issued
under Audit Roots to Members with 1 point.
- Criteria DRC C.7.f, A.2.q, A.2.i indicate registry whois reading.
Also A.2.h.
- Current view is that this will be resolved in BirdShack.
#### 4.2.3. Options Available
The Member has options available:
- Each Email address that is verified is available for Client
Certificates.
- Each Domain address that is verified is available for Server
Certificates.
- If the Member is unassured then only the Member SubRoot is
available.
- If the Member is Assured then both Assured Member and Member
SubRoots are available.
- If a Name is Assured then it may be put in a client certificate or
an OpenPGP signature.
#### 4.2.4. Client Certificate Procedures
For an individual client certificate, the following is required.
- The email address is claimed and added.
- The email address is ping-tested.
- For the Member Subroot, the Member must have at least one point of
Assurance and have signed a CAP form.
- For the Assured Subroot, the Member must have at least fifty points
of Assurance.
- To include a Name, the Name must be assured to at least fifty
points.
#### 4.2.5. Server Certificate Procedures
For a server certificate, the following is required:
- The domain is claimed and added.
- The domain is checked twice as above.
- For the Member SubRoot, the Member must have at least one point of
Assurance and have signed a CAP form.
- For the Assured SubRoot, the Member must have at least fifty points
of Assurance.
#### 4.2.6. Code-signing Certificate Procedures
Code-signing certificates are made available to Assurers only. They are
processed in a similar manner to client certificates.
#### 4.2.7. Organisation Domain Verification
Organisation Domains are handled under the Organisation Assurance Policy
and the Organisation Handbook.
- As of time of writing, there is no Handbook for Organisation
Assurers or for the Organisation, and the policy needs rework; so
(audit) roots will not have OA certs ....
- [Drafts](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDrafts/OrganisationAssurance)
for ongoing story.
### 4.3. Certificate issuance
#### 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance
**Key Sizes.** Members may request keys of any size permitted by the key
algorithm. Many older hardware devices require small keys.
**Algorithms.** CAcert currently only supports the RSA algorithm for
X.509 keys. X.509 signing uses the SHA-1 message digest algorithm.
OpenPGP Signing uses RSA signing over RSA and DSA keys.
**Process for Certificates:** All details in each certificate are
verified by the website issuance system. Issuance is based on a
'template' system that selects profiles for certificate lifetime, size,
algorithm.
1. The CSR is verified.
2. Data is extracted from CSR and verified:
- Name §3.1,
- Email address [§4.2.2](#p4.2.2),
- Domain address [§4.2.2](#p4.2.2).
3. Certificate is generated from template.
4. Data is copied from CSR.
5. Certificate is signed.
6. Certificate is stored as well as mailed.
**Process for OpenPGP key signatures:** All details in each Sub-ID are
verified by the website issuance system. Issuance is based on the
configuration that selects the profile for signature lifetime, size,
algorithm following the process:
1. The public key is verified.
2. Data is extracted from the key and verified (Name, Emails). Only the
combinations of data in Table 4.3.1 are permitted.
3. OpenPGP Key Signature is generated.
4. Key Signature is applied to the key.
5. The signed key is stored as well as mailed.
|
Verified Name |
Unverified Name
|
Empty Name
|
Verified email
|
✔ |
✘ |
✔ |
| Unverified email |
✘ |
✘ |
✘ |
Empty email
|
✔ |
✘ |
✘ |
Table 4.3.1. Permitted Data in Signed OpenPgp
Keys
#### 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate
Once signed, the certificate is made available via the Member's account,
and emailed to the Member. It is also archived internally.
### 4.4. Certificate acceptance
#### 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
There is no need for the Member to explicitly accept the certificate. In
case the Member does not accept the certificate, the certificate has to
be revoked and made again.
#### 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA
CAcert does not currently publish the issued certificates in any
repository. In the event that CAcert will run a repository, the
publication of certificates and signatures there will be at the Member's
options. However note that certificates that are issued and delivered to
the Member are presumed to be published. See §2.2.
#### 4.4.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
There are no external entities that are notified about issued
certificates.
### 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage
All Members (subscribers and relying parties) are obliged according to
the CAcert Community Agreement
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html))
See especially 2.3 through 2.5.
#### 4.5.1. Subscriber Usage and Responsibilities
Subscribers should use keys only for their proper purpose, as indicated
by the certificate, or by wider agreement with others.
#### 4.5.2. Relying Party Usage and Responsibilities
Relying parties (Members) may rely on the following.
Relying Party Statement
Certificates are issued to Members only.
All information in a certificate is verified. |
The following notes are in addition to the Relying Party Statement, and
can be seen as limitations on it.
