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<h1>CAcert CPS and CP</h1>
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Name: CPS <a style="color: steelblue" href="https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/ControlledDocumentList.html">COD6</a>
<br>
Creation Date : 20060726, drafted at 20091108
<br>
Editor: NN
<br>
Status: POLICY <a href="https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDecisions#p20140731">p20140731</a>
<br>
Licence: <a style="color: steelblue" href="https://wiki.cacert.org/Policy#Licence" title="this document is Copyright © CAcert Inc., licensed openly under CC-by-sa with all disputes resolved under DRP. More at wiki.cacert.org/Policy">CC-by-sa+DRP</a>
</td>
<td align="right" valign="top">
<a href="https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.php">
<img src="images/cacert-policy.png" alt="CPS Status - POLICY" style="border-style: none;" height="31" width="88">
</a>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<font size="-1">
<ol>
<li> <a href="#p1">INTRODUCTION</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#p1.1">1.1. Overview</a></li>
<li><a href="#p1.2">1.2. Document name and identification</a></li>
<li><a href="#p1.3">1.3. PKI participants</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p1.4">1.4. Certificate usage</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p1.5">1.5. Policy administration</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p1.6">1.6. Definitions and acronyms</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li> <a href="#p2">PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#p2.1">2.1. Repositories</a></li>
<li><a href="#p2.2">2.2. Publication of certification information</a></li>
<li><a href="#p2.3">2.3. Time or frequency of publication</a></li>
<li><a href="#p2.4">2.4. Access controls on repositories</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li> <a href="#p3">IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (I&amp;A)</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#p3.1">3.1. Naming</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p3.2">3.2. Initial Identity Verification</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p3.3">3.3. I&amp;A for Re-key Requests</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p3.4">3.4. I&amp;A for Revocation Request</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#p4">CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#p4.1">4.1. Certificate Application</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p4.2">4.2. Certificate application processing</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p4.3">4.3. Certificate issuance</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p4.4">4.4. Certificate acceptance</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p4.5">4.5. Key pair and certificate usage</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p4.6">4.6. Certificate renewal</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p4.7">4.7. Certificate re-key</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p4.8">4.8. Certificate modification</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p4.9">4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p4.10">4.10. Certificate status services</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p4.11">4.11. End of subscription</a></li>
<li><a href="#p4.12">4.12. Key escrow and recovery</a> </li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#p5">FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#p5.1">5.1. Physical controls</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p5.2">5.2. Procedural controls</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p5.3">5.3. Personnel controls</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p5.4">5.4. Audit logging procedures</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p5.5">5.5. Records archival</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p5.6">5.6. Key changeover</a></li>
<li><a href="#p5.7">5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p5.8">5.8. CA or RA termination</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#p6">TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#p6.1">6.1. Key pair generation and installation</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p6.2">6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p6.3">6.3. Other aspects of key pair management</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p6.4">6.4. Activation data</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p6.5">6.5. Computer security controls</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p6.6">6.6. Life cycle technical controls</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p6.7">6.7. Network security controls</a></li>
<li><a href="#p6.8">6.8. Time-stamping</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#p7">CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#p7.1">7.1. Certificate profile</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p7.2">7.2. CRL profile</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p7.3">7.3. OCSP profile</a> </li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#p8">COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#p8.1">8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment</a></li>
<li><a href="#p8.2">8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor</a></li>
<li><a href="#p8.3">8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity</a></li>
<li><a href="#p8.4">8.4. Topics covered by assessment</a></li>
<li><a href="#p8.5">8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency</a></li>
<li><a href="#p8.6">8.6. Communication of results</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#p9">OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#p9.1">9.1. Fees</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p9.2">9.2. Financial responsibility</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p9.3">9.3. Confidentiality of business information</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p9.4">9.4. Privacy of personal information</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p9.5">9.5. Intellectual property rights</a></li>
<li><a href="#p9.6">9.6. Representations and warranties</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p9.7">9.7. Disclaimers of warranties</a></li>
<li><a href="#p9.8">9.8. Limitations of liability</a></li>
<li><a href="#p9.9">9.9. Indemnities</a></li>
<li><a href="#p9.10">9.10. Term and termination</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p9.11">9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants</a></li>
<li><a href="#p9.12">9.12. Amendments</a> </li>
<li><a href="#p9.13">9.13. Dispute resolution provisions</a></li>
<li><a href="#p9.14">9.14. Governing law</a></li>
<li><a href="#p9.15">9.15. Compliance with applicable law</a></li>
<li><a href="#p9.16">9.16. Miscellaneous provisions</a> </li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
</font>
<!-- *************************************************************** -->
<h2 id="p1">1. INTRODUCTION</h2>
<h3 id="p1.1">1.1. Overview</h3>
<p>
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of
CAcert, the Community Certification Authority (CA).
It describes rules and procedures used by CAcert for
operating its CA,
and applies to all CAcert PKI Participants,
including Assurers, Members, and CAcert itself.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<h3 id="p1.2">1.2. Document name and identification</h3>
<p>
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of CAcert.
The CPS also fulfills the role of the Certificate Policy (CP)
for each class of certificate.
</p>
<ul>
<li>
This document is COD6 under CAcert Official Documents numbering scheme.
</li>
<li>
The document is structured according to
Chokhani, et al,
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3647.txt">RFC3647</a>,
<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3647#section-4">chapter 4</a>.
All headings derive from that Chapter.
</li>
<li>
It has been improved and reviewed (or will be reviewed)
to meet or exceed the criteria of the
<cite>Certificate Authority Review Checklist</cite>
from <i>David E. Ross</i> ("DRC")
and Mozilla Foundation's CA policy.
</li>
<li>
OID assigned to this document: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.4.4.x (x=approved Version)
(<a href="http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers">iana.org</a>)
</li>
<li>
© CAcert Inc. 2006-2009.
<!-- note that CCS policies must be controlled by CAcert Inc. -->
</li>
<li>
Earlier notes were written by Christian Barmala
in a document placed under GNU Free Document License
and under FSF copyright.
However this clashed with the control provisions of
Configuration-Control Specification
(COD2) within Audit criteria.
</li>
</ul>
<p>
The CPS is an authoritive document,
and rules other documents
except where explicitly deferred to.
See also <a href="#p1.5.1">1.5.1 Organisation Administering the Document</a>.
</p>
<h3 id="p1.3">1.3. PKI participants</h3>
<p>
The CA is legally operated by CAcert Incorporated,
an Association registered in 2002 in
New South Wales, Australia,
on behalf of the wider Community of Members of CAcert.
The Association details are at the
<a href="http://wiki.cacert.org/wiki/CAcertIncorporated">CAcert wiki</a>.
</p>
<p>
CAcert is a Community formed of Members who agree to the
<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.php">
CAcert Community Agreement</a>.
The CA is technically operated by the Community,
under the direction of the Board of CAcert Incorporated.
(The Members of the Community are not to be confused
with the <i>Association Members</i>, which latter are
not referred to anywhere in this CPS.)
