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<h1>Security Policy for CAcert Systems</h1>
<p><a href="PolicyOnPolicy.html"><img src="Images/cacert-wip.png" id="graphics1" alt="CAcert Security Policy Status == wip" align="bottom" border="0" height="33" width="90"></a>
<br>
Creation date: 2009-02-16<br>
Status: <i>work-in-progress</i>
</p>
<h2><a name="1">1.</a> INTRODUCTION</h2>
<h3><a name="1.1">1.1.</a> Motivation and Scope </h3>
<p>
This Security Policy sets out the policy
for the secure operation of the CAcert critical computer systems.
These computer systems include:
</p>
<ol><li>
Physical hardware mounting the logical services
</li><li>
Webserver + database (core server(s))
</li><li>
Signing service (signing server)
</li><li>
Support interface
</li><li>
Source code (changes and patches)
</li></ol>
<h4><a name="1.1.1">1.1.1.</a> Effected Personnel </h4>
<p>
These roles and teams are effected:
</p>
<ul><li>
Hardware Controllers (Oophaga)
</li><li>
Direct Hardware Access Systems Administrators
(as listed in Oophaga Appendix B Access List)
</li><li>
Application Administrators
(online access to critical systems at Unix level)
</li><li>
Support Team
(online access via administration interfaces)
</li><li>
Software Development Team
(approval of application code)
</li></ul>
<h4><a name="1.1.1">1.1.2.</a> Out of Scope </h4>
<p>
Non-critical systems are not covered by this manual,
but may be guided by it, and impacted where they are
found within the security context.
Architecture is out of scope, see CPS#6.2.
</p>
<h3><a name="1.2">1.2.</a> Principles </h3>
<p>
Important principles of this Security Policy are:
</p>
<ul><li>
<i>dual control</i> -- at least two individuals must control a task
</li><li>
<i>four eyes</i> -- at least two individuals must be present during a task,
one to execute and one to observe.
</li><li>
<i>redundancy</i> -- no single individual is the only one authorized
to perform a task.
</li><li>
<i>escrow</i> -- where critical information (backups, passwords)
is kept with other parties
</li><li>
<i>logging</i> -- where events are recorded in a file
</li><li>
<i>separation of concerns</i> -- when a core task is split between
two people from different areas
</li><li>
<i>Audit</i> -- where external reviewers do checks on practices and policies
</li></ul>
<p>
Each task or asset is covered by a variety of protections
deriving from the above principles.
</p>
<h3><a name="1.3">1.3.</a> Definition of Terms</h3>
<dl>
<dt><i>Access Engineer</i> </dt>
<dd>
A Member who manages the critical hardware,
including maintenance, access control and physical security.
See &sect;1.1.
</dd>
<dt><i>Software Developer </i> </dt>
<dd>
A Member who reviews patches for security and workability,
signs-off on them, and incorporates them into the repository.
See &sect;7.
</dd>
<dt><i>Support ???</i> <span class="q"> noun needed here</span> </dt>
<dd>
A Member who mans the support list,
and has access to restricted
data through the online interface.
See &sect;8.
</dd>
<dt><i>Systems Administrator</i> </dt>
<dd>
A Member who manages a critial system, and has access
to security-sensitive functions or data.
</dd>
</dl>
<h3><a name="1.4">1.4.</a> Documents and Version control</h3>
<h4><a name="1.4.1">1.4.1.</a> The Security Policy Document </h4>
<p>
This Security Policy is part of the configuration-control specification
for audit purposes (DRC).
It is under the control of Policy on Policy for version purposes.
</p>
<p>
This policy document says what is done, rather than how to do it.
</p>
<h4><a name="1.4.2">1.4.2.</a> The Security Manual (Practices) Document </h4>
<p>
This Policy explicitly defers detailed security practices to the
<a href="http://wiki.cacert.org/wiki/SecurityManual">Security Manual</a>
("SM"),
The SM says how things are done.
As practices are things that vary from time to time,
including between each event of practice,
the SM is under the direct control of the Systems Administration team.
It is located and version-controlled on the CAcert wiki.
</p>
<h4><a name="1.4.3">1.4.3.</a> The Security Procedures </h4>
<p>
The team leaders may from time to time
explicitly defer single, cohesive components of the
security practices into separate procedures documents.
Each procedure should be managed in a wiki page under
their control, probably at
<a href="http://wiki.cacert.org/wiki/SystemAdministration/Procedures">
SystemAdministration/Procedures</a>.