##### 4.5.2.a Methods of Verification
The term Verification as used in the Relying Party Statement means one
of
| Assurance |
under CAcert Assurance Programme (CAP) |
Assurance Policy |
only information assured to 50 points under CAP is placed in the
certificate |
| Evaluation |
under automated domain and email checks |
this CPS |
see §4.2.2 |
| Controlled |
programs or "profiles" that check the information within the
CSR |
this CPS |
see §7.1 |
##### 4.5.2.b Who may rely
**Members may rely.** Relying parties are Members, and as such are bound
by this CPS and the CAcert Community Agreement
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)).
The licence and permission to rely is not assignable.
**Suppliers of Software.** CAcert roots may be distributed in software,
and those providers may enter into agreement with CAcert by means of the
Third Party Vendor - Disclaimer and Licence (wip). This licence brings
the supplier in to the Community to the extent that
...WIP comment: they agree to dispute resolution within CAcert's
forum.
- Just exactly what the 3PV-DaL says is unclear.
- The document itself is more a collection of ideas.
**NRPs may not rely.** If not related to CAcert by means of an agreement
that binds the parties to dispute resolution within CAcert's forum, a
person is a Non-Related-Person (NRP). An NRP is not permitted to rely
and is not a Relying Party. For more details, see the Root Distribution
License
([COD14](https://www.cacert.org/policy/RootDistributionLicense.html)).
##### 4.5.2.c The Act of Reliance
**Decision making.** Reliance means taking a decision that is in part or
in whole based on the information in the certificate. A Relying Party
may incorporate the information in the certificate, and the implied
information such as Membership, into her decision-making. In making a
decision, a Relying Party should also:
- include her own overall risk equation,
- include the general limitations of the Assurance process,
certificates, and wider security considerations,
- make additional checks to provide more information,
- consider any wider agreement with the other Member, and
- use an appropriate protocol or custom of reliance (below).
**Examining the Certificate.** A Relying Party must make her own
decision in using each certificate. She must examine the certificate, a
process called *validation*. Certificate-related information includes,
but is not limited to:
- Name,
- expiry time of certificate,
- current certificate revocation list (CRL),
- certificate chain and the validity check of the certificates in the
chain,
- issuer of certificate (CAcert),
- SubRoot is intended for reliance (Assured, Organisation and Class 3)
- purpose of certificate.
**Keeping Records.** Records should be kept, appropriate to the import
of the decision. The certificate should be preserved. This should
include sufficient evidence to establish who the parties are
(especially, the certificate relied upon), to establish the transaction
in question, and to establish the wider agreement that defines the act.
**Wider Protocol.** In principle, reliance will be part of a wider
protocol (customary method in reaching and preserving agreement) that
presents and preserves sufficient of the evidence for dispute resolution
under CAcert's forum of Arbitration. The protocol should be agreed
amongst the parties, and tuned to the needs. This CPS does not define
any such protocol. In the absence of such a protocol, reliance will be
weakened; a dispute without sufficient evidence may be dismissed by an
Arbitrator.
**As Compared to Usage**. Reliance goes beyond Usage. The latter is
limited to letting the software act as the total and only Validation
Authority. When relying, the Member also augments the algorithmic
processing of the software with her own checks of the business,
technical and certificate aspect.
##### 4.5.2.d Risks and Limitations of Reliance
**Roots and Naming.** Where the Class 1 root is used, this Subscriber
may be a new Member including one with zero points. Where the Name is
not provided, this indicates it is not available. In these
circumstances, reliance is not defined, and Relying parties should take
more care. See Table 4.5.2.
|
Statements of Reliance for Members |
| Class of Root |
Anonymous
(all Members) |
Named
(Assured Members only) |
|
|
Class
1 |
Do not rely.
Relying party must use other methods to check. |
Do not rely. Although the named
Member has been Assured by CAcert, reliance is not defined with Class 1
root.
(issued for compatibility only). |
|
|
Member
SubRoot |
|
|
Class
3 |
Do not rely on the Name (being
available). The Member has been Assured by CAcert, but reliance is
undefined. |
The Member named in the certificate has been Assured by
CAcert. |
|
|
Assured
SubRoot |
|
|
Table 4.5.2. Statements of Reliance
**Software Agent.** When relying on a certificate, relying parties
should note that your software is responsible for the way it shows you
the information in a certificate. If your software agent hides parts of
the information, your sole remedy may be to choose another software
agent.
**Malware.** When relying on a certificate, relying parties should note
that platforms that are vulnerable to viruses or trojans or other
weaknesses may not process any certificates properly and may give
deceptive or fraudulent results. It is your responsibility to ensure you
are using a platform that is secured according to the needs of the
application.
##### 4.5.2.e When something goes wrong
In the event that an issue arises out of the Member's reliance, her sole
avenue is **to file dispute under DRP**. See [§9.13](#p9.13). For this
purpose, the certificate (and other evidence) should be preserved.
**Which person?** Members may install certificates for other individuals
or in servers, but the Member to whom the certificate is issued remains
the responsible person. E.g., under Organisation Assurance, an
organisation is issued a certificate for the use by individuals or
servers within that organisation, but the Organisation is the
responsible person.