</p>
<h4 id="p1.3.1">1.3.1. Certification authorities</h4>
<p>
CAcert does not issue certificates to external
intermediate CAs under the present CPS.
</p>
<h4 id="p1.3.2">1.3.2. Registration authorities</h4>
<p>
Registration Authorities (RAs) are controlled under Assurance Policy
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.php">COD13</a>).
</p>
<h4 id="p1.3.3">1.3.3. Subscribers</h4>
<p>
CAcert issues certificates to Members only.
Such Members then become Subscribers.
</p>
<h4 id="p1.3.4">1.3.4. Relying parties</h4>
<p>
A relying party is a Member,
having agreed to the
CAcert Community Agreement
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.php">COD9</a>),
who, in the act of using a CAcert certificate,
makes a decision on the basis of that certificate.
</p>
<h4 id="p1.3.5">1.3.5. Other participants</h4>
<p>
<b>Member.</b>
Membership of the Community is as defined in the
<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.php">COD9</a>.
Only Members may RELY or may become Subscribers.
Membership is free.
</p>
<p>
<b>Arbitrator.</b>
A senior and experienced Member of the CAcert Community
who resolves disputes between Members, including ones
of certificate reliance, under
Dispute Resolution Policy
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/DisputeResolutionPolicy.php">COD7</a>).
</p>
<p>
<b>Vendor.</b>
Software suppliers who integrate the root certificates of CAcert
into their software also assume a proxy role of Relying Parties,
and are subject to another licence.
</p>
<p>
<b>Non-Related Persons</b> (NRPs).
These are users of browsers and similar software who are
unaware of the CAcert certificates they may use, and
are unaware of the ramifications of usage.
Their relationship with CAcert
is described by the
Non-related Persons - Disclaimer and Licence
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/NRPDisclaimerAndLicence.php">COD4</a>).
No other rights nor relationship is implied or offered.
</p>
<h3 id="p1.4">1.4. Certificate usage</h3>
<p>CAcert serves as issuer of certificates for
individuals, businesses, governments, charities,
associations, churches, schools,
non-governmental organisations or other groups.
CAcert certificates are intended for low-cost
community applications especially where volunteers can
become Assurers and help CAcert to help the Community.
</p>
<p>
Types of certificates and their appropriate and
corresponding applications are defined in
<a href="#p1.4.1">§1.4.1</a>.
Prohibited applications are defined in <a href="#p1.4.2">§1.4.2</a>.
Specialist uses may be agreed by contract or within
a specific environment, as described in
<a href="#p1.4.4">§1.4.4</a>.
Note also the
unreliable applications in
<a href="#p1.4.3">§1.4.3</a>
and risks, liabilities and obligations in
<a href="#p9">§9</a>.
</p>
<center>
<table border="1" cellpadding="5">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td colspan="2">
<center><i>Type</i></center>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<center><i>Appropriate Certificate uses</i></center>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th>General</th>
<th>Protocol</th>
<th>
<center>Description</center>
</th>
<th>
<center>Comments</center>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2">
<center>Server</center>
</td>
<td> TLS </td>
<td> web server encryption </td>
<td> enables encryption </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td> embedded </td>
<td> embedded server authentication </td>
<td> mail servers, IM-servers </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="4">
<center>Client</center>
</td>
<td> S/MIME </td>
<td> email encryption </td>
<td> "digital signatures" employed in S/MIME
are not legal / human signatures,
but instead enable the encryption mode of S/MIME </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td> TLS </td>
<td> client authentication </td>
<td> the nodes must be secure </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td> TLS </td>
<td> web based signature applications </td>
<td> the certificate authenticates only. See <a href="#p1.4.3">§1.4.3</a>. </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td> "Digital Signing" </td>
<td> for human signing over documents </td>
<td> Only within a wider application and rules
such as by separate policy,
as agreed by contract, etc.
See <a href="#p1.4.4">§1.4.4</a>.
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<center>Code</center>
</td>
<td> Authenticode, ElfSign, Java </td>
<td> Code Signing </td>
<td> Signatures on packages are evidence of their Membership and indicative of Identity </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<center>PGP</center>
</td>
<td> OpenPGP </td>
<td> Key Signing </td>
<td> Signatures on Member Keys are evidence of their Membership and indicative of Identity </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<center>Special</center>
</td>
<td> X.509 </td>
<td> OCSP, Timestamping </td>
<td> Only available to CAcert Systems Administrators, as controlled by Security Policy </td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<span class="figure">Table 1.4. Types of Certificate</span>
</center>
<h4 id="p1.4.1">1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses</h4>
<p>
General uses.
</p>
<ul>
<li>
CAcert server certificates can be used to enable encryption
protection in web servers.
Suitable applications include webmail and chat forums.
</li>
<li>
CAcert server certificates can be used to enable encryption
in SSL/TLS links in embedded protocols such as mail servers
and IM-servers.
</li>
<li>
CAcert client certificates can be used to enable encryption
protection in email clients.
(See <a href="#p1.4.3">§1.4.3</a> for caveat on signatures.)
</li>
<li>
CAcert client certificates can be used to replace password-based
authentication to web servers.
</li>
<li>
OpenPGP keys with CAcert signatures can be used
to encrypt and sign files and emails,
using software compatible with OpenPGP.
</li>
<li>
CAcert client certificates can be used in web-based
authentication applications.
</li>
<li>
CAcert code signing certificates can be used to sign code
for distribution to other people.
</li>
<li>
Time stamping can be used to attach a time record
to a digital document.
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="p1.4.2">1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses</h4>
<p>
CAcert certificates are not designed, intended, or authorised for
the following applications:
</p>
<ul>
<li>
Use or resale as control equipment in hazardous circumstances
or for uses requiring fail-safe performance such as the operation
of nuclear facilities, aircraft navigation or communication systems,
air traffic control systems, or weapons control systems,
where failure could lead directly to death, personal injury,
or severe environmental damage.
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="p1.4.3">1.4.3. Unreliable Applications</h4>
<p>
CAcert certificates are not designed nor intended for use in
the following applications, and may not be reliable enough
for these applications:
</p>
<ul>
<li>
<b>Signing within Protocols.</b>
Digital signatures made by CAcert certificates carry
<u>NO default legal or human meaning</u>.
See <a href="#p9.15.1">§9.15.1</a>.
Especially, protocols such as S/MIME commonly will automatically
apply digital signatures as part of their protocol needs.
The purpose of the cryptographic signature in S/MIME
and similar protocols is limited by default to strictly
protocol security purposes:
to provide some confirmation that a familiar certificate
is in use, to enable encryption, and to ensure the integrity
of the email in transit.
</li>
<li>
<b>Non-repudiation applications.</b>
Non-repudiation is not to be implied from use of
CAcert certificates. Rather, certificates may
provide support or evidence of actions, but that
evidence is testable in any dispute.
</li>
<li>
<b>Ecommerce applications.</b>
Financial transactions or payments or valuable e-commerce.
</li>
<li>
Use of anonymous (Class 1 or Member SubRoot) certificates
in any application that requires or expects identity.
