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# Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
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**WARNING:**
The proper policy document is located [on the CAcert website](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CertificationPracticeStatement.html) .
This document is a **working draft** to include
future revisions only, and is currently
only relevant for the \[policy\] group.
Suggested additions in BLUE, ~strikes in blue~.
Michael T&#228;nzer 20111113: CPS #7.1.2 "Certificate Extensions" adjustments
Ulrich Schroeter 20130309: several minor fixes according to [PoP 2.5](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/PolicyOnPolicy.html) and [Bug #1131](https://bugs.cacert.org/view.php?id=1131)
Ale&#353; Kastner, Kim Nilsson - 20240624: changes based on the "Person" - "Client" - "Server" model with RSA & ECC encrypting by Dirk Astrath and Jan Dittberner
* 20111113 changes are still incorporated in the revision on main website but not in the svn revision, so therefor copied over CPS revision from CAcert main website to SVN policy working directory as source of changes
* header reformated to reflect new header style
* http to https fixes
* full url fixes
* wiki.cacert.org/wiki/ to wiki.cacert.org/ fixes
* wiki redirects to redirected link fixes
* img src images/ fixes
* .php to .html fixes per [Bug #1131](https://bugs.cacert.org/view.php?id=1131)
* replace all NRP-DaL references with text Root Distribution License and RootDistributionLicense.html link
* fix of ~65 html errors and ~14 html warnings
* * *
| | |
| --- | --- |
| Name: CAcert CPS and CP [COD6](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/ControlledDocumentList.html) | |
| Status: DRAFT-[p20091108](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDecisions#p20091108), DRAFT-[p20111113](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDecisions#p20111113), ver. 2024 – WIP (Work In Progress) | |
| Caveat: this document is already [on the main website in DRAFT](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CertificationPracticeStatement.html). p20111113. | |
| Creation date: 20060726 | |
| Changes: p20111113, 20130309, 20240612-30 | |
| Licence: [CC-by-sa+DRP](https://wiki.cacert.org/Policy#Licence) | |
CAcert CPS and CP
=================
1. [INTRODUCTION](#p1)
* [1.1. Overview](#p1.1)
* [1.2. Document name and identification](#p1.2)
* [1.3. PKI participants](#p1.3)
* [1.4. Certificate usage](#p1.4)
* [1.5. Policy administration](#p1.5)
* [1.6. Definitions and acronyms](#p1.6)
2. [PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES](#p2)
* [2.1. Repositories](#p2.1)
* [2.2. Publication of certification information](#p2.2)
* [2.3. Time or frequency of publication](#p2.3)
* [2.4. Access controls on repositories](#p2.4)
3. [IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (I&A)](#p3)
* [3.1. Naming](#p3.1)
* [3.2. Initial Identity Verification](#p3.2)
* [3.3. ~I&A for~ Re-key Requests](#p3.3)
* [3.4. ~I&A for~ Revocation Request](#p3.4)
4. [CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS](#p4)
* [4.1. Certificate Application](#p4.1)
* [4.2. Certificate application processing](#p4.2)
* [4.3. Certificate issuance](#p4.3)
* [4.4. Certificate acceptance](#p4.4)
* [4.5. Key pair and certificate usage](#p4.5)
* [4.6. Certificate renewal](#p4.6)
* [4.7. Certificate re-key](#p4.7)
* [4.8. Certificate modification](#p4.8)
* [4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension](#p4.9)
* [4.10. Certificate status services](#p4.10)
* [4.11. End of subscription](#p4.11)
* [4.12. Key escrow and recovery](#p4.12)
5. [FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS](#p5)
* [5.1. Physical controls](#p5.1)
* [5.2. Procedural controls](#p5.2)
* [5.3. Personnel controls](#p5.3)
* [5.4. Audit logging procedures](#p5.4)
* [5.5. Records archival](#p5.5)
* [5.6. Key changeover](#p5.6)
* [5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery](#p5.7)
* [5.8. CA or RA termination](#p5.8)
6. [TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS](#p6)
* [6.1. Key pair generation and installation](#p6.1)
* [6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls](#p6.2)
* [6.3. Other aspects of key pair management](#p6.3)
* [6.4. Activation data](#p6.4)
* [6.5. Computer security controls](#p6.5)
* [6.6. Life cycle technical controls](#p6.6)
* [6.7. Network security controls](#p6.7)
* [6.8. Time-stamping](#p6.8)
7. [CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES](#p7)
* [7.1. Certificate profile](#p7.1)
* [7.2. CRL profile](#p7.2)
* [7.3. OCSP profile](#p7.3)
* [7.4. Root CA certificate and Subordinate CA certificates](#p7.4)
8. [COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS](#p8)
* [8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment](#p8.1)
* [8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor](#p8.2)
* [8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity](#p8.3)
* [8.4. Topics covered by assessment](#p8.4)
* [8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency](#p8.5)
* [8.6. Communication of results](#p8.6)
9. [OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS](#p9)
* [9.1. Fees](#p9.1)
* [9.2. Financial responsibility](#p9.2)
* [9.3. Confidentiality of business information](#p9.3)
* [9.4. Privacy of personal information](#p9.4)
* [9.5. Intellectual property rights](#p9.5)
* [9.6. Representations and warranties](#p9.6)
* [9.7. Disclaimers of warranties](#p9.7)
* [9.8. Limitations of liability](#p9.8)
* [9.9. Indemnities](#p9.9)
* [9.10. Term and termination](#p9.10)
* [9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants](#p9.11)
* [9.12. Amendments](#p9.12)
* [9.13. Dispute resolution provisions](#p9.13)
* [9.14. Governing law](#p9.14)
* [9.15. Compliance with applicable law](#p9.15)
* [9.16. Miscellaneous provisions](#p9.16)
[Appendix A: RSAEnd Certificate Patterns](#pA)
[Appendix B: ECC Root CA Certificate](#pB)
1\. INTRODUCTION
----------------
### 1.1. Overview
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of CAcert, the Community Certification Authority (CA). It describes rules and procedures used by CAcert for operating its CA, and applies to all CAcert PKI Participants, including Assurers, Members, and CAcert itself.