**Software Agent.** If a Member is relying on a CAcert root embedded in
the software as supplied by a vendor, the risks, liabilities and
obligations of the Member do not automatically transfer to the vendor.
### 4.6. Certificate renewal
A certificate can be renewed at any time. The procedure of certificate
renewal is the same as for the initial certificate issuance.
### 4.7. Certificate re-key
Certificate "re-keyings" are not offered nor supported. A new
certificate with a new key has to be requested and issued instead, and
the old one revoked.
### 4.8. Certificate modification
Certificate "modifications" are not offered nor supported. A new
certificate has to be requested and issued instead.
### 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension
#### 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation
Certificates may be revoked under the following circumstances:
1. As initiated by the Subscriber through her online account.
2. As initiated in an emergency action by a support team member. Such
action will immediately be referred to dispute resolution for
ratification.
3. Under direction from the Arbitrator in a duly ordered ruling from a
filed dispute.
These are the only three circumstances under which a revocation occurs.
#### 4.9.2. Who can request revocation
As above.
#### 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request
The Subscriber logs in to her online account through the website at
http://www.cacert.org/ .
In any other event such as lost passwords or fraud, a dispute should be
filed by email at \< support AT cacert DOT org \>
#### 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period
No stipulation.
#### 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
The revocation automated in the Web Interface for subscribers, and is
handled generally in less than a minute.
A filed dispute that requests a revocation should be handled within a
five business days, however the Arbitrator has discretion.
#### 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
Each revoked certificate is recorded in the certificate revocation list
(CRL). Relying Parties must check a certificate against the most recent
CRL issued, in order to validate the certificate for the intended
reliance.
#### 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency (if applicable)
A new CRL is issued after every certificate revocation.
#### 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable)
The maximum latency between revocation and issuance of the CRL is 1
hour.
#### 4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
OCSP is available at http://ocsp.cacert.org/ .
#### 4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements
Relying parties must check up-to-date status before relying.
#### 4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
None.
#### 4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise
Subscribers are obliged to revoke certificates at the earliest
opportunity.
#### 4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension
Suspension of certificates is not available.
#### 4.9.14. Who can request suspension
Not applicable.
#### 4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request
Not applicable.
#### 4.9.16. Limits on suspension period
Not applicable.
### 4.10. Certificate status services
#### 4.10.1. Operational characteristics
OCSP is available at http://ocsp.cacert.org/ .
#### 4.10.2. Service availability
OCSP is made available on an experimental basis.
#### 4.10.3. Optional features
No stipulation.
### 4.11. End of subscription
Certificates include expiry dates.
### 4.12. Key escrow and recovery
#### 4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices
CAcert does not generate nor escrow subscriber keys.
#### 4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
No stipulation.
## 5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS
### 5.1. Physical controls
Refer to Security Policy
([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
- Site location and construction - SP2.1
- Physical access - SP2.3
#### 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning
Refer to Security Policy 2.1.2
([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
#### 5.1.4. Water exposures
Refer to Security Policy 2.1.4
([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
#### 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection
Refer to Security Policy 2.1.4
([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
#### 5.1.6. Media storage
Refer to Security Policy 4.3
([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
#### 5.1.7. Waste disposal
No stipulation.
#### 5.1.8. Off-site backup
Refer to Security Policy 4.3
([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
### 5.2. Procedural controls
#### 5.2.1. Trusted roles
- **Technical teams:**
- User support personnel
- Systems Administrators -- critical and non-critical
- Softare Developers
- controllers of keys
Refer to Security Policy 9.1
([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
- **Assurance:**
- Assurers
- Any others authorised under COD13
Refer to Assurance Policy
([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html))
- **Governance:**
- Directors (members of the CAcert Inc. committee, or "Board")
- Internal Auditor
- Arbitrator
#### 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task
CAcert operates to the principles of *four eyes* and *dual control*. All
important roles require a minimum of two persons. The people may be
tasked to operate with an additional person observing (*four eyes*), or
with two persons controlling (*dual control*).
#### 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role
All important roles are generally required to be assured at least to the
level of Assurer, as per AP. Refer to Assurance Policy
([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)).
**Technical.** Refer to Security Policy 9.1
([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html)).
#### 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties
Roles strive in general for separation of duties, either along the lines
of *four eyes principle* or *dual control*.
### 5.3. Personnel controls
#### 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
| Role |
Policy |
Comments |
| Assurer |
COD13 |
Passes Challenge, Assured to 100 points. |
| Organisation Assurer |
COD11 |
Trained and tested by two supervising OAs. |
| Technical |
SM => COD08 |
Teams responsible for testing. |
| Arbitrator |
COD7 |
Experienced Assurers. |
Table 5.3.1. Controls on Roles
#### 5.3.2. Background check procedures
Refer to Security Policy 9.1.3
([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html)).
#### 5.3.3. Training requirements
No stipulation.
#### 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements
No stipulation.