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="p1.4.4">1.4.4. Limited certificate uses</h4>
<p>
By contract or within a specific environment
(e.g. internal to a company),
CAcert Members are permitted to use Certificates
for higher security, customised or experimental applications.
Any such usage, however, is limited to such entities
and these entities take on the whole responsible for
any harm or liability caused by such usage.
</p>
<p>
<b>Digital signing applications.</b>
CAcert client certificates
may be used by Assured Members in
applications that provide or support the human signing of documents
(known here as "digital signing").
This must be part of a wider framework and set of rules.
Usage and reliance
must be documented either under a separate CAcert digital signing
policy or other external regime agreed by the parties.
</p>
<h4 id="p1.4.5">1.4.5. Roots and Names</h4>
<p>
<b>Named Certificates.</b>
Assured Members may be issued certificates
with their verified names in the certificate. In this role, CAcert
operates and supports a network of Assurers who verify the
identity of the Members.
All Names are verified, either by Assurance or another defined
method under policy (c.f. Organisations).
</p>
<p>
<b>Anonymous Certificates.</b>
Members can be issued certificates that are anonymous,
which is defined as the certificate with no Name included,
or a shared name such as "Community Member".
These may be considered to be somewhere between Named certificates
and self-signed certificates. They have serial numbers in them
which is ultimately traceable via dispute to a Member, but
reliance is undefined.
In this role, CAcert provides the
infrastructure, saving the Members from managing a difficult
and messy process in order to get manufactured certificates.
</p>
<p>
<b>Psuedonymous Certificates.</b>
Note that CAcert does not currently issue pseudonymous certificates,
being those with a name chosen by the Member and not verifiable
according to documents.
</p>
<p>
<b>Advanced Certificates.</b>
Members who are as yet unassured are not permitted to create
advanced forms such as wildcard or subjectAltName
certificates.
</p>
<p>
<b> Roots.</b>
The CAcert root layout is as below.
These roots are pending Audit,
and will be submitted to vendors via the (Top-level) Root.
</p>
<ul>
<li>
<b>(Top-level) Root.</b>
Used to sign on-line CAcert SubRoots only.
This Root is kept offline.
</li>
<li>
<b>Member SubRoot.</b>
For Community Members who are new and unassured (some restrictions exist).
Reliance is undefined.
(Replacement for the Class 1 root, matches "Domain Validation" type.)
</li>
<li>
<b>Assured SubRoot.</b>
Only available for Assured individual Members,
intended to sign certificates with Names.
Suitable for Reliance under this and other policies.
Approximates the type known as Individual Validation.
</li>
<li>
<b>Organisation SubRoot.</b>
Only available for Assured Organisation Members.
Suitable for Reliance under this and other policies.
Approximates the type known as Organisational Validation.
</li>
</ul>
<center>
<table border="1" cellpadding="5">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td colspan="5">
<center><i>Level of Assurance</i></center>
</td>
<th> </th>
</tr>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th colspan="2">
<center> Members † </center>
</th>
<th colspan="2">
<center> Assured Members</center>
</th>
<th colspan="1">
<center> Assurers </center>
</th>
<th colspan="1">
<center> </center>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><i>Class of Root</i></td>
<th>Anon</th>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Anon</td>
<th>Name</th>
<td>Name+Anon</td>
<td colspan="1">
<center><i>Remarks</i></center>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<center>Top level
<br>
<big><b>Root</b></big></center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td> Signs other CAcert SubRoots only. </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<center><big><b>Member</b></big>
<br>
SubRoot</center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td> † For Members meeting basic checks in <a href="#p4.2.2">§4.2.2</a>
<br>
(Reliance is undefined.) </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<center><big><b>Assured</b></big>
<br>
SubRoot</center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td> Assured Members only.
<br>
Fully intended for reliance. </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<center><big><b>Organisation</b></big>
<br>
SubRoot</center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td> Assured Organisation Members only.
<br>
Fully intended for reliance. </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th>Expiry of Certificates</th>
<td colspan="2">
<center>6 months</center>
</td>
<td colspan="3">
<center>24 months</center>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<td colspan="2">
<center>client, server</center>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<center>wildcard, subjectAltName</center>
</td>
<td colspan="1">
<center>code-signing</center>
</td>
<td> (Inclusive to the left.) </td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<span class="figure">Table 1.4.5.b Certificate under Audit Roots</span>
</center>
<center>
<table border="1" cellpadding="5">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td colspan="4">
<center><i>Level of Assurance</i></center>
</td>
<th> </th>
</tr>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th colspan="2">
<center>Members</center>
</th>
<th colspan="2">
<center>Assured Members</center>
</th>
<th colspan="1">
<center> </center>
</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><i>Class of Root</i></td>
<th>Anonymous</th>
<td>Named</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<th>Named</th>
<td colspan="1">
<center><i>Remarks</i></center>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<center>Class
<br>
<big><b>1</b></big></center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td> Available for all Members,
<br>
reliance is undefined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<center>Class
<br>
<big><b>3</b></big></center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td> Assured Members only.
<br>
Intended for Reliance. </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th>Expiry of Certificates</th>
<td colspan="2">
<center>6 months</center>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<center>24 months</center>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th>Types available</th>
<td colspan="2">
<center>simple only</center>
</td>
<td colspan="2">
<center>wildcard, subjectAltName</center>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<span class="figure">Table 1.4.5. Certificates under Old Roots - <b>Audit Fail</b> </span>
</center>
<p>
<b> Old Roots.</b>
The old CAcert root layout is as below. These roots are <b>Audit Fail</b>
and will only be used where new roots do not serve:
</p>
<ul>
<li>
(old) <b>Class 1 root.</b>
Used primarily for certificates with no names and by
unassured Members.
For compatibility only,
Assured Members may also use this root.
</li>
<li>
(old) <b>Class 3 root.</b>
Used primarily for certificates including the names
of Assured Members.
Signed by Class 1 root.
Members can decide to rely on these
certificates for Assured Members
by selecting the Class 3 root for
Assured Members as trust anchor.
</li>
</ul>
<h3 id="p1.5">1.5. Policy administration</h3>
<p>See <a href="#p1.2">1.2 Document Name and Identification</a>
for general scope of this document.</p>
<h4 id="p1.5.1">1.5.1. Organization administering the document</h4>
<p>
This document is administered by the policy group of
the CAcert Community under Policy on Policy (<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.php">COD1</a>).
</p>
<h4 id="p1.5.2">1.5.2. Contact person</h4>
<p>
For questions including about this document:
</p>
<ul>
<li>Join the policy group, by means of the discussion forum at
<a href="http://lists.cacert.org/mailman/listinfo">
lists.cacert.org</a> . </li>
<li>Send email to &lt; support AT cacert DOT org &gt; </li>
<li>IRC: irc.cacert.org #CAcert (ssl port 7000, non-ssl port 6667)</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="p1.5.3">1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy</h4>
<p>
This CPS and all other policy documents are managed by
the policy group, which is a group of Members of the
Community found at policy forum. See discussion forums above.