### 1.2. Document name and identification
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of CAcert. The CPS also fulfills the role of the Certificate Policy (CP) for each class of certificate.
* This document is COD6 under CAcert Official Documents numbering scheme.
* The document is structured according to Chokhani, et al, [RFC3647](http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3647.txt), [chapter 4](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3647#section-4). All headings derive from that Chapter.
* It has been improved and reviewed (or will be reviewed) to meet or exceed the criteria of the Certificate Authority Review Checklist from _David E. Ross_ ("DRC") and Mozilla Foundation's CA policy.
* It has been improved and reviewed to meet the criteria of the CA/Browser Forum (https://cabforum.org/)
* OID assigned to this document: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.4.4.x (x=approved Version) ([iana.org](http://www.iana.org/assignments/enterprise-numbers))
.x will change to .1 in the first approved instance.
* &copy; CAcert Inc. 2006-2009-2013-2024.
* Issued under the CAcert document licence policy, as and when made policy. See [PolicyDrafts/DocumentLicence](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDrafts/DocumentLicence).
* The cited page discusses 2 options: CCau Attribute-Share-alike and GNU Free Document License. Refer to that.
* Note that the noun Licence in Australian English has two Cs. The verb License is spelt the same way as American English.
* Earlier notes were written by Christian Barmala in a document placed under GNU Free Document License and under FSF copyright. However this clashed with the control provisions of Configuration-Control Specification (COD2) within Audit criteria.
* In this document:
* Green text refers to questions that seek answers
* Red text refers to probably audit fails or serious errors.
* Blue, yellow emphasized text refers to changes written after the document got seriously reviewed.
* No coloured text is to be considered part of the policy, and they should disappear in the DRAFT and must disappear in the POLICY.
The CPS is an authoritive document, and rules other documents except where explicitly deferred to. See also [1.5.1 Organisation Administering the Document](#p1.5.1).
### 1.3. PKI participants
The CA is legally operated by CAcert Incorporated, an Association registered in 2002 in New South Wales, Australia, on behalf of the wider Community of Members of CAcert. The Association details are at the [CAcert wiki](https://wiki.cacert.org/CAcertInc).
2021, the CAcert Incorporated, was moved to Geneve, Swiss.
CAcert is a Community formed of Members who agree to the [CAcert Community Agreement](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html). The CA is technically operated by the Community, under the direction of the Board of CAcert Incorporated. (The Members of the Community are not to be confused with the _Association Members_, which latter are not referred to anywhere in this CPS.)
#### 1.3.1. Certification authorities
CAcert does not issue certificates to external intermediate CAs under the present CPS.
#### 1.3.2. Registration authorities
Registration Authorities (RAs) are controlled under Assurance Policy ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)).
#### 1.3.3. Subscribers
CAcert issues certificates to Members only. Such Members then become Subscribers, and must have accounts on the Cacert WoT (www.cacert.org).
#### 1.3.4. Relying parties
A relying party is a Member, having agreed to the CAcert Community Agreement ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)), who, in the act of using a CAcert certificate, makes a decision on the basis of that certificate.
#### 1.3.5. Other participants
**Member.** Membership of the Community is as defined in the [COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html). Only Members may RELY or may become Subscribers. Membership is free.
**Arbitrator.** A senior and experienced Member of the CAcert Community who resolves disputes between Members, including ones of certificate reliance, under Dispute Resolution Policy ([COD7](https://www.cacert.org/policy/DisputeResolutionPolicy.html)).
**Vendor.** Software suppliers who integrate the root certificates of CAcert into their software also assume a proxy role of Relying Parties, and are subject to another licence. At the time of writing, the "3rd Party Vendor - Disclaimer and Licence" is being worked upon, but is neither approved nor offered.
**Non-Related Persons** (NRPs). These are users of browsers and similar software who are unaware of the CAcert certificates they may use, and are unaware of the ramifications of usage. Their relationship with CAcert is described by the Root Distribution License ([COD14](https://www.cacert.org/policy/RootDistributionLicense.html)). No other rights nor relationship is implied or offered.
### 1.4. Certificate usage
CAcert serves as issuer of certificates for individuals, businesses, governments, charities, associations, churches, schools, non-governmental organisations or other groups. CAcert certificates are intended for low-cost community applications especially where volunteers can become Assurers and help CAcert to help the Community.