#### 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence
No stipulation.
#### 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions
Any actions that are questionable - whether uncertain or grossly
negligent - may be filed as a dispute. The Arbitrator has wide
discretion in ruling on loss of points, retraining, or termination of
access or status. Refer to DRP.
#### 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements
No stipulation.
#### 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel
No stipulation.
### 5.4. Audit logging procedures
Refer to Security Policy 4.2, 5
([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html)).
### 5.5. Records archival
The standard retention period is 7 years. Once archived, records can
only be obtained and verified by means of a filed dispute. Following
types of records are archived:
| Record |
Nature |
Exceptions |
Documentation |
| Member |
username, primary and added addresses, security questions, Date of
Birth |
resigned non-subscribers: 0 years. |
Security Policy and Privacy Policy |
| Assurance |
CAP forms |
"at least 7 years."
as per subsidiary policies |
Assurance Policy 4.5 |
| Organisation Assurance |
COAP forms |
as per subsidiary policies |
Organisation Assurance Policy |
| certificates and revocations |
for reliance |
7 years after termination |
this CPS |
| critical roles |
background check worksheets |
under direct Arbitrator control |
Security Policy 9.1.3 |
Table 5.5. Documents and Retention
### 5.6. Key changeover
Refer to Security Policy 9.2
([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html)).
### 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery
Refer to Security Policy 5, 6
([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html)).
(Refer to [§1.4](#p1.4) for limitations to service.)
### 5.8. CA or RA termination
#### 5.8.1 CA termination
If CAcert should terminate its operation or be taken over by another
organisation, the actions will be conducted according to a plan approved
by the CAcert Inc. Board.
In the event of operational termination, the Roots (including SubRoots)
and all private Member information will be secured. The Roots will be
handed over to a responsible party for the sole purpose of issuing
revocations. Member information will be securely destroyed.
The CA cannot be transferrred to another
organisation.
In the event of takeover, the Board will decide if it is in the
interest of the Members to be converted to the new organisation. Members
will be notified about the conversion and transfer of the Member
information. Such takeover, conversion or transfer may involve
termination of this CPS and other documents. See §9.10.2. Members will
have reasonable time in which to file a related dispute after
notification (at least one month). See §9.13.
- The ability to transfer is not given in any of CCA, PP or AP!
- The Board does not have the power to terminate a policy, that is the
role of policy group!
- The right to transfer was against the principles of the CAcert?
- Check Association Statutes....
New root keys and certificates will be made
available by the new organisation as soon as reasonably
practical.
#### 5.8.2 RA termination
When an Assurer desires to voluntarily terminates her responsibilities,
she does this by filing a dispute, and following the instructions of the
Arbitrator.
In the case of involuntary termination, the process is the same, save
for some other party filing the dispute.
## 6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
### 6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation
#### 6.1.1. Key Pair Generation
Subscribers generate their own Key Pairs.
#### 6.1.2. Subscriber Private key security
There is no technical stipulation on how Subscribers generate and keep
safe their private keys, however, CCA 2.5 provides for general security
obligations. See [§9.6](#p9.6).
#### 6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer
Members login to their online account. Public Keys are delivered by
cut-and-pasting them into the appropriate window. Public Keys are
delivered in signed-CSR form for X.509 and in self-signed form for
OpenPGP.
#### 6.1.4. CA Public Key delivery to Relying Parties
The CA root certificates are distributed by these means:
- Published on the website of CAcert, in both HTTP and HTTPS.
- Included in Third-Party Software such as Browsers, Email-Clients.
Such suppliers are subject to the Third Party Vendor Agreement.
Third Party Vendor Agreement is early wip, only
#### 6.1.5. Key sizes
No limitation is placed on Subscriber key sizes.
CAcert X.509 root and intermediate keys are currently 4096 bits. X.509
roots use RSA and sign with the SHA-1 message digest algorithm. See
[§4.3.1](#p4.3.1).
OpenPGP Signing uses both RSA and DSA (1024 bits).
CAcert adds larger keys and hashes in line with general cryptographic
trends, and as supported by major software suppliers.
- old Class 3 SubRoot is signed with MD5
- likely this will clash with future plans of vendors to drop
acceptance of MD5
- Is this a concern?
- to users who have these certs, a lot?
- to audit, not much?
#### 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
No stipulation.
#### 6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes
- This section probably needs to detail the key usage bits in the
certs.
CAcert roots are general purpose. Each root key may sign all of the
general purposes - client, server, code.
The website controls the usage purposes that may be signed. This is
effected by means of the 'template' system.
### 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls
#### 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
SubRoot keys are stored on a single machine which acts as a
Cryptographic Module, or *signing server*. It operates a single daemon
for signing only. The signing server has these security features:
- It is connected only by one dedicated (serial USB) link to the
online account server. It is not connected to the network, nor to
any internal LAN (ethernet), nor to a console switch.
- The protocol over the dedicated link is a custom, simple request
protocol that only handles certificate signing requests.