</p>
<h4 id="p1.5.4">1.5.4. CPS approval procedures</h4>
<p>
CPS is controlled and updated according to the
Policy on Policy
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.php">COD1</a>)
which is part of
Configuration-Control Specification (COD2).
</p>
<p>
In brief, the policy forum prepares and discusses.
After a last call, the document moves to DRAFT status
for a defined period.
If no challenges have been received in the defined period,
it moves to POLICY status.
The process is modelled after some elements of
the RFC process by the IETF.
</p>
<h4 id="p1.5.5">1.5.5. CPS updates</h4>
<p>
As per above.
</p>
<h3 id="p1.6">1.6. Definitions and acronyms</h3>
<p>
<b><a name="d_cert" id="d_cert">Certificate</a></b>.
A certificate is a piece of cryptographic data used
to validate certain statements, especially those of
identity and membership.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="d_cacert" id="d_cacert">CAcert</a></b>.
CAcert is a Community certificate authority as defined under
<a href="#p1.2">§1.2 Identification</a>.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="d_member" id="d_member">Member</a></b>.
Everyone who agrees to the
CAcert Community Agreement
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.php">COD9</a>).
This generally implies having an account registered
at CAcert and making use of CAcert's data, programs or services.
A Member may be an individual ("natural person")
or an organisation (sometimes, "legal person").
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="d_community" id="d_community">Community</a></b>.
The group of Members who agree to the
CAcert Community Agreement
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.php">COD9</a>)
or equivalent agreements.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="d_unassured" id="d_unassured">Unassured Member</a></b>.
A Member who has not yet been Assured.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="d_subscriber" id="d_subscriber">Subscriber</a></b>.
A Member who requests and receives a certificate.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="d_assured" id="d_assured">Assured Member</a></b>.
A Member whose identity has been sufficiently
verified by Assurers or other
approved methods under Assurance Policy.</p>
<p></p>
<p>
<b><a name="d_assurer" id="d_assurer">Assurer</a></b>.
An Assured Member who is authorised under Assurance Policy
to verify the identity of other Members.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="d_name" id="d_name">Name</a></b>.
As defined in the
Assurance Policy
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.php">COD13</a>),
to describe a name of a Member
that is verified by the Assurance process.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="d_oadmin" id="d_oadmin">Organisation Administrator</a></b>.
("O-Admin")
An Assurer who is authorised to act for an Organisation.
The O-Admin is authorised by an organisation
to vouch for the identity of other users of the organisation.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="d_org_ass" id="d_org_ass">Organisation Assurer</a></b>.
An Assurer who is authorised to conduct assurances on
organisations.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="d_user" id="d_user">Non-Related Persons</a></b>.
("NRPs")
are general users of browsers and similar software.
The NRPs are generally unaware of
CAcert or the certificates that they may use, and
are unaware of the ramifications of usage.
They are not permitted to RELY, but may USE, under the
Non-Related Persons - Disclaimer and Licence (<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/NRPDisclaimerAndLicence.php">COD4</a>).
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="rel" id="d_reliance">Reliance</a></b>.
An industry term referring to
the act of making a decision, including taking a risk,
which decision is in part or in whole
informed or on the basis of the contents of a certificate.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="rel" id="rel">Relying Party</a></b>.
An industry term refering to someone who relies
(that is, makes decisions or takes risks)
in part or in whole on a certificate.
</p>
<p>
<b>Subscriber Naming.</b>
The term used in this CPS to
describe all naming data within a certificate.
Approximately similar terms from Industry such as
"Subject naming" and "Distinguished Name"
are not used here.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="ver" id="d_verification">Verification</a></b>.
An industry term referring to
the act of checking and controlling
the accuracy and utility of a single claim.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="ver" id="d_validation">Validation</a></b>.
An industry term referring to the process of
inspecting and verifying the information and
subsidiary claims behind a claim.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="rel" id="rel">Usage</a></b>.
The event of allowing a certificate to participate in
a protocol, as decided and facilitated by a user's software.
Generally, Usage does not require significant input, if any,
on the part of the user.
This defers all decisions to the user software,
thus elevating the software as user's only and complete
Validation Authority or Agent.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="drel" id="drel">CAcert Relying Party</a></b>.
CAcert Members who make decisions based in part or in whole
on a certificate issued by CAcert.
Only CAcert Members are permitted to Rely on CAcert certificates,
subject to the CAcert Community Agreement.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="ddst" id="ddst">Vendors</a></b>.
Non-members who distribute CAcert's root or intermediate certificates
in any way, including but not limited to delivering these
certificates with their products, e.g. browsers, mailers or servers.
Vendors are covered under a separate licence.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="d_ccs" id="d_ccs">Configuration-Control Specification</a></b> "CCS".
The audit criteria that controls this CPS.
The CCS is documented in COD2, itself a controlled document under CCS.
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="d_cod" id="d_cod">CAcert Official Document</a></b> (COD).
Controlled Documents that are part of the CCS.
</p>
<!-- *************************************************************** -->
<h2 id="p2">2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES</h2>
<h3 id="p2.1">2.1. Repositories</h3>
<p>
CAcert operates no repositories in the sense
of lookup for non-certificate-related information
for the general public.
</p>
<p>
Under the Assurance Policy (<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.php">COD13</a>),
there are means for Members to search, retrieve
and verify certain data about themselves and others.
</p>
<h3 id="p2.2">2.2. Publication of certification information</h3>
<p>
CAcert publishes:
</p>
<ul>
<li>A repository of CRLs. An OCSP responder is in operation.</li>
<li>The root certificate and intermediate certificates.</li>
</ul>
<p>
CAcert does not expressly publish information on issued certificates.
However, due to the purpose of certificates, and the essential
public nature of Names and email addresses, all information within
certificates is presumed to be public and published, once
issued and delivered to the Member.
</p>
<h3 id="p2.3">2.3. Time or frequency of publication</h3>
<p>
Root and Intermediate Certificates and CRLs are
made available on issuance.
</p>
<h3 id="p2.4">2.4. Access controls on repositories</h3>
<p> No stipulation. </p>
<!-- *************************************************************** -->
<h2 id="p3">3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION</h2>
<h3 id="p3.1">3.1. Naming</h3>
<h4 id="p3.1.1">3.1.1. Types of names</h4>
<p>
<b>Client Certificates.</b>
The Subscriber Naming consists of:
</p>
<ul>
<li><tt>subjectAltName=</tt>
One, or more, of the Subscriber's verified email addresses,
in rfc822Name format.
</li>
<li><tt>EmailAddress=</tt>
One, or more, of the Subscriber's verified email addresses.
This is deprecated under
RFC5280 <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.6">4
.2.1.6</a>
and is to be phased out. Also includes a SHA1 hash of a random number if
the member selects SSO (Single Sign On ID) during submission of CSR.
</li>
<li><tt>CN=</tt> The common name takes its value from one of:
<ul>
<li>
For all Members,
the string "<tt>CAcert WoT Member</tt>" may be used for
anonymous certificates.
</li>
<li>
For individual Members,
a Name of the Subscriber,
as Assured under AP.
</li>
<li>
For Organisation Members,
an organisation-chosen name,
as verified under OAP.