Each procedure must be referenced explicitly in the Security Manual.
</p>
<h2><a name="2">2.</a> PHYSICAL SECURITY</h2>
<h3><a name="2.1">2.1.</a> Facility </h3>
<p>
CAcert shall host critical servers in a highly secure facility.
There shall be independent verification of the physical and
access security.
</p>
<h3><a name="2.2">2.2.</a> Physical Assets </h3>
<ul class="q"><li>
Big question here is whether Oophaga falls inside SP/SM or not.<br>
Answered: <b>IN</b>.
</li><li>
2nd Big Question is whether Oophaga is in SP or in SM.<br>
Answered: <b>in the SM.</b>
</li></ul>
<h4><a name="2.2.1">2.2.1.</a> Computers </h4>
<p>
Computers shall be inventoried before being put into service.
Inventory list shall be available to all
Access Engineeers and all Systems Administrators.
List must be subject to change control.
</p>
<p>
Units shall have nickname clearly marked on front and rear of chassis.
Machines shall be housed in secured facilities (cages and/or locked racks).
</p>
<h4><a name="2.2.1.1">2.2.1.1</a> Acquisition </h4>
<p>
Acquisition of new equipment that is subject to a
pre-purchase security risk must be done from a
vendor that is regularly and commercially in business.
Precautions must be taken to prevent equipment being
prepared in advance.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.2.2">2.2.2.</a> Cables </h4>
<p>
Cabling to all equipment shall be labeled at both ends
with identification of end points.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.2.3">2.2.3.</a> Media </h4>
<h4><a name="2.2.3.1">2.2.3.1</a> Provisioning </h4>
<p>
Storage media (disk drives, tapes, removable media)
are inventoried upon acquisition
and tracked in their use.
</p>
<p>
New storage media (whether disk or removable) shall be
securely wiped and reformatted before use.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.2.3.2">2.2.3.2</a> Storage </h4>
<p>
Removable media shall be securely stored at all times,
including when not in use.
Drives that are kept for reuse are wiped securely before storage.
Reuse can only be within critical systems.
</p>
<p>
When there is a change to status of media,
a report is made to the log specifying the new status.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.2.3.3">2.2.3.3</a> Retirement </h4>
<p>
Storage media that is exposed to critical data and is
to be retired from service shall be destroyed or otherwise secured.
The following steps are to be taken:
</p>
<ol><li>
The media is to be securely erased, <b>and</b>
</li><li>
The media is securely destroyed.
</li></ol>
<p>
Records of secure erasure and method of final disposal
shall be tracked in the asset inventory.
Where critical data is involved,
2 system administrators must sign-off on each step.
</p>
<h3><a name="2.3">2.3.</a> Physical Access </h3>
<p>
In accordance with the principle of dual control,
at least two persons authorized for access must
be on-site at the same time for physical access to be granted.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.3.1">2.3.1.</a> Access Authorisation </h4>
<p>
Access to physical equipment must be authorised.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.3.2">2.3.2.</a> Access Profiles </h4>
<p>
The Security Manual must present the different access profiles.
At least one CAcert systems administrator will be present for
logical access to CAcert critical servers.
Only the most basic and safest of accesses should be done with
one CAcert systems administrator present.
</p>
</p>
Only Systems Administrators are authorised to access the data.
All others must not access the data.
All are responsible for protecting the data
from access by those not authorised.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.3.3">2.3.3.</a> Access Logging </h4>
<p>
All physical accesses are logged and reported to all.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.3.4">2.3.4.</a> Emergency Access </h4>
<p>
There is no procedure for emergency access.
If emergency access is gained,
this must be reported and justified immediately.
See DPR.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.3.5">2.3.5.</a> Physical Security codes & devices </h4>
<p>
All personel who are in possession of physical security
codes and devices (keys) are to be authorised and documented.
</p>
<h2><a name="3">3.</a> LOGICAL SECURITY</h2>
<h3><a name="3.1">3.1.</a> Network </h3>
<h4><a name="3.1.1">3.1.1.</a> Infrastructure </h4>
<p>
Current and complete diagrams of the physical and logical CAcert network infrastructure shall be maintained by systems administration team leader. These diagrams should include cabling information, physical port configuration details, and expected/allowed data flow directions, as applicable. Diagrams should be revision controlled, and must be updated when any change is made.
</p>
<h5> 3.1.1.1. External connectivity </h5>
<p>
Only such services as are required for normal operation should be visible externally; systems and servers which do not require access to the Internet for their normal operation must not be granted that access.