- The daemon is designed not to reveal the key.
- The daemon incorporates a dead-man switch that monitors the one
webserver machine that requests access.
- The daemon shuts down if a bad request is detected.
- The daemon resides on an encrypted partition.
- The signing server can only be (re)started with direct systems
administration access.
- Physical Access to the signing server is under dual control.
See §5. and the Security Policy 9.3.1.
(Hardware-based, commercial and standards-based cryptographic modules
have been tried and tested, and similar have been tested, but have been
found wanting, e.g., for short key lengths and power restrictions.)
1. What document is responsible for architecture? CPS? SM?
[website](https://wiki.cacert.org/HELP/7)? SM punts it to CPS, so
above stays.
2. There is no criteria on Architecture.
3. Old questions moved to SM.
4. See [CAcert Root key protection](https://wiki.cacert.org/HELP/7)
which should be deprecated by this CPS.
### 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management
#### 6.3.1. Public key archival
Subscriber certificates, including public keys, are stored in the
database backing the online system. They are not made available in a
public- or subscriber-accessible archive, see §2. They are backed-up by
CAcert's normal backup procedure, but their availability is a subscriber
responsibility.
#### 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
The operational period of a certificate and its key pair depends on the
Assurance status of the Member, see [§1.4.5](#p1.4.5) and Assurance
Policy ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)).
The CAcert (top-level) Root certificate has a 30 year expiry. SubRoots
have 10 years, and are to be rolled over more quickly. The keysize of
the root certificates are chosen in order to ensure an optimum security
to CAcert Members based on current recommendations from the
[cryptographic community](http://www.keylength.com/) and maximum limits
in generally available software. At time of writing this is 4096 bits.
### 6.4. Activation data
No stipulation.
### 6.5. Computer security controls
Refer to Security Policy.
### 6.6. Life cycle technical controls
Refer to SM7 "Software Development".
### 6.7. Network security controls
Refer to SM3.1 "Logical Security - Network".
### 6.8. Time-stamping
Each server synchronises with NTP. No "timestamping" service is
currently offered.
- How does the signing server syncronise if only connected over
serial?
- How is timestamping done on records?
## 7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES
CAcert defines all the meanings, semantics and profiles applicable to
issuance of certificates and signatures in its policies, handbooks and
other documents. Meanings that may be written in external standards or
documents or found in wider conventions are not incorporated, are not
used by CAcert, and must not be implied by the Member or the Non-related
Person.
### 7.1. Certificate profile
#### 7.1.1. Version number(s)
What versions of PGP are signed? v3? v4?
Issued X.509 certificates are of v3 form. The form of the PGP signatures
depends on several factors, therefore no stipulation.
#### 7.1.2. Certificate extensions
Client certificates include the following extensions:
- basicConstraints=CA:FALSE (critical)
- keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyEncipherment,keyAgreement (critical)
- extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection,clientAuth,msEFS,msSGC,nsSGC
- authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org
- crlDistributionPoints=URI:\ where \ is replaced
with the URI where the certificate revocation list relating to the
certificate is found
- subjectAltName=(as per [§3.1.1.](#p3.1.1)).
- what about Client Certificates Adobe Signing extensions ?
- SubjectAltName should become critical if DN is removed
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.6
Server certificates include the following extensions:
- basicConstraints=CA:FALSE (critical)
- keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyEncipherment,keyAgreement (critical)
- extendedKeyUsage=clientAuth,serverAuth,nsSGC,msSGC
- authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org
- crlDistributionPoints=URI:\ where \ is replaced
with the URI where the certificate revocation list relating to the
certificate is found
- subjectAltName=(as per [§3.1.1.](#p3.1.1)).
Code-Signing certificates include the following extensions:
- basicConstraints=CA:FALSE (critical)
- keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyEncipherment,keyAgreement (critical)
- extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection,clientAuth,codeSigning,msCodeInd,msCodeCom,msEFS,msSGC,nsSGC
- authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org
- crlDistributionPoints=URI:\ where \ is replaced
with the URI where the certificate revocation list relating to the
certificate is found
- subjectAltName=(as per [§3.1.1.](#p3.1.1)).
- what about subjectAltName for Code-signing
OpenPGP key signatures currently do not include extensions. In the
future, a serial number might be included as an extension.
#### 7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers
No stipulation.
#### 7.1.4. Name forms
Refer to [§3.1.1](#p3.1.1).
#### 7.1.5. Name constraints
Refer to [§3.1.1](#p3.1.1).
#### 7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier
The following OIDs are defined and should be incorporated into
certificates:
| OID |
Type/Meaning |
Comment |
| 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.4.4 |
Certification Practice Statement |
(this present document) |
Versions are defined by additional numbers appended such as .1.
#### 7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension
No stipulation.
#### 7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics
No stipulation.
#### 7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension
No stipulation.