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>
<b>Individual Server Certificates.</b>
The Subscriber Naming consists of:
</p>
<ul>
<li><tt>CN=</tt>
The common name is the host name out of a domain
for which the Member is a domain master.
</li>
<li>
<tt>subjectAltName=</tt>
Additional host names for which the Member
is a domain master may be added to permit the
certificate to serve multiple domains on one IP number.
</li>
<li>
All other fields are optional and must either match
the CN or they must be empty
</li>
</ul>
<p>
<b>Certificates for Organisations.</b>
In addition to the above, the following applies:
</p>
<ul>
<li><tt>OU=</tt>
organizationalUnitName (set by O-Admin, must be verified by O-Admin).</li>
<li><tt>O=</tt>
organizationName is the fixed name of the Organisation.</li>
<li><tt>L=</tt>
localityName</li>
<li><tt>ST=</tt>
stateOrProvinceName</li>
<li><tt>C=</tt>
countryName</li>
<li><tt>contact=</tt>
EMail Address of Contact.
</li>
</ul>
<p>
Except for the OU and CN, fields are taken from the Member's
account and are as verified by the Organisation Assurance process.
Other Subscriber information that is collected and/or retained
does not go into the certificate.
</p>
<h4 id="p3.1.2">3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful</h4>
<p>
Each Member's Name (<tt>CN=</tt> field)
is assured under the Assurance Policy (<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.php">COD13</a>)
or subsidiary policies (such as Organisation Assurance Policy).
Refer to those documents for meanings and variations.
</p>
<p>
Anonymous certificates have the same <code>subject</code>
field common name.
See <a href="#p1.4.5">§1.4.5.</a>.
</p>
<p>
Email addresses are verified according to
<a href="#p4.2.2">§4.2.2.</a>
</p>
<h4 id="p3.1.3">3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers</h4>
<p>
See <a href="#p1.4.5">§1.4.5</a>.
</p>
<h4 id="p3.1.4">3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms</h4>
<p>
Interpretation of Names is controlled by the Assurance Policy,
is administered by means of the Member's account,
and is subject to change by the Arbitrator.
Changes to the interpretation by means of Arbitration
should be expected as fraud (e.g., phishing)
may move too quickly for policies to fully document rules.
</p>
<h4 id="p3.1.5">3.1.5. Uniqueness of names</h4>
<p>
Uniqueness of Names within certificates is not guaranteed.
Each certificate has a unique serial number which maps
to a unique account, and thus maps to a unique Member.
See the Assurance Statement within Assurance Policy
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.php">COD13</a>).
</p>
<p>
Domain names and email address
can only be registered to one Member.
</p>
<h4 id="p3.1.6">3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks</h4>
<p>
Organisation Assurance Policy
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/OrganisationAssurancePolicy.php">COD11</a>)
controls issues such as trademarks where applicable.
A trademark can be disputed by filing a dispute.
See
<a href="#adr">§9.13</a>.
</p>
<h4 id="p3.1.7">3.1.7. International Domain Names</h4>
<p>
Certificates containing International Domain Names, being those containing a
ACE prefix (<a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3490#section-5">RFC3490
Section 5</a>), will only be issued to domains satisfying one or more
of the following conditions:
</p>
<ul>
<li>The Top Level Domain (TLD) Registrar associated with the domain has a policy
that has taken measures to prevent two homographic domains being registered to
different entities down to an accepted level.
</li>
<li>Domains contain only code points from a single unicode character script,
excluding the "Common" script, with the additionally allowed numberic
characters [0-9], and an ACSII hyphen '-'.
</li>
</ul>
<p></p>
<p>Email address containing International Domain Names in the domain portion of
the email address will also be required to satisfy one of the above conditions.
</p>
<p>
The following is a list of accepted TLD Registrars:
</p>
<table>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.ac</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.ac/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.ac/pdf/AC-IDN-Policy.pdf">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.ar</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.ar/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.ar/616.html">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.at</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.at/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.at/en/service/legal_information/registration_guidelines/">Policy</a> (<a href="http://www.nic.at/en/service/technical_information/idn/charset_converter/">character list</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.biz</td>
<td><a href="http://www.neustarregistry.biz/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.neustarregistry.biz/products/idns">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.br</td>
<td><a href="http://registro.br/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://registro.br/faq/faq6.html">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.cat</td>
<td><a href="http://www.domini.cat/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.domini.cat/normativa/en_normativa_registre.html">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.ch</td>
<td><a href="http://www.switch.ch/id/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.switch.ch/id/terms/agb.html#anhang1">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.cl</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.cl/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.cl/CL-IDN-policy.html">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.cn</td>
<td><a href="http://www.cnnic.net.cn/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3743.html">Policy</a> (JET Guidelines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.de</td>
<td><a href="http://www.denic.de/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.denic.de/en/richtlinien.html">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.dk</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dk-hostmaster.dk/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.dk-hostmaster.dk/index.php?id=151">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.es</td>
<td><a href="https://www.nic.es/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="https://www.nic.es/media/2008-12/1228818323935.pdf">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.fi</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ficora.fi/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.ficora.fi/en/index/palvelut/fiverkkotunnukset/aakkostenkaytto.html">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.gr</td>
<td><a href="https://grweb.ics.forth.gr/english/index.html">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="https://grweb.ics.forth.gr/english/ENCharacterTable1.jsp">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.hu</td>
<td><a href="http://www.domain.hu/domain/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.domain.hu/domain/English/szabalyzat.html">Policy</a> (section 2.1.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.info</td>
<td><a href="http://www.afilias.info/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.afilias.info/register/idn/">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.io</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.io/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.io/IO-IDN-Policy.pdf">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.ir</td>
<td><a href="https://www.nic.ir/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="https://www.nic.ir/IDN">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.is</td>
<td><a href="http://www.isnic.is/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.isnic.is/english/domain/rules.php">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.jp</td>
<td><a href="http://jprs.co.jp/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.iana.org/assignments/idn/jp-japanese.html">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.kr</td>
<td><a href="http://domain.nic.or.kr/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3743.html">Policy</a> (JET Guidelines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.li</td>
<td><a href="http://www.switch.ch/id/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.switch.ch/id/terms/agb.html#anhang1">Policy</a> (managed by .ch registry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.lt</td>
<td><a href="http://www.domreg.lt/public?pg=&amp;sp=&amp;loc=en">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.domreg.lt/public?pg=8A7FB6&amp;sp=idn&amp;loc=en">Policy</a> (<a href="http://www.domreg.lt/static/doc/public/idn_symbols-en.pdf">character list</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.museum</td>
<td><a href="http://about.museum/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://about.museum/idn/idnpolicy.html">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.no</td>
<td><a href="http://www.norid.no/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.norid.no/domeneregistrering/veiviser.en.html">Policy</a> (section 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.org</td>
<td><a href="http://www.pir.org/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://pir.org/PDFs/ORG-Extended-Characters-22-Jan-07.pdf">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.pl</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nask.pl/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.dns.pl/IDN/idn-registration-policy.txt">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.pr</td>
<td><a href="https://www.nic.pr/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="https://www.nic.pr/idn_rules.asp">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.se</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic-se.se/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.iis.se/en/domaner/internationaliserad-doman-idn/">Policy</a> (<a href="http://www.iis.se/docs/teckentabell-03.pdf">character list</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.sh</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.sh/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.sh/SH-IDN-Policy.pdf">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.th</td>
<td><a href="http://www.thnic.or.th/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.iana.org/assignments/idn/th-thai.html">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.tm</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.tm/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.nic.tm/TM-IDN-Policy.pdf">Policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.tw</td>
<td><a href="http://www.twnic.net.tw/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3743.html">Policy</a> (JET Guidelines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.vn</td>
<td><a href="http://www.vnnic.net.vn/">Registry</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.vnnic.vn/english/5-6-300-2-2-04-20071115.htm">Policy</a> (<a href="http://vietunicode.sourceforge.net/tcvn6909.pdf">character list</a>)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p></p>
<p>
This criteria will apply to the email address and server host name fields for all certificate types.