Types of certificates and their appropriate and corresponding applications are defined in [&#167;1.4.1](#p1.4.1). Prohibited applications are defined in [&#167;1.4.2](#p1.4.2). Specialist uses may be agreed by contract or within a specific environment, as described in [&#167;1.4.4](#p1.4.4). Note also the unreliable applications in [&#167;1.4.3](#p1.4.3) and risks, liabilities and obligations in [&#167;9](#p9).
| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| _Type_ | | _Appropriate Certificate uses_ | |
| General | Protocol | Description | Comments |
| Server | TLS | web server encryption | enables encryption |
| | embedded | embedded server authentication | mail servers, IM-servers |
| Person | S/MIME | email encryption | "digital signatures" employed in S/MIME are not legal / human signatures, but instead enable the encryption mode of S/MIME |
| | "Digital Signing" | for human signing over documents | Only within a wider application and rules such as by separate policy, as agreed by contract, etc. See [&#167;1.4.4](#p1.4.4). |
| Client | TLS | web based signature applications | the certificate authenticates only. See [&#167;1.4.3](#p1.4.3). |
| | TLS | client authentication | the nodes must be secure |
| Code | Authenticode, ElfSign, Java | Code Signing | Signatures on packages are evidence of their Membership and indicative of Identity |
| PGP | OpenPGP | Key Signing | Signatures on Member Keys are evidence of their Membership and indicative of Identity |
| Special | X.509 | OCSP, Timestamping | Only available to CAcert Systems Administrators, as controlled by Security Policy |
Table 1.4. Types of Certificate
#### 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses
General uses.
* CAcert server certificates can be used to enable encryption protection in web servers. Suitable applications include webmail and chat forums.
* CAcert server certificates can be used to enable encryption in SSL/TLS links in embedded protocols such as mail servers and IM-servers.
* CAcert person certificates can be used to enable encryption protection in email clients. (See [&#167;1.4.3](#p1.4.3) for caveat on signatures.)
* CAcert person certificates can be used for human signing over documents
* Time stamping can be used to attach a time record to a digital document.
* CAcert client certificates can be used to replace password-based authentication to web servers.
* CAcert client certificates can be used in web-based authentication applications.
* CAcert code signing certificates can be used to sign code for distribution to other people.
* OpenPGP keys with CAcert signatures can be used to encrypt and sign files and emails, using software compatible with OpenPGP.
#### 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses
CAcert certificates are not designed, intended, or authorised for the following applications:
* Use or resale as control equipment in hazardous circumstances or for uses requiring fail-safe performance such as the operation of nuclear facilities, aircraft navigation or communication systems, air traffic control systems, or weapons control systems, where failure could lead directly to death, personal injury, or severe environmental damage.
#### 1.4.3. Unreliable Applications
CAcert certificates are not designed nor intended for use in the following applications, and may not be reliable enough for these applications:
* **Signing within Protocols.** Digital signatures made by CAcert certificates carry NO default legal or human meaning. See [&#167;9.15.1](#p9.15.1). Especially, protocols such as S/MIME commonly will automatically apply digital signatures as part of their protocol needs. The purpose of the cryptographic signature in S/MIME and similar protocols is limited by default to strictly protocol security purposes: to provide some confirmation that a familiar certificate is in use, to enable encryption, and to ensure the integrity of the email in transit.
* **Non-repudiation applications.** Non-repudiation is not to be implied from use of CAcert certificates. Rather, certificates may provide support or evidence of actions, but that evidence is testable in any dispute.
* **Ecommerce applications.** Financial transactions or payments or valuable e-commerce.
* Use of anonymous ~(Class 1 or Member SubRoot)~ certificates in any application that requires or expects identity.
#### 1.4.4. Limited certificate uses
By contract or within a specific environment (e.g. internal to a company), CAcert Members are permitted to use Certificates for higher security, customised or experimental applications. Any such usage, however, is limited to such entities and these entities take on the whole responsible for any harm or liability caused by such usage.
**Digital signing applications.** CAcert client certificates may be used by Assured Members in applications that provide or support the human signing of documents (known here as "digital signing"). This must be part of a wider framework and set of rules. Usage and reliance must be documented either under a separate CAcert digital signing policy or other external regime agreed by the parties.
#### 1.4.5. Roots and Names
**Named Certificates.** Assured Members may be issued certificates with their verified names in the certificate. In this role, CAcert operates and supports a network of Assurers who verify the identity of the Members. All Names are verified, either by Assurance or another defined method under policy (c. f. Organisations).
**Anonymous Certificates.** Members can be issued certificates that are anonymous, which is defined as the certificate with no Name included, or a shared name such as "Community Member". These may be considered to be somewhere between Named certificates and self-signed certificates. They have serial numbers in them which is ultimately traceable via dispute to a Member, but reliance is undefined. In this role, CAcert provides the infrastructure, saving the Members from managing a difficult and messy process in order to get manufactured certificates.
**Pseudonymous Certificates.** Note that CAcert does not currently issue pseudonymous certificates, being those with a name chosen by the Member and not verifiable according to documents.