</p>
<h5> 3.1.1.2. Internal connectivity </h5>
<p>
System and server connections internal to the CAcert infrastructure should be kept to the minimum required for routine operations. Any new connectivity desired must be requested and approved by CAcert system administration team leader and then must be reflected in the appropriate infrastructure diagram(s).
</p>
<h4><a name="3.1.2">3.1.2.</a> Operating Configuration </h4>
<h5> 3.1.2.1. Ingress </h5>
<p>
All ports on which incoming traffic is expected shall be documented; traffic to other ports must be blocked. Unexpected traffic must be logged as an exception.
</p>
<h5> 3.1.2.2. Egress </h5>
<p>
All ports to which outbound traffic is initiated shall be documented; traffic to other ports must be blocked. Unexpected traffic must be logged as an exception.
</p>
<h4><a name="3.1.3">3.1.3.</a> Intrusion detection </h4>
<p>
Logs should be examined regularly (by manual or automatic means) for unusual patterns and/or traffic; anomalies should be investigated as they are discovered and should be reported to appropriate personnel in near-real-time (e.g. text message, email) and investigated as soon as possible. Suspicious activity which may indicate an actual system intrusion or compromise should trigger the incident response protocol described in section 5.1.
</p>
<h3><a name="3.2">3.2.</a> Operating System </h3>
<p>
Any operating system used for critical server machines must be available under an OSI-approved open source software license.
</p>
<h4> 3.2.1. Disk Encryption </h4>
<p>
Any operating system used for critical server machines must support software full-disk or disk volume encryption, and this encryption option must be enabled for all relevant disks/volumes when the operating system is first installed on the machine.
</p>
<h4> 3.2.2. Operating configuration </h4>
<p>
Servers must enable only the operating system functions required to support the necessary services. Options and packages chosen at OS install shall be documented, and newly-installed systems must be inspected to ensure that only required services are active, and their functionality is limited through configuration options. Any required application software must follow similar techniques to ensure minimal exposure footprint.
</p>
<p>
Documentation for installing and configuring servers with the appropriate software packages and configurations will be maintained by the system administrators in the wiki.
</p>
<h4> 3.2.3. Patching </h4>
<p class="q">A.1.i, A.1.k:</p>
<p>
Software used on production servers must be kept current with respect to patches affecting software security. Patch application is governed by CCS and must be approved by the systems administration team leader, fully documented in the logs and reported by email to the systems administration list on completion (see &sect;4.2).
</p>
<h5> 3.2.3.1. “emergency” patching </h5>
<p>
Application of a patch is deemed an <i>emergency</i>
when a remote exploit for a weakness in the particular piece
of software has become known
(on servers allowing direct local user access,
an emergent local exploit may also be deemed to be an emergency).
Application of patches in this case may occur as soon as possible,
bypassing the normal configuration-change process.
The systems administration team leader must either approve the patch,
instruct remedial action, or refer the case to dispute resolution.
</p>
<p>
<b>
Declaration of an emergency patching situation should not occur with any regularity.
</b>
Emergency patch events must be documented within the regular summaries to Board.
</p>
<h3> 3.3. Application </h3>
<p>
Software development takes place on various test systems (not a critical system). See &sect;7. Once offered by Software Development (team), system administration team leader has to approve the installation of each release or patch.
</p>
<p>
Any changes made to source code must be referred back to software development.
</p>
<h3> 3.4. Access control </h3>
<p>
General user access to CAcert services shall normally be conducted through a web-based application interface. Features are made available according to Assurance Points and direct permissions.
</p>
<p>
Direct Permissions are managed by the Application to enable special online administrators from the Support Team access to certain functions.
</p>
<h4> 3.4.1. Authorisation </h4>
<p>
The access control lists are:
</p>
<ul><li>
Console Access List,
for physical access by System Administrators.
</li><li>
SSH Access List,
for access to Unix-level facilities of the online webserver.
</li><li>
Support Access List,
for access to the online support interface features.
</li></ul>
<p>
All changes to the above lists are approved by the board of CAcert.
</p>
<h4> 3.4.2. Authentication </h4>
<p>
A strong method of authentication is used and documented.
</p>
<h4> 3.4.3. Removing access </h4>
<p>
Termination actions must be documented,
including resignation, arbitration, or determination
by team or board.
</p>
<h2> <a name="4">4.</a> OPERATIONAL SECURITY </h2>
<h3> <a name="4.1">4.1.</a> System administration </h3>
<p>
Primary systems administration tasks shall be conducted under four eyes principle.