</p>
<p>
The CAcert Inc. Board has the authority to decide to add or remove accepted TLD Registrars on this list.
</p>
<h3 id="p3.2">3.2. Initial Identity Verification</h3>
<p>
Identity verification is controlled by the
<a href="https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html">
Assurance Policy</a> (<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.php">COD13</a>).
The reader is refered to the Assurance Policy,
the following is representative and brief only.
</p>
<h4 id="p3.2.1">3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key</h4>
<p>
CAcert uses industry-standard techniques to
prove the possession of the private key.
</p>
<p>
For X.509 server certificates,
the stale digital signature of the CSR is verified.
For X.509 client certificates for "Netscape" browsers,
SPKAC uses a challenge-response protocol
to check the private key dynamically.
For X.509 client certificates for "explorer" browsers,
ActiveX uses a challenge-response protocol
to check the private key dynamically.
</p>
<h4 id="p3.2.2">3.2.2. Authentication of Individual Identity</h4>
<p>
<b>Agreement.</b>
An Internet user becomes a Member by agreeing to the
CAcert Community Agreement
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.php">COD9</a>)
and registering an account on the online website.
During the registration process Members are asked to
supply information about themselves:
</p>
<ul>
<li>A valid working email.
</li>
<li>Full Name and Date of Birth such as is
found on Identity documents.
</li>
<li>Personal Questions used only for Password Retrieval.</li>
</ul>
<p>
The online account establishes the method of authentication
for all service requests such as certificates.
</p>
<p>
<b>Assurance.</b>
Each Member is assured according to Assurance Policy
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.php">COD13</a>).
</p>
<p>
<b>Certificates.</b>
Based on the total number of Assurance Points
that a Member (Name) has, the Member
can get different levels of certificates.
See <a href="#p1.4.5">§1.4.5</a>.
See Table 3.2.b.
When Members have 50 or more points, they
become <i>Assured Members</i> and may then request
certificates that state their Assured Name(s).
</p>
<br>
<br>
<center>
<table border="1" cellpadding="5">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Assurance Points</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Unassured Member</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Certificates with no Name, under Class 1 Root. Limited to 6 months expiry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-49</td>
<td>Unassured Member</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Certificates with no Name under Member SubRoot. Limited to 6 months expiry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="1">50-99</td>
<td>Assured Member</td>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>Certificates with Verified Name for S/MIME, web servers, "digital signing."
Expiry after 24 months is available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2">100++</td>
<td rowspan="2">Assurer</td>
<td>Code-signing</td>
<td>Can create Code-signing certificates </td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<span class="figure">Table 3.2.b - How Assurance Points are used in Certificates</span>
</center>
<br>
<h4 id="p3.2.3">3.2.3. Authentication of organization identity</h4>
<p>
Verification of organisations is delegated by
the Assurance Policy to the
Organisation Assurance Policy
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/OrganisationAssurancePolicy.php">COD11</a>).
The reader is refered to the Organisation Assurance Policy,
the following is representative and brief only.
</p>
<p>
Organisations present special challenges.
The Assurance process for Organisations is
intended to permit the organisational Name to
appear in certificates.
The process relies heavily on the Individual
process described above.
</p>
<p>
Organisation Assurance achieves the standard
stated in the OAP, briefly presented here:
</p>
<ol type="a">
<li>
the organisation exists,
</li>
<li>
the organisation name is correct and consistent,
</li>
<li>
signing rights: requestor can sign on behalf of the organisation, and
</li>
<li>
the organisation has agreed to the terms of the
CAcert Community Agreement
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.php">COD9</a>),
and is therefore subject to Arbitration.
</li>
</ol>
<h4 id="p3.2.4">3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information</h4>
<p>
All information in the certificate is verified,
see Relying Party Statement, §4.5.2.
</p>
<h4 id="p3.2.5">3.2.5. Validation of authority</h4>
<p>
The authorisation to obtain a certificate is established as follows:
</p>
<p>
<b>Addresses.</b>
The member claims authority over a domain or email address
when adding the address, <a href="#p4.1.2">§4.1.2</a>.
(Control is tested by means described in <a href="#p4.2.2">§4.2.2</a>.)
</p>
<p>
<b>Individuals.</b>
The authority to participate as a Member is established
by the CAcert Community Agreement
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.php">COD9</a>).
Assurances are requested by means of the signed CAP form.
</p>
<p>
<b>Organisations.</b>
The authority for Organisation Assurance is established
in the COAP form, as signed by an authorised representative
of the organisation.
The authority for the
Organisation Administrator
(O-Admin) is also established on the
COAP form.
See Organisation Assurance Policy.
</p>
<h4 id="p3.2.6">3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation</h4>
<p>
CAcert does not currently issue certificates to subordinate CAs
or other PKIs.
Other CAs may become Members, and are then subject to the
same reliance provisions as all Members.
</p>
<h3 id="p3.3">3.3. Re-key Requests</h3>
<p>
Via the Member's account.
</p>
<h3 id="p3.4">3.4. Revocations Requests</h3>
<p>
Via the Member's account.
In the event that the Member has lost the password,
or similar, the Member emails the support team who
either work through the lost-password questions
process or file a dispute.
</p>
<!-- *************************************************************** -->
<h2 id="p4">4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS</h2>
<p>
The general life-cycle for a new certificate for an Individual Member is:
</p>
<ol>
<li>
Member adds claim to an address (domain/email).
</li>
<li>
System probes address for control.
</li>
<li>
Member creates key pair.
</li>
<li>
Member submits CSR with desired options (Anonymous Certificate, SSO, Root Certificate) .
</li>
<li>
System validates and accepts CSR based on
known information: claims, assurance, controls, technicalities.
</li>
<li>
System signs certificate.
</li>
<li>
System makes signed certificate available to Member.
</li>
<li>
Member accepts certificate.
</li>
</ol>
<p></p>
<p>
(Some steps are not applicable, such as anonymous certificates.)
</p>
<h3 id="p4.1">4.1. Certificate Application</h3>
<h4 id="p4.1.1">4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application</h4>
<p>
Members may submit certificate applications.