### 7.2. CRL profile
#### 7.2.1. Version number(s)
CRLs are created in X.509 v2 format.
#### 7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions
No extensions.
### 7.3. OCSP profile
#### 7.3.1. Version number(s)
The OCSP responder operates in Version 1.
#### 7.3.2. OCSP extensions
No stipulation.
## 8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS
There are two major threads of assessment:
- **Systems Audit**. Analyses the CA for business and operations
security. This is conducted in two phases: documents for compliance
with criteria, and operations for compliance with documentation.
- **Code Audit**. Analyses the source code. This is conducted at two
levels: Security concepts at the web applications level, and source
code security and bugs review.
See the Audit page at
[wiki.cacert.org/Audit/](https://wiki.cacert.org/Audit/) for more
information.
### 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment
The first audits started in late 2005, and since then, assessments have
been an ongoing task. Even when completed, they are expected to be
permanent features.
- **Systems Audit**. The first phase of the first
audit is nearing completion. The second phase starts in earnest when
documentation is in effect, at lease as DRAFT under PoP. As the
second phase is dependent on this CPS and the Security Policy, they
will be in effect as DRAFT at least before the first audit is
completed. Only prior and completed audits can be reported here.
- **Code Audit**. A complete review of entire source
code has not yet been completed.
### 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor
**Systems Auditors.** CAcert uses business systems auditors with broad
experience across the full range of business, information systems and
security fields. In selecting a business systems auditor, CAcert looks
for experience that includes but is not limited to cryptography, PKI,
governance, auditing, compliance and regulatory environments, business
strategy, software engineering, networks, law (including
multijurisdictional issues), identity systems, fraud, IT management.
**Code Auditors.** See Security Policy, sections 7, 9.1.
### 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity
Specific internal restrictions on audit personnel:
- Must be Assured by CAcert Assurers and must be background checked.
- Must not have been active in any (other) role in CAcert.
Specifically, must not be an Assurer, a member of the association,
or in any other defined role or office.
- Although the Auditor may be expected to undertake various of the
activities (Assurance, Training) during the process of the audit,
any results are frozen until resignation as auditor is effected.
- The Auditor is required to declare to CAcert all potential conflicts
of interest on an ongoing basis.
Specific external restrictions on audit personnel:
- Should have a verifiable and lengthy history in user privacy and
user security.
- Must not have worked for a competitive organisation.
- Must not have worked for national security, intelligence, LEO or
similar agencies.
An Auditor may convene an audit team. The same restrictions apply in
general to all members of the team, but may be varied. Any deviations
must be documented and approved by the CAcert Inc. Board.
### 8.4. Topics covered by assessment
Systems Audits are generally conducted to criteria. CAcert requires that
the criteria are open:
- Published. The criteria must be reviewable by all interested
parties.
- Understandable. They should be understandable, in that they provide
the sufficient information in a readable form for interested parties
to follow the gist and importance. (Arcane security criteria may
stretch this requirement.)
- Complete. There must be sufficent background information that the
whole story is there. Especially, criteria that refer to
undocumented practices or conventions deliberately kept secret must
be avoided.
- Applicable. The criteria should relate directly and unambiguously to
a need of the identified interested parties (Members, Relying
Parties, Subscribers, Assurers).
See [DRC](http://rossde.com/CA_review/) for the current criteria. If
Auditor determines that a criteria fails to follow the meet the above
requirements, then the criteria should be reworked to conform, or should
be dropped (both with explanatory notes).
### 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency
See the current [Audit Done list](https://wiki.cacert.org/Audit/Done)
for work completed, and [Audit Todo
list](https://wiki.cacert.org/AuditToDo) for work in progress.
Auditor may issue directives instructing changes, where essential to
audit success or other extreme situations. Directives should be grounded
on criteria, on established minimum or safe practices, or clearly
described logic. Adequate discussion with Community (e.g., CAcert Inc.
Board and with Policy Group) should precede any directive. They should
be presented to the same standard as the criteria, above.
The
[wiki.cacert.org/AuditDirectives](https://wiki.cacert.org/AuditDirectives)
documents issued directives and actions.
### 8.6. Communication of results
Current and past Audit information is available at
[wiki.CAcert.org/Audit/](https://wiki.cacert.org/Audit/). CAcert runs an
open disclosure policy and Audit is no exception.
This CPS and other documents are subject to the process in Policy on
Policy ([COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html)).
Audits cover the overall processes more than any one document, and
documents may vary even as Audit reports are delivered.
## 9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS
### 9.1. Fees
The current fees structure is posted at
[wiki.cacert.org/Price](https://wiki.cacert.org/Price). Changes to the
fees structure will be announced from time to time on the
[blog](https://blog.cacert.org/). CAcert retains the right to charge
fees for services. All fees are non-refundable.
### 9.2. Financial responsibility
Financial risks are dealt with primarily by the Dispute Resolution
Policy
([COD7](https://www.cacert.org/policy/DisputeResolutionPolicy.html)).