These shall include
backup performance verification,
log inspection,
software patch identification and application,
account creation and deletion,
and hardware maintenance.
</p>
<p>
System administrators must pass a background check and comply with all applicable policies in force.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.1.1">4.1.1.</a> Privileged accounts and passwords </h4>
<p>
Access to Accounts (root and user via SSH or console) must be strictly controlled.
Passwords and passphrases entered into the systems will be kept private
to CAcert sysadmins in all cases.
</p>
<h5> <a name="4.1.1.1">4.1.1.1.</a> Authorized users </h5>
<p>
Only system administrators designated on the Access List
shall be authorized to access accounts.
</p>
<p class="q">Assumes above that there is no reason to have access
to a Unix-level account on the critical machines unless on the Access List.</p>
<h5> <a name="4.1.1.2">4.1.1.2.</a> Access to </h5>
<p>
All remote communications for systems administration purposes is encrypted,
logged and monitored.
</p>
<h5> <a name="4.1.1.3">4.1.1.3.</a> Changing </h5>
<p>
Passwords must be kept secure.
The procedure for changing passwords should be documented.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.1.2">4.1.2.</a> Required staff response time </h4>
<p>
Response times should be documented.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.1.3">4.1.3.</a> Change management procedures </h4>
<p>
All changes made to system configuration must be recorded.
</p>
<h3> <a name="4.2">4.2.</a> Logging </h3>
<h4> <a name="4.2.1">4.2.1.</a> Coverage </h4>
<p>
Logs shall be maintained for:
</p>
<ul>
<li> anomalous network traffic, </li>
<li> system activities and events, </li>
<li> application (certificate, web, mail, and database) events, </li>
<li> "Comms Module" requests for certificate signing on both the cryptographic module (signing server) and the main online server, </li>
<li> login and root access, </li>
<li> configuration changes. </li>
</ul>
<h4> <a name="4.2.2">4.2.2.</a> Access and Security </h4>
<p>
Access to logs must be restricted.
The security of the logs should be documented.
The records retention should be documented.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.2.3">4.2.3.</a> Automated logs </h4>
<p>
Logging should be automated,
and use should be made of appropriate system-provided automated tools.
Automated logs should be reviewed periodically;
suspicious events should be flagged and investigated in a timely fashion.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.2.4">4.2.4.</a> Operational (manual) logs </h4>
<p>
Configuration changes, no matter how small, must be logged.
Access to this log shall be restricted.
</p>
<p>
All physical visits will be logged and a report provided by the accessor.
</p>
<h3> <a name="4.3">4.3.</a> Backup </h3>
<p>
The procedure for all backups must be documented,
according to the following sub-headings.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.1">4.3.1.</a> Type </h4>
<p>
Backups must be taken for operational
and for disaster recovery purposes ("offline").
Disaster recovery backups must be offline and remote.
Operational backups may be online and local.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.2">4.3.2.</a> Frequency </h4>
<p>Document.</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.3">4.3.3.</a> Storage </h4>
<p>
Backups must be protected to the same level as the critical systems themselves.
Offline backups should be distributed.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.4">4.3.4.</a> Retention period and Re-use </h4>
<p>Document.</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.5">4.3.5.</a> Encryption </h4>
<p>
Backups must be encrypted and must only be transmitted via secured channels.
Off-site backups must be dual-encrypted using divergent methods.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.6">4.3.6.</a> Verifying Backups </h4>
<p>
Two CAcert system administrators must be
present for verification of a backup.
Four eyes principle must be maintained when the key and backup are together.
For any other purpose than verification of the success of the backup, see next.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.7">4.3.7.</a> Key Management </h4>
<p>
The encryption keys must be stored securely by the
CAcert systems administrators.
Paper documentation must be stored with manual backups.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.8">4.3.8.</a> Reading Backups </h4>
<p>
Conditions and procedures for examining the backups for purposes
other than for verification must be documented
and must be under Arbitrator control.
</p>
<h3> <a name="4.4">4.4.</a> Data retention </h3>
<h4> <a name="4.4.1">4.4.1.</a> User data </h4>
<p>
Termination of user data is under direction of the Arbitrator.
See CCA.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.4.2">4.4.2.</a> System logs </h4>
<p>Document.</p>
<h4> <a name="4.4.3">4.4.3.</a> Incident reports </h4>
<p>
The systems administration team leader is to maintain incident reports securely.