On issuance of certificates, Members become Subscribers.
</p>
<h4 id="p4.1.2">4.1.2. Adding Addresses</h4>
<p>
The Member can claim ownership or authorised control of
a domain or email address on the online system.
This is a necessary step towards issuing a certificate.
There are these controls:
</p>
<ul>
<li>
The claim of ownership or control is legally significant
and may be referred to dispute resolution.
</li>
<li>
Each unique address can be handled by one account only.
</li>
<li>
When the Member makes the claim,
the certificate application system automatically initiates the
check of control, as below.
</li>
</ul>
<p></p>
<h4 id="p4.1.3">4.1.3. Preparing CSR </h4>
<p>
Members generate their own key-pairs.
The CAcert Community Agreement
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.php">COD9</a>)
obliges the Member as responsible for security.
See CCA2.5, §9.6.
</p>
<p>
The Certificate Signing Request (CSR) is prepared by the
Member for presentation to the automated system.
</p>
<h3 id="p4.2">4.2. Certificate application processing</h3>
<!-- states what a CA does on receipt of the request -->
<p>
The CA's certificate application process is completely automated.
Requests, approvals and rejections are handled by the website system.
Each application should be processed in less than a minute.
</p>
<p>
Where certificates are requested for more than one
purpose, the requirements for each purpose must be
fulfilled.
</p>
<!-- all sub headings in 4.2 are local, not from Chokhani. -->
<h4 id="p4.2.1">4.2.1. Authentication </h4>
<p>
The Member logs in to her account on the CAcert website
and thereby authenticates herself with username
and passphrase or with her CAcert client-side digital certificate.
</p>
<h4 id="p4.2.2">4.2.2. Verifying Control</h4>
<p>
In principle, at least two controls are placed on each address.
</p>
<p>
<b><a name="ping">Email-Ping</a>.</b>
Email addresses are verified by means of an
<i><a name="ping">Email-Ping test</a></i>:
</p>
<ul>
<li>
The system generates a cookie
(a random, hard-to-guess code)
and formats it as a string.
</li>
<li>
The system sends the cookie
to the Member in an email.
</li>
<li>
Once the Member receives the email,
she enters the cookie into the website.
</li>
<li>
The entry of the code verifies
control of that email account.
</li>
</ul>
<p>
<b><a name="email">Email Control</a>.</b>
Email addresses for client certificates are verified by passing the
following checks:
</p>
<ol>
<li>An Email-ping test
is done on the email address.
</li>
<li>The Member must have signed a CAP form or equivalent,
and been awarded at least one Assurance point.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
<b><a name="domain">Domain Control</a>.</b>
Domains addresses for server certificates are verified by passing two of the
following checks:
</p>
<ol>
<li>
An Email-ping test
is done on an email address chosen from <i>whois</i>
or interpolated from the domain name.
</li>
<li>
The system generates a cookie
which is then placed in DNS
by the Member.
</li>
<li>
The system generates a cookie
which is then placed in HTTP headers or a text file on the website
by the Member.
</li>
<li>
Statement by at least 2 Assurers about
ownership/control of the domain name.
</li>
<li>
The system generates a cookie
which is then placed in whois registry information
by the Member.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
Notes.
</p>
<ul>
<li>
Other methods can be added from time to time by CAcert.
</li>
<li>
Static cookies should remain for the duration of a certificate
for occasional re-testing.
</li>
<li>
Dynamic tests can be repeated at a later time of CAcert's choosing.
</li>
<li>
Domain control checks may be extended to apply to email control
in the future.
</li>
</ul>
<p></p>
<h4 id="p4.2.3">4.2.3. Options Available</h4>
<p>
The Member has options available:
</p>
<ul>
<li>Each Email address that is verified
is available for Client Certificates.
</li>
<li>Each Domain address that is verified
is available for Server Certificates.
</li>
<li>If the Member is unassured then only the Member SubRoot is available.
</li>
<li>If the Member is Assured then both Assured Member and Member SubRoots
are available.
</li>
<li>If a Name is Assured then it may be
put in a client certificate or an OpenPGP signature.
</li>
</ul>
<h4 id="p4.2.4">4.2.4. Client Certificate Procedures</h4>
<p>
For an individual client certificate, the following is required.
</p>
<ul>
<li>The email address is claimed and added. </li>
<li>The email address is ping-tested. </li>
<li>For the Member Subroot, the Member must have
at least one point of Assurance and have signed a CAP form.</li>
<li>For the Assured Subroot, the Member must have
at least fifty points of Assurance. </li>
<li>To include a Name, the Name must be assured to at least fifty points. </li>
</ul>
<p></p>
<h4 id="p4.2.5">4.2.5. Server Certificate Procedures</h4>
<p>
For a server certificate, the following is required:
</p>
<ul>
<li>The domain is claimed and added. </li>
<li>The domain is checked twice as above. </li>
<li>For the Member SubRoot, the Member must have
at least one point of Assurance and have signed a CAP form.</li>
<li>For the Assured SubRoot, the Member must have
at least fifty points of Assurance. </li>
</ul>
<p></p>
<h4 id="p4.2.6">4.2.6. Code-signing Certificate Procedures</h4>
<p>
Code-signing certificates are made available to Assurers only.
They are processed in a similar manner to client certificates.
</p>
<h4 id="p4.2.7">4.2.7. Organisation Domain Verification</h4>
<p>
Organisation Domains are handled under the Organisation Assurance Policy
and the Organisation Handbook.
</p>
<h3 id="p4.3">4.3. Certificate issuance</h3>
<h4 id="p4.3.1">4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance</h4>
<p>
<b>Key Sizes.</b>
Members may request keys of any size permitted by the key algorithm.
Many older hardware devices require small keys.
</p>
<p>
<b>Algorithms.</b>
CAcert currently only supports the RSA algorithm for X.509 keys.
X.509 signing uses the SHA-1 message digest algorithm.
OpenPGP Signing uses RSA signing over RSA and DSA keys.
</p>
<p>
<b>Process for Certificates:</b>
All details in each certificate are verified
by the website issuance system.
Issuance is based on a 'template' system that selects
profiles for certificate lifetime, size, algorithm.
</p>
<ol>
<li>
The CSR is verified.
</li>
<li>
Data is extracted from CSR and verified:
<ul>
<li> Name §3.1, </li>
<li> Email address <a href="#p4.2.2">§4.2.2</a>, </li>
<li> Domain address <a href="#p4.2.2">§4.2.2</a>. </li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
Certificate is generated from template.
</li>
<li>
Data is copied from CSR.
</li>
<li>
Certificate is signed.
</li>
<li>
Certificate is stored as well as mailed.
</li>
</ol>
<p>
<b>Process for OpenPGP key signatures:</b>
All details in each Sub-ID are verified
by the website issuance system.
Issuance is based on the configuration that selects
the profile for signature lifetime, size,
algorithm following the process:
</p>
<ol>
<li>
The public key is verified.
</li>
<li>
Data is extracted from the key and verified (Name, Emails).
Only the combinations of data in Table 4.3.1 are permitted.