**Advanced Certificates.** Members who are as yet unassured are not permitted to create advanced forms such as wildcard or subjectAltName certificates.
**Roots.** The (new) CAcert root layout is as below. These roots are pending Audit, and will be submitted to vendors via the (Top-level) Root.
* **(Top-level) Root.** Used to sign on-line CAcert Subordinate CA certificates only. This Root is kept offline.
* **Unassured Member** **Subordinate CA certificates.** For Community Members who are new and unassured (some restrictions exist). Reliance is undefined. (Replacement for the Class 1 root, matches "Domain Validation" type.)
* **Assured Member Subordinate CA certificates.** Only available for Assured individual Members, intended to sign certificates with Names. Suitable for Reliance under this and other policies. Approximates the type known as Individual Validation.
* **Organisation Subordinate CA certificates.** Only available for Assured Organisation Members. Suitable for Reliance under this and other policies. Approximates the type known as Organisational Validation.
* **Note**: An **Unassured Member** is a Member having 0-49 Assurance points. An **Assured Member** is a Member having 50+ APs. An **Assurer** is a Member which have 10+ APs and passed the Assurer Challenge exam. An **Organisation** must have its **Organisation Assurer**.
| | | | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | _Level of Assurance_ | | | | | |
| | Members &#134; | | Assured Members | | Assurers | |
| _Class of Root_ | Anon | Name | Anon | Name | Name+Anon | _Remarks_ |
| **Root CA certificate** Top level root | o | o | o | o | o | Signs other CAcert Subordinate CA certificates only. |
| **Person-unassured** Subordinate CA cert. | v | x | v | v | v | &#134; For Members meeting basic checks in [&#167;4.2.2](#p4.2.2) (Reliance is undefined.) |
| **Client-unassured** Subordinate CA cert. | v | x | v | v | v | &#134; For Members meeting basic checks in [&#167;4.2.2](#p4.2.2) (Reliance is undefined.) |
| **Server-unassured** Subordinate CA cert. | v | x | v | v | v | &#134; For Members meeting basic checks in [&#167;4.2.2](#p4.2.2) (Reliance is undefined.) |
| **Person-assured** Subordinate CA cert. | x | x | v | v | v | Assured Members only. Fully intended for reliance. |
| **Client-assured** Subordinate CA cert. | x | x | v | v | v | Assured Members only. Fully intended for reliance. |
| **Server-assured** Subordinate CA cert. | x | x | v | v | v | Assured Members only. Fully intended for reliance. |
| **Person-organisation** Subordinate CA cert. | x | x | v | v | v | Assured Organisation Members only. Fully intended for reliance. |
| **Client-organisation** Subordinate CA cert. | x | x | v | v | v | Assured Organisation Members only. Fully intended for reliance. |
| **Server-organisation** Subordinate CA cert. | x | x | v | v | v | Assured Organisation Members only. Fully intended for reliance. |
| Expiry of Certificates | ~6 months | | ~12 months (following CA/B forum) | | | |
| Types | Person, Client, Server | | wildcard, subjectAltName | | code-signing | (Inclusive to the left.) |
Table 1.4.5.b Certificate under Audit Roots
Fig. 1.4.1 shows the certificate tree and the Root paths of length = 3
![Fig. 1.4.1](RSA-tree.jpg)
Following information on OLD roots here for descriptive and historical purposes only. When CPS goes to DRAFT, this needs to be converted into a short summary of the way OLD roots are used and its relationship to this CPS. E.g., "OLD roots are used for testing and other purposes outside this CPS." Because ... they still exist, and people will look at the CPS to figure it out.
| | | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | _Level of Assurance_ | | | | |
| | Members | | Assured Members | | |
| _Class of Root_ | Anonymous | Named | Anonymous | Named | _Remarks_ |
| Class **1** | v | x | v | v | Available for all Members, reliance is undefined. |
| Class **3** | x | x | v | v | Assured Members only. Intended for Reliance. |
| Expiry of Certificates | ~6 months | | ~24 months | | |
| Types available | simple only | | wildcard, subjectAltName | | |
Table 1.4.5. Certificates under Old Roots - **Audit Fail**
**Old Roots.** The old CAcert root layout is as below. These roots are **Audit Fail** and will only be used where new roots do not serve:
* (old) **Class 1 root.** Used primarily for certificates with no names and by unassured Members. For compatibility only, Assured Members may also use this root. **According to CA/B, all Members should NOT use it.**
* (old) **Class 3 root.** Used primarily for certificates including the names of Assured Members. Signed by Class 1 root. Members can decide to rely on these certificates for Assured Members by selecting the Class 3 root for Assured Members as trust anchor.
* Current Mozilla position has drifted from Class 1,2,3s to DV, IV+OV and EV posture. Except, the actual posture is either unstated or difficult to fathom.
* scheme for future roots is at [NewRootsTaskForce](https://wiki.cacert.org/Roots/NewRootsTaskForce).
* END OLD ROOTS
### 1.5. Policy administration
See [1.2 Document Name and Identification](#p1.2) for general scope of this document.
#### 1.5.1. Organization administering the document
This document is administered by the policy group of the CAcert Community under Policy on Policy ([COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html)).