#### 9.2.1. Insurance coverage
No stipulation.
#### 9.2.2. Other assets
No stipulation.
#### 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities
No stipulation.
### 9.3. Confidentiality of business information
#### 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information
CAcert has a policy of transparency and openness. The default posture is
that information is public to the extent possible, unless covered by
specific policy provisions (for example, passwords) or rulings by
Arbitrator.
### 9.4. Privacy of personal information
Privacy is covered by the CCA (COD9) and the Privacy Policy
([COD5](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PrivacyPolicy.html)).
#### 9.4.1. Privacy plan
No stipulation.
#### 9.4.2. Information treated as private
Member's Date of Birth and "Lost Password" questions are treated as
fully private.
#### 9.4.3. Information not deemed private
To the extent that information is put into an issued certificate, that
information is not deemed private, as it is expected to be published by
the Member as part of routine use of the certificate. Such information
generally includes Names, domains, email addresses, and certificate
serial numbers.
Under Assurance Policy
([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)) the
Member's status (as Assured, Assurer, etc) is available to other
Members.
Information placed in forums outside the online system (wiki, blogs,
policies, etc) is not deemed private, and is generally deemed to be
published as contributions by Members. See CCA1.3 (COD9).
#### 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information
CAcert is a privacy organisation and takes privacy more seriously. Any
privacy issue may be referred to dispute resolution.
#### 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information
Members are permitted to rely on certificates of other Members. As a
direct consequence of the general right to rely, Members may read and
store the certificates and/or the information within them, where duly
presented in a relationship, and to the extent necessary for the agreed
relationship.
#### 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
Any disclosure pursuant to process from foreign courts (or similar) is
controlled by the Arbitrator.
#### 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances
None.
### 9.5. Intellectual property rights
CAcert is committed to the philosophy of an open and free Internet,
broadly as encapsulated by open and free source. However, due to the
strict control provisions imposed by the audit criteria (CCS), and the
general environment and role of CAs, and the commitment to security of
Members, some deviations are necessary.
#### 9.5.1. Ownership and Licence
Assets that fall under the control of CCS must be transferred to CAcert.
See PoP 6.2
([COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html#6.2)), CCA 1.3
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#1.3)).
That is, CAcert is free to use, modify, distribute, and otherwise
conduct the business of the CA as CAcert sees fit with the asset.
#### 9.5.2. Brand
The brand of CAcert is made up of its logo, name, trademark, service
marks, etc. Use of the brand is strictly limited by the Board, and
permission is required. See
[m20070917.5](https://wiki.cacert.org/TopMinutes-20070917).
#### 9.5.3. Documents
CAcert owns or requires full control over its documents, especially
those covered by CCS. See PoP 6.2
([COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html#6.2)).
Contributors transfer the rights, see CCA 1.3
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#1.3)).
Contributors warrant that they have the right to transfer.
Documents are generally licensed under free and open licence. See
[wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDrafts/DocumentLicence](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDrafts/DocumentLicence).
Except where explicitly negotiated, CAcert extends back to contributors
a non-exclusive, unrestricted perpetual licence, permitting them to to
re-use their original work freely. See PoP 6.4
([COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html#6.4)), CCA 1.3
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#1.3)).
#### 9.5.4. Code
CAcert owns its code or requires full control over code in use by means
of a free and open licence. See CCS.
See the (new, wip)
[SourceCodeManifesto](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Software/BirdShack/Documents/SourceCodeManifesto.html).
Maybe this can replace these two paras?
CAcert licenses its code under GPL. CAcert extends back to contributors
a non-exclusive, unrestricted perpetual licence, permitting them to to
re-use their original work freely.
#### 9.5.5. Certificates and Roots
CAcert asserts its intellectual property rights over certificates issued
to Members and over roots. See CCA 4.4
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#4.4)),
CCS. The certificates may only be used by Members under
[COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#4.4),
and, by others under the licences offered, such as Root Distribution
License
([COD14](https://www.cacert.org/policy/RootDistributionLicense.html)).
### 9.6. Representations and warranties
**Members.** All Members of the Community agree to the CAcert Community
Agreement
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)),
which is the primary document for representations and warranties.
Members include Subscribers, Relying Parties, Registration Agents and
the CA itself.
**RAs.** Registration Agents are obliged additionally by Assurance
Policy, especially 3.1, 4.1
([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)).
**CA.** The CA is obliged additionally by the CCS.
**Third Party Vendors.** Distributors of the roots are offered the wip 3rd-Party Vendors - Disclaimer and Licence (3PV-DaL
=\> CODx) and are offered wip the same deal as
Members to the extent that they agree to be Members in the Community.
wip
### 9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties
Persons who have not accepted the above Agreements are offered the Root
Distribution License
([COD14](https://www.cacert.org/policy/RootDistributionLicense.html)).
Any representations and warranties are strictly limited to nominal
usage. In essence, NRPs may USE but must not RELY.