</li>
<li>
OpenPGP Key Signature is generated.
</li>
<li>
Key Signature is applied to the key.
</li>
<li>
The signed key is stored as well as mailed.
</li>
</ol>
<center>
<table valign="top" align="center" border="1" cellpadding="5">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>
<br>
</td>
<td>Verified Name</td>
<td valign="top">Unverified Name
<br>
</td>
<td>Empty Name
<br>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verified email
<br>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td valign="top">
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unverified email</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td valign="top">
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td>
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">Empty email
<br>
</td>
<td valign="top">
<center> <font title="pass." color="green" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td valign="top">
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
<td valign="top">
<center> <font title="pass." color="red" size="+3"></font> </center>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<br>
<span class="figure">Table 4.3.1. Permitted Data in Signed OpenPgp Keys</span>
</center>
<h4 id="p4.3.2">4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate</h4>
<p>
Once signed, the certificate is
made available via the Member's account,
and emailed to the Member.
It is also archived internally.
</p>
<h3 id="p4.4">4.4. Certificate acceptance</h3>
<h4 id="p4.4.1">4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance</h4>
<p>
There is no need for the Member to explicitly accept the certificate.
In case the Member does not accept the certificate,
the certificate has to be revoked and made again.
</p>
<h4 id="p4.4.2">4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA</h4>
<p>
CAcert does not currently publish the issued certificates
in any repository.
In the event that CAcert will run a repository,
the publication of certificates and signatures
there will be at the Member's options.
However note that certificates that are issued
and delivered to the Member are presumed to be
published. See §2.2.
</p>
<h4 id="p4.4.3">4.4.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities</h4>
<p>
There are no external entities that are notified about issued certificates.
</p>
<h3 id="p4.5">4.5. Key pair and certificate usage</h3>
<p>
All Members (subscribers and relying parties)
are obliged according to the
CAcert Community Agreement
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.php">COD9</a>)
See especially 2.3 through 2.5.
</p>
<h4 id="p4.5.1">4.5.1. Subscriber Usage and Responsibilities</h4>
<p>
Subscribers should use keys only for their proper purpose,
as indicated by the certificate, or by wider agreement with
others.
</p>
<h4 id="p4.5.2">4.5.2. Relying Party Usage and Responsibilities</h4>
<p>
Relying parties (Members) may rely on the following.
</p>
<center>
<table border="1" cellpadding="25">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>
<p align="center">
<big><b>Relying Party Statement</b></big>
</p>
<p>
Certificates are issued to Members only.
<br>
<br>
All information in a certificate is verified.
</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</center>
<p>
The following notes are in addition to the Relying Party Statement,
and can be seen as limitations on it.
</p>
<h5 id="p4.5.2.1">4.5.2.a Methods of Verification </h5>
<p>
The term Verification as used in the Relying Party Statement means one of
</p>
<table border="1" cellpadding="5">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>How</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>remarks</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<th>Assurance</th>
<td>under CAcert Assurance Programme (CAP)</td>
<td>Assurance Policy</td>
<td>only information assured to 50 points under CAP is placed in the certificate </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<td>under automated domain and email checks </td>
<td>this CPS</td>
<td>see §4.2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th>Controlled</th>
<td>programs or "profiles" that check the information within the CSR </td>
<td>this CPS</td>
<td>see §7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h5 id="p4.5.2.2">4.5.2.b Who may rely</h5>
<p>
<b>Members may rely.</b>
Relying parties are Members,
and as such are bound by this CPS and the
CAcert Community Agreement
(<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.php">COD9</a>).
The licence and permission to rely is not assignable.
</p>
<p>
<b>Suppliers of Software.</b>
CAcert roots may be distributed in software,
and those providers may
enter into agreement with CAcert by means of the
Third Party Vendor - Disclaimer and Licence
(wip).
This licence brings the supplier in to the Community
to the extent that
they agree to dispute resolution
within CAcert's forum.
</p>
<p>
<b>NRPs may not rely.</b>
If not related to CAcert by means of an agreement
that binds the parties to dispute resolution within CAcert's forum,
a person is a Non-Related-Person (NRP).
An NRP is not permitted to rely and is not a Relying Party.
For more details, see the
NRP - Disclaimer and Licence (<a href="http://www.cacert.org/policy/NRPDisclaimerAndLicence.php">COD4</a>).
</p>
<h5 id="p4.5.2.3">4.5.2.c The Act of Reliance </h5>
<p>
<b>Decision making.</b>
Reliance means taking a decision that is in part or in whole
based on the information in the certificate.
A Relying Party may incorporate
the information in the certificate,
and the implied information such as Membership,
into her decision-making.
In making a decision,
a Relying Party should also:
</p>
<ul>
<li>
include her own overall risk equation,
</li>
<li>
include the general limitations of the Assurance process,
certificates, and wider security considerations,
</li>
<li>
make additional checks to provide more information,
</li>
<li>
consider any wider agreement with the other Member, and
</li>
<li>
use an appropriate protocol or custom of reliance (below).
</li>
</ul>
<p>
<b>Examining the Certificate.</b>
A Relying Party must make her own decision in using
each certificate. She must examine the certificate,
a process called <i>validation</i>.
Certificate-related information includes,
but is not limited to:
</p>
<ul>
<li>
Name,
</li>
<li>
expiry time of certificate,
</li>
<li>
current certificate revocation list (CRL),
</li>
<li>
certificate chain and
the validity check of the certificates in the chain,
</li>
<li>
issuer of certificate (CAcert),
</li>
<li>
SubRoot is intended for reliance (Assured, Organisation and Class 3)
</li>
<li>
purpose of certificate.
</li>
</ul>
<p>
<b>Keeping Records.</b>
Records should be kept, appropriate to the import of the decision.
The certificate should be preserved.
This should include sufficient
evidence to establish who the parties are
(especially, the certificate relied upon),
to establish the transaction in question,
and to establish the wider agreement that
defines the act.
</p>
<p>
<b>Wider Protocol.</b>
In principle, reliance will be part of a wider protocol
(customary method in reaching and preserving agreement)
that presents and preserves sufficient of the evidence
for dispute resolution under CAcert's forum of Arbitration.
The protocol should be agreed amongst the parties,
and tuned to the needs.
This CPS does not define any such protocol.
In the absence of such a protocol, reliance will be weakened;
a dispute without sufficient evidence may be dismissed by an Arbitrator.
</p>
<p>
<b>As Compared to Usage</b>.
Reliance goes beyond Usage. The latter is limited to
letting the software act as the total and only Validation
Authority. When relying, the Member also augments
the algorithmic processing of the software with her own
checks of the business, technical and certificate aspect.
</p>
<h5 id="p4.5.2.4">4.5.2.d Risks and Limitations of Reliance </h5>
<p>
<b>Roots and Naming.</b>
Where the Class 1 root is used,
this Subscriber may be a new Member
including one with zero points.
Where the Name is not provided,
this indicates it is not available.
In these circumstances,
reliance is not defined,
and Relying parties should take more care.
See Table 4.5.2.
</p>
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