#### 1.5.2. Contact person
For questions including about this document:
* Join the policy group, by means of the discussion forum at [lists.cacert.org](https://lists.cacert.org/wws/lists) .
* Send email to &lt; support AT cacert DOT org &gt;
* IRC: irc.cacert.org #CAcert (ssl port 7000, non-ssl port 6667)
#### 1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy
This CPS and all other policy documents are managed by the policy group, which is a group of Members of the Community found at policy forum. See discussion forums above.
#### 1.5.4. CPS approval procedures
CPS is controlled and updated according to the Policy on Policy ([COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html)) which is part of Configuration-Control Specification (COD2).
In brief, the policy forum prepares and discusses. After a last call, the document moves to DRAFT status for a defined period. If no challenges have been received in the defined period, it moves to POLICY status. The process is modelled after some elements of the RFC process by the IETF.
#### 1.5.5 CPS updates
As per above.
### 1.6. Definitions and acronyms
**Certificate**. A certificate is a piece of cryptographic data used to validate certain statements, especially those of identity and membership.
**Root CA certificate** \- the main certificate of a CA (Main Root, top level Root).
**Subordinate CA certificate** (Subroot, intermediate CA certificate).
**Issuer DN** \- Distinguished Name of the issuer authority.
**Subject DN** \- Distinguished Name of the subject, for which the certificate is issued.
**CAcert**. CAcert is a Community certificate authority as defined under [&#167;1.2 Identification](#p1.2).
**Member**. Everyone who agrees to the CAcert Community Agreement ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)). This generally implies having an account registered at CAcert and making use of CAcert's data, programs or services. A Member may be an individual ("natural person") or an organisation (sometimes, "legal person").
**Community**. The group of Members who agree to the CAcert Community Agreement ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)) or equivalent agreements.
**Unassured Member**. A Member who has not yet been Assured, or who is assured with 0-49 APs (COD13 Assurance Policy #2.3).
**Unassured Member** is a member of the CAcert community who has <50 APs (COD13 Assurance Policy #2.3) (in terms of COD13 Assurance Policy: Prospective Member with created account + Member).
**Subscriber**. A Member who requests and receives a certificate.
**Assured Member**. A Member whose identity has been sufficiently verified by Assurers or other approved methods under Assurance Policy, and received at least 50 APs (COD13 Assurance Policy #2.3).
**Assured Member** is a member of the CAcert community who has 50+ APs (COD13 Assurance Policy #2.3) (in terms of COD13 Assurance Policy: Assured Member + Prospective Assurer + Assurer).
**Assurer**. An Assured Member who is authorised under Assurance Policy to verify the identity of other Members.
**Name**. As defined in the Assurance Policy ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)), to describe a name of a Member that is verified by the Assurance process.
**Organisation Administrator**. ("O-Admin") An Assurer who is authorised to act for an Organisation. The O-Admin is authorised by an organisation to vouch for the identity of other users of the organisation.
**Organisation Assurer**. An Assurer who is authorised to conduct assurances on organisations.
**Non-Related Persons**. ("NRPs") are general users of browsers and similar software. The NRPs are generally unaware of CAcert or the certificates that they may use, and are unaware of the ramifications of usage. They are not permitted to RELY, but may USE, under the Root Distribution License ([COD14](https://www.cacert.org/policy/RootDistributionLicense.html)).
**Reliance**. An industry term referring to the act of making a decision, including taking a risk, which decision is in part or in whole informed or on the basis of the contents of a certificate.
**Relying Party**. An industry term refering to someone who relies (that is, makes decisions or takes risks) in part or in whole on a certificate.
**Subscriber Naming.** The term used in this CPS to describe all naming data within a certificate. Approximately similar terms from Industry such as "Subject naming" and "Distinguished Name" are not used here.
**Verification**. An industry term referring to the act of checking and controlling the accuracy and utility of a single claim.
**Validation**. An industry term referring to the process of inspecting and verifying the information and subsidiary claims behind a claim.
**Usage**. The event of allowing a certificate to participate in a protocol, as decided and facilitated by a user's software. Generally, Usage does not require significant input, if any, on the part of the user. This defers all decisions to the user software, thus elevating the software as user's only and complete Validation Authority or Agent.
**CAcert Relying Party**. CAcert Members who make decisions based in part or in whole on a certificate issued by CAcert. Only CAcert Members are permitted to Rely on CAcert certificates, subject to the CAcert Community Agreement.
**Vendors.** Non-members who distribute CAcert's root or intermediate certificates in any way, including but not limited to delivering these certificates with their products, e.g. browsers, mailers or servers. Vendors are covered under a separate licence. As of the moment, this licence is not written.
**Configuration-Control Specification** "CCS". The audit criteria that controls this CPS. The CCS is documented in COD2, itself a controlled document under CCS.