Access to incident reports is restricted.
</p>
<h3> <a name="4.5">4.5.</a> Cycling </h3>
<p>Document.</p>
<h2><a name="5">5.</a> INCIDENT RESPONSE</h2>
<h3> <a name="5.1">5.1.</a> Incidents </h3>
<p>
Incidents and sources of important events and logging should be documented.
</p>
<h3> <a name="5.2">5.2.</a> Detection </h3>
<p>
The standard of monitoring, alerting and reporting must be documented.
</p>
<h3> <a name="5.3">5.3.</a> Immediate Action </h3>
<h4> <a name="5.2.1">5.2.1.</a> Severity and Priority </h4>
<p>
On discovery of an incident,
an initial assessment of severity and priority must be made.
</p>
<h4> <a name="5.2.2">5.2.2.</a> Communications </h4>
<p>
An initial report should be sent to systems administrators
and wider interested parties.
</p>
<p>
A communications forum should be established for direct
support of high priority or high severity incidents.
</p>
<h4> <a name="5.2.3">5.2.3.</a> Oversight </h4>
<p>
A process of escalation of oversight should be eastablished.
</p>
<h3> <a name="5.4">5.4.</a> Investigation </h3>
<p>
Incidents must be investigated.
The investigation must be documented.
Evidence must be secured if the severity is high.
</p>
<h3> <a name="5.5">5.5.</a> Response </h3>
<p>Document.</p>
<h3> <a name="5.6">5.6.</a> Report </h3>
<p>
A report should be appended to the documentation of the investigation,
and distributed in the act of closing the investigation.
</p>
<p>
Incidents are not normally kept secret or confidential.
Ony under a defined exception under policy,
or under the oversight of the Arbitrator,
may confidentiality be maintained.
The knowledge of the existence of the event must not be kept
secret, nor the manner in which it is kept confidential.
</p>
<h2><a name="6">6.</a> DISASTER RECOVERY</h2>
<h2><a name="7">7.</a> SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT</h2>
<h2><a name="8">8.</a> SUPPORT</h2>
<h2><a name=Documents"9">9.</a> ADMINISTRATIVE</h2></h3>
<h3> <a name="9.1"> 9.1. </a> Staffing</h3>
<h3> <a name="9.1.1"> 9.1.1. </a> Roles and responsibilities</h3>
<ul>
<li> System administrator: responsible for maintaining core services and integrity. </li>
<li> Software Developer: maintain the code base and confirm security ("sign-off") of patches and releases.</li>
<li> Support: human interface with users.</li>
<li> Team leaders: coordinate with teams, report to board.</li>
<li> All: respond to Arbitrator's rulings on changes. Respond to critical security issues. Observe.</li>
<li> Board: authorise new individuals and accesses. Coordinate overall. </li>
</ul>
<h3> <a name="9.1.2"> 9.1.2. </a> Staffing levels</h3>
<p>
Each team should have a minimum of 2 members available at any time.
Individuals should be active in only one team at any one time,
but may be observers on any number of teams.
</p>
<p>
One individual in each team is designated leader and reports to Board.
</p>
<h3> <a name="9.1.3"> 9.1.3. </a> Process of new Team Members</h3>
<p>
New team members need:
</p>
<ul>
<li> Recommendation by team leader </li>
<li> Independent background check </li>
<li> Authorisation by Board </li>
</ul>
<p>
The team supports the process of adding new team members.
</p>
<h3> <a name="9.1.4"> 9.1.4. </a> Background Check Procedures</h3>
<p>
Background checks are carried out with full seriousness.
Background checks must be conducted under the direction of the Arbitrator,
with a separate Case Manager to provide four eyes.
</p>
<h4> <a name="9.1.4.1"> 9.1.4.1. </a> Scope </h4>
<p>
An investigation should include examination of:
</p>
<ul>
<li> realm-specific knowledge </li>
<li> realm-specific understanding of good security practice </li>
<li> history of activity within Community </li>
<li> reputation and standing within Community </li>
<li> provided references </li>
<li> conflicts of interest </li>
</ul>
<h4> <a name="9.1.4.2"> 9.1.4.2. </a> Coverage </h4>
<p>
A background check is to be done for all critical roles.
The background check should be done on all of:
</p>
<ul>
<li> systems administrator </li>
<li> access engineeers </li>
<li> software developer </li>
<li> support </li>
<li> Board </li>
</ul>
<h4> <a name="9.1.4.3"> 9.1.4.3. </a> Documentation </h4>
<p>
The process of the background check should be documented as a procedure.