In today's aggressive fraud environment, and within the context of
CAcert as a community CA, all parties should understand that CAcert and
its Subscribers, Assurers and other roles provide service on a Best
Efforts basis. See [§1.4](#p1.4). CAcert seeks to provide an adequate
minimum level of quality in operations for its Members without undue
risks to NRPs. See
[Principles](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/principles.html).
CAcert on behalf of the Community and itself makes no Warranty nor
Guarantee nor promise that the service or certificates are adequate for
the needs and circumstances.
### 9.8. Limitations of liability
### 9.8.1 Non-Related Persons
CAcert on behalf of related parties (RAs, Subscribers, etc) and itself
disclaims all liability to NRPs in their usage of CA's certificates. See
[COD4](https://www.cacert.org/policy/RootDistributionLicense.html).
### 9.8.2 Liabilities Between Members
Liabilities between Members are dealt with by internal dispute
resolution, which rules on liability and any limits. See [§9.13](#9.13).
### 9.9. Indemnities
No stipulation.
### 9.10. Term and termination
#### 9.10.1. Term
No stipulation.
#### 9.10.2. Termination
Members file a dispute to terminate their agreement. See [§9.13](#p9.13)
and CCA 3.3
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#3.3)).
Documents are varied (including terminated) under
[COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html).
For termination of the CA, see [§5.8.1](#p5.8.1).
#### 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival
No stipulation.
### 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants
All participants are obliged to keep their listed primary email
addresses in good working order. See CCA 3.5
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#3.5)).
### 9.12. Amendments
Amendments to the CPS are controlled by
[COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html). Any changes
in Member's Agreements are notified under CCA 3.4
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#3.4)).
### 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions
CAcert provides a forum and facility for any Member or other related
party to file a dispute.
- The CAcert Dispute Resolution Policy
([COD7](https://www.cacert.org/policy/DisputeResolutionPolicy.html))
includes rules for dispute resolution.
- Filing is done via email to \< support AT cacert DOT org \>
Members agree to file all disputes through CAcert's forum for dispute
resolution. The rules include specific provisions to assist non-Members,
etc, to file dispute in this forum.
### 9.14. Governing law
The governing law is that of New South Wales, Australia. Disputes are
generally heard before the Arbitrator under this law. Exceptionally, the
Arbitrator may elect to apply the law of the parties and events, where
in common, but this is unlikely because it may create results that are
at odds with the Community.
### 9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law
### 9.15.1 Digital Signature Law
The Commonwealth and States of Australia have passed various Electronic
Transactions Acts that speak to digital signatures. In summary, these
acts follow the "technology neutral" model and permit but do not
regulate the use of digital signatures.
This especially means that the signatures created by certificates issued
by CAcert are not in and of themselves legally binding human signatures,
at least according to the laws of Australia. See [§1.4.3](#p1.4.3).
However, certificates may play a part in larger signing applications.
See [§1.4.1](#p1.4.1) for "digital signing" certificates. These
applications may impose significant obligations, risks and liabilities
on the parties.
### 9.15.2 Privacy Law
See the Privacy Policy
([COD5](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PrivacyPolicy.html)).
### 9.15.3 Legal Process from External Forums
CAcert will provide information about its Members only under legal
subpoena or equivalent process from a court of competent jurisdiction.
Any requests made by legal subpoena are treated as under the Dispute
Resolution Policy See [§9.13](#p9.13) and
[COD7](https://www.cacert.org/policy/DisputeResolutionPolicy.html). That
is, all requests are treated as disputes, as only a duly empanelled
Arbitrator has the authorisation and authority to rule on the such
requests.
A subpoena should include sufficient legal basis to support an
Arbitrator in ruling that information be released pursuant to the
filing, including the names of claimants in any civil case and an
indication as to whether the claimants are Members or not (and are
therefore subject to Dispute Resolution Policy).
### 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions
#### 9.16.1. Entire agreement
All Members of the Community agree to the CAcert Community Agreement
([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)).
This agreement also incorporates other key documents, being this CPS,
DRP and PP. See CCA 4.2.
The Configuration-Control Specification is the set of policies that rule
over the Community, of which the above documents are part. See COD2.
Documents that have reached full POLICY status are located at
[www.cacert.org/policy/](https://www.cacert.org/policy/). Although
detailed practices may be found in other places on the website and on
the wiki, the CCS documents that have reached DRAFT and POLICY status
are the ruling documents.
2nd half of this section can be transfered over to PoP,
only a reference to PoP 5.4 to remain (see [Changes to PoP
p20130223](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDecisions#p20130223))
#### 9.16.2. Assignment
The rights within CCA may not be ordinarily assigned.
#### 9.16.3. Severability
No stipulation.
#### 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
The Arbitrator will specify fees and remedies, if any.
#### 9.16.5. Force Majeure
No stipulation.
## ---This is the end of the Policy---