**CAcert Official Document** (COD). Controlled Documents that are part of the CCS.
**Abbreviations:**
**CA** (Certification Authority)
**OCSP** (On-line Certificate Status Protocol) - the protocol and server giving the quick informaton about revoked certificates based on their serial numbers
**CSR** (Certificate Signing Request) - user's utilities, as OpenSSL, XCA, and others, generate pairs of keys; one key of each pair is claimed as the private key and saved on user's machine; the other key with some added information about the user is usually given the PEM (Base64 coded) format and serves as CSR, the request to issue a certificate
**WoT** (Web of Trust) -
**CRL** (Certificate Revoke List) - the list of revoked certificates
**AP** (Assurance Points) - points a member can collect by means of assurance appointments or TIP
**RSA**: Rivest–Shamir–Adleman cryptography, developed 1978; a key pair can be generated using the original RSA method
**ECC**: Elliptic Curve Cryptography - gives greater cryptographic strength then RSA at equivalent key size, developed 1985; a key pair can be generated using the ECC method
**DN:** Distinguished Name
**X.509:** an [International Telecommunication Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Telecommunication_Union) (ITU) standard defining the format of [public key certificates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate)
**X.509v3:** the certificate standard X.509, version 3
**FQDN:** Fully Qualified Domain Name, e.g. a website name including domain
**EKU:** Extended Key Usage, attribute suite in certificates
**msEFS:** (EKU attribute) Encrypted File System by Microsoft
**msCGS:** (EKU attribute) Server Gated Cryptography, an extension for SSL/TLS certificates that allows older browsers with 40-bit encryption to upgrade to 128-bit encryption. By Microsoft.
**nsCGS:** (EKU attribute) Server Gated Cryptography, an extension for SSL/TLS certificates that allows older browsers with 40-bit encryption to upgrade to 128-bit encryption. By Netscape.
**Cacert related abbreviations:**
**COD#:** Cacert official Documents, numbered. Numbers 4, 10, 12 do not exist anymore. The remaining ones are:
**COD1: PoP** Policy on Policies
**COD2: CCS** Configuration-Control Specification
**COD3: COD** Documents Policy
**COD5: PP** Privacy Policy
**COD6: CPS** Certification Practice Statement (this document)
**COD7: DRP** Dispute Resolution Policy
**COD8: SP** Security Policy
**COD9: CCA** Cacert Community Agreement
**COD11: OAP** Organization Assurance Policy
**COD13: AP** Assurance Policy
**COD14: RDL** Root Distribution License
**DRC:** David Ross Criteria – (rossde.com) _are not longer maintained and common industrial standards should be followed._ See https://wiki.cacert.org/Roots/EscrowAndRecovery
2\. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES
-----------------------------------------------
### 2.1. Repositories
CAcert operates no repositories in the sense of lookup for non-certificate-related information for the general public.
Under the Assurance Policy ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)), there are means for Members to search, retrieve and verify certain data about themselves and others.
### 2.2. Publication of certification information
CAcert publishes:
* A repository of CRLs. An OCSP responder is in operation.
* The Root CA certificate and Subordinate CA certificates.
CAcert does not expressly publish information on issued certificates. However, due to the purpose of certificates, and the essential public nature of Names and Email addresses, all information within certificates is presumed to be public and published, once issued and delivered to the Member.
### 2.3. Time or frequency of publication
Root CA Certificate, Subordinate CA Certificates, and CRLs, are made available on issuance.
### 2.4. Access controls on repositories
No stipulation.
3\. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
-------------------------------------
### 3.1. Naming
#### 3.1.1. Types of names
**Person** **Certificates.** The Subscriber Naming consists of:
* subjectAltName= One, or more, of the Subscriber's verified email addresses, in rfc822 Name format.
* SSO in subjectAltName?.
* ~EmailAddress=~ ~One, or more, of the Subscriber's verified email addresses. This is deprecated under RFC5280 [4 .1.2.6](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.6) and is to be phased out.~ Also includes a SHA1 hash of a random number if the member selects SSO (Single Sign On ID) during submission of CSR.
* CN= The common name takes its value from one of:
* For all Members, the string "CAcert WoT Member" may be used for anonymous certificates.
* For individual Members, a Name of the Subscriber, as Assured under AP.
* For Organisation Members, an organisation-chosen name, as verified under OAP.
* [bug 672](https://bugs.cacert.org/view.html?id=672) filed on subjectAltName.
* O-Admin must verify as per [p20081016](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDecisions#p20081016).
* it is a wip for OAP to state how this is done.
* curiously, (RFC5280) verification is only mandated for subjectAltName not subject field.
* All strings contained in a certificate should be coded as UTF-8.
* ~what Directory String is used in above? UTF8String is specified by RFC52804.1.2.6? is this important for the CPS to state?~
**Client Certificates.** The Subscriber Naming consists of:
* CN= The common name is the FQDN of a website where is to connect to, e.g. for the purpose of authentication to a web application.
* subjectAltName= Additional host/website FQDN names
* All other fields are optional and must either match the CN or they must be empty
**Individual Server Certificates.** The Subscriber Naming consists of:
* CN= The common name is the host name out of a domain for which the Member is a domain master.
* subjectAltName= Additional host names for which the Member is a domain master may be added to permit the certificate to serve multiple domains on one IP number.
* All other fields are optional and must either match the CN or they must be empty
**Certificates for Organisations.** In addition to the above, the following applies:
* OU= organizationalUnitName (set by O-Admin, must be verified by O-Admin).
* O= organizationName is the fixed name of the Organisation.
* L= localityName
* ST= stateOrProvinceName
* C= countryName
* contact= EMail Address of Contact.