</p>
<p>
Documentation of each individual check should be preserved
and should be reviewable under any future Arbitration.
It must include:
</p>
<ul>
<li> agreement with appropriate policies, etc </li>
<li> contact information </li>
</ul>
<h4> <a name="9.1.4.4"> 9.1.4.4. </a> Privacy for Hard Roles</h4>
<p>
The following privacy considerations exist:
</p>
<ul>
<li> procedure and ruling (recommendation) should be public </li>
<li> interview, documents should not be public, </li>
<li> summary of evidence should be in the ruling. </li>
<li> Arbitrator can rule on the escrow questions of evidence </li>
<li> contact information goes into the contact addressbook </li>
</ul>
<p>
CAcert trusted roles give up some privacy for the privacy of others.
</p>
<h3> <a name="9.1.5"> 9.1.5. </a> Authorisation </h3>
<p>
Individuals and access (both) must be authorised by the Board.
Only the Board may approve new individuals or any access to the systems.
Each Individual should be proposed to the Board,
with the relevant supporting information as above.
</p>
<p>
The Board should deliberate directly and in full.
Board members who are also active in the area should recuse from the vote,
but should support the deliberations.
Deliberations and decisions should be documented.
All conflicts of interest should be examined.
</p>
<h3> <a name="9.1.6"> 9.1.6. </a> Security</h3>
<p>
It is the responsibility of all individuals to observe and report on security issues.
All of CAcert observes all where possible.
It is the responsibility of each individual to resolve it satisfactorily,
or to ensure that it is reported fully.
</p>
<p>
Only information subject to a specific and documented exception
may be kept secret or confidential.
The exception itself must not be secret or confidential.
All secrets and confidentials are reviewable under Arbitration,
and may be reversed.
</p>
<h3> <a name="9.1.7"> 9.1.7. </a> Termination of staff</h3>
<p>
Termination of access may be for resignation, Arbitration ruling,
or decision of Board or team leader.
On termination (for any reason), access and information must be secured.
</p>
<h3> <a name="9.1.8"> 9.1.8. </a> HR and Training</h3>
<p>
It is the responsibility of the team leaders
to coordinate technical testing and training,
especially of new team members.
</p>
<h3> <a name="9.2"> 9.2. </a> Key changeover</h3>
<p class="q">what goes in here? Non-root keys?</p>
<h3> <a name="9.3"> 9.3. </a> Key generation/transfer</h3>
<h3> <a name="9.3.1"> 9.3.1. </a> Root Key generation</h3>
<p>
Root keys should be generated on a machine built securely
for that purpose only and cleaned/wiped/destroyed immediately afterwards.
</p>
<h3> <a name="9.3.2"> 9.3.2. </a> Backup and escrow</h3>
<p>
Root keys must be kept on reliable removable media used for that purpose only.
Private Keys must be encrypted and should be dual-encrypted.
Passphrase must be strong and must be separately escrowed from media.
Dual control must be maintained.
</p>
<p>
The top-level root must be escrowed under Board control.
Subroots may be escrowed by either Board or Systems Administration Team.
</p>
<h3> <a name="9.3.3"> 9.3.3. </a> Recovery</h3>
<p>
Recovery must only be conducted under Board or Arbitrator direction.
A recovery exercise should be conducted approximately every year.
</p>
<h3> <a name="9.4"> 9.4. </a> Root certificate changes</h3>
<h3> <a name="9.4.1"> 9.4.1. </a> Creation</h3>
<p>Document.</p>
<h3> <a name="9.4.2"> 9.4.2. </a> Revocation</h3>
<p>Document.</p>
<h3> <a name="9.4.3"> 9.4.3. </a> Public notification</h3>
<p>
Board has responsibility for formal advisory to the public.
</p>
<h3> <a name="9.5"> 9.5. </a> Legal</h3>
<h3> <a name="9.5.1"> 9.5.1. </a> Responsibility</h3>
<p>
The board is responsible for the CA at the executive level.
</p>
<h3> <a name="9.5.2"> 9.5.2. </a> Response to external (legal) inquiry</h3>
<p>
All external inquiries of security import are filed as disputes and placed before the Arbitrator under DRP.
</p>
<p>
Only the Arbitrator has the authority to deal with external requests and/or create a procedure. Systems administrators, board members and other key roles do not have the authority to answer legal inquiry. The Arbitrator's ruling may instruct individuals, and becomes your authority to act.
</p>