Except for the OU and CN, fields are taken from the Member's account and are as verified by the Organisation Assurance process. Other Subscriber information that is collected and/or retained does not go into the certificate.
#### 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful
Each Member's Name (CN= field) is assured under the Assurance Policy ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)) or subsidiary policies (such as Organisation Assurance Policy). Refer to those documents for meanings and variations.
Anonymous certificates have the same `subject` field common name. See [&#167;1.4.5.](#p1.4.5).
Email addresses are verified according to [&#167;4.2.2.](#p4.2.2)
#### 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
See [&#167;1.4.5](#p1.4.5).
#### 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms
Interpretation of Names is controlled by the Assurance Policy, is administered by means of the Member's account, and is subject to change by the Arbitrator. Changes to the interpretation by means of Arbitration should be expected as fraud (e.g., phishing) may move too quickly for policies to fully document rules.
#### 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names
Uniqueness of Names within certificates is not guaranteed. Each certificate has a unique serial number which maps to a unique account, and thus maps to a unique Member. See the Assurance Statement within Assurance Policy ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)).
Domain names and email address can only be registered to one Member.
#### 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
Organisation Assurance Policy ([COD11](https://www.cacert.org/policy/OrganisationAssurancePolicy.html)) controls issues such as trademarks where applicable. A trademark can be disputed by filing a dispute. See [&#167;9.13](#adr).
#### 3.1.7. International Domain Names
Certificates containing International Domain Names, being those containing a ACE prefix ([RFC3490 Section 5](http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3490#section-5)), will only be issued to domains satisfying one or more of the following conditions:
* The Top Level Domain (TLD) Registrar associated with the domain has a policy that has taken measures to prevent two homographic domains being registered to different entities down to an accepted level.
* Domains contain only code points from a single unicode character script, excluding the "Common" script, with the additionally allowed numberic characters \[0-9\], and an ACSII hyphen '-'.
Email address containing International Domain Names in the domain portion of the email address will also be required to satisfy one of the above conditions.
The following is a list of accepted TLD Registrars:
| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| .ac | [Registry](http://www.nic.ac/) | [Policy](http://www.nic.ac/pdf/AC-IDN-Policy.pdf) |
| .ar | [Registry](http://www.nic.ar/) | [Policy](http://www.nic.ar/616.html) |
| .at | [Registry](http://www.nic.at/) | [Policy](http://www.nic.at/en/service/legal_information/registration_guidelines/) ([character list](http://www.nic.at/en/service/technical_information/idn/charset_converter/)) |
| .biz | [Registry](http://www.neustarregistry.biz/) | [Policy](http://www.neustarregistry.biz/products/idns) |
| .br | [Registry](http://registro.br/) | [Policy](http://registro.br/faq/faq6.html) |
| .cat | [Registry](http://www.domini.cat/) | [Policy](http://www.domini.cat/normativa/en_normativa_registre.html) |
| .ch | [Registry](http://www.switch.ch/id/) | [Policy](http://www.switch.ch/id/terms/agb.html#anhang1) |
| .cl | [Registry](http://www.nic.cl/) | [Policy](http://www.nic.cl/CL-IDN-policy.html) |
| .cn | [Registry](http://www.cnnic.net.cn/) | [Policy](http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3743.html) (JET Guidelines) |
| .de | [Registry](http://www.denic.de/) | [Policy](http://www.denic.de/en/richtlinien.html) |
| .dk | [Registry](http://www.dk-hostmaster.dk/) | [Policy](http://www.dk-hostmaster.dk/index.html?id=151) |
| .es | [Registry](https://www.nic.es/) | [Policy](https://www.nic.es/media/2008-12/1228818323935.pdf) |
| .fi | [Registry](http://www.ficora.fi/) | [Policy](http://www.ficora.fi/en/index/palvelut/fiverkkotunnukset/aakkostenkaytto.html) |
| .gr | [Registry](https://grweb.ics.forth.gr/english/index.html) | [Policy](https://grweb.ics.forth.gr/english/ENCharacterTable1.jsp) |
| .hu | [Registry](http://www.domain.hu/domain/) | [Policy](http://www.domain.hu/domain/English/szabalyzat.html) (section 2.1.2) |
| .info | [Registry](http://www.afilias.info/) | [Policy](http://www.afilias.info/register/idn/) |
| .io | [Registry](http://www.nic.io/) | [Policy](http://www.nic.io/IO-IDN-Policy.pdf) |
| .ir | [Registry](https://www.nic.ir/) | [Policy](https://www.nic.ir/IDN) |
| .is | [Registry](http://www.isnic.is/) | [Policy](http://www.isnic.is/english/domain/rules.html) |
| .jp | [Registry](http://jprs.co.jp/) | [Policy](http://www.iana.org/assignments/idn/jp-japanese.html) |
| .kr | [Registry](http://domain.nic.or.kr/) | [Policy](http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3743.html) (JET Guidelines) |
| .li | [Registry](http://www.switch.ch/id/) | [Policy](http://www.switch.ch/id/terms/agb.html#anhang1) (managed by .ch registry) |
| .lt | [Registry](http://www.domreg.lt/public?pg=&sp=&loc=en) | [Policy](http://www.domreg.lt/public?pg=8A7FB6&sp=idn&loc=en) ([character list](http://www.domreg.lt/static/doc/public/idn_symbols-en.pdf)) |
| .museum | [Registry](http://about.museum/) | [Policy](http://about.museum/idn/idnpolicy.html) |
| .no | [Registry](http://www.norid.no/) | [Policy](http://www.norid.no/domeneregistrering/veiviser.en.html) (section 4) |
| .org | [Registry](http://www.pir.org/) | [Policy](http://pir.org/PDFs/ORG-Extended-Characters-22-Jan-07.pdf) |
| .pl | [Registry](http://www.nask.pl/) | [Policy](http://www.dns.pl/IDN/idn-registration-policy.txt) |
| .pr | [Registry](https://www.nic.pr/) | [Policy](https://www.nic.pr/idn_rules.asp) |
| .se | [Registry](http://www.nic-se.se/) | [Policy](http://www.iis.se/en/domaner/internationaliserad-doman-idn/) ([character list](http://www.iis.se/docs/teckentabell-03.pdf)) |
| .sh | [Registry](http://www.nic.sh/) | [Policy](http://www.nic.sh/SH-IDN-Policy.pdf) |
| .th | [Registry](http://www.thnic.or.th/) | [Policy](http://www.iana.org/assignments/idn/th-thai.html) |
| .tm | [Registry](http://www.nic.tm/) | [Policy](http://www.nic.tm/TM-IDN-Policy.pdf) |
| .tw | [Registry](http://www.twnic.net.tw/) | [Policy](http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3743.html) (JET Guidelines) |
| .vn | [Registry](http://www.vnnic.net.vn/) | [Policy](http://www.vnnic.vn/english/5-6-300-2-2-04-20071115.htm) ([character list](http://vietunicode.sourceforge.net/tcvn6909.pdf)) |
This criteria will apply to the email address and server host name fields for all certificate types.
The CAcert Inc. Board or CAcert policy group has the authority to decide to add or remove accepted TLD Registrars on this list.
### 3.2. Initial Identity Verification
Identity verification is controlled by the [Assurance Policy](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html) ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)). The reader is refered to the Assurance Policy, the following is representative and brief only.
#### 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key
CAcert uses industry-standard techniques to prove the possession of the private key.
For X.509 server certificates, the stale digital signature of the CSR is verified. For X.509 client certificates for "Netscape" browsers, SPKAC uses a challenge-response protocol to check the private key dynamically. For X.509 client certificates for "explorer" browsers, ActiveX uses a challenge-response protocol to check the private key dynamically.
#### 3.2.2. Authentication of Individual Identity
**Agreement.** An Internet user becomes a Member by agreeing to the CAcert Community Agreement ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)) and registering an account on the online website. During the registration process Members are asked to supply information about themselves:
* A valid working email.
* Full Name and Date of Birth such as is found on Identity documents.
* Personal Questions used only for Password Retrieval.
The online account establishes the method of authentication for all service requests such as certificates.
**Assurance.** Each Member is assured according to Assurance Policy ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)).
**Certificates.** Based on the total number of Assurance Points that a Member (Name) has, the Member can get different levels of certificates. See [&#167;1.4.5](#p1.4.5). See Table 3.2.b. When Members have 50 or more points, they become _Assured Members_ and may then request certificates that state their Assured Name(s).
| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Assurance Points | Level | Service | Comments |
| 0 | Unassured Member | Anonymous | Certificates with no Name, under "-unassured" Subordinate CA Root. Limited to ~6 months expiry. |
| 1-49 | Unassured Member | Anonymous | Certificates with no Name, under "-unassured" Subordinate CA Root. Limited to ~6 months expiry. |
| | | | |
| 50-99 | Assured Member | Verified | Certificates with Verified Name for S/MIME, web servers, "digital signing", under "-assured"/"-organization" Subordinate CA Root. Expiry after ~12 months is available. |
| 100, and passed the Assurer Challenge test | Assurer | As an Assured Member, plus can request for issuing Code-signing certificates | As an Assured Member, plus can assure other Members and can request for issuing Code-signing certificates |
Table 3.2.b - How Assurance Points are used in Certificates
#### 3.2.3. Authentication of organization identity
Verification of organisations is delegated by the Assurance Policy to the Organisation Assurance Policy ([COD11](https://www.cacert.org/policy/OrganisationAssurancePolicy.html)). The reader is refered to the Organisation Assurance Policy, the following is representative and brief only.
Organisations present special challenges. The Assurance process for Organisations is intended to permit the organisational Name to appear in certificates. The process relies heavily on the Individual process described above.
Organisation Assurance achieves the standard stated in the OAP, briefly presented here:
1. the organisation exists,
2. the organisation name is correct and consistent,
3. signing rights: requestor can sign on behalf of the organisation, and
4. the organisation has agreed to the terms of the CAcert Community Agreement ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)), and is therefore subject to Arbitration.
* As of the current time of writing, OA lacks critical documentation and there are bugs identified with no response.
* [documented bugs](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDrafts/OrganisationAssurance).
* Therefore Organisations will not participate in the current audit cycle of roots.
* See [wiki](https://wiki.cacert.org/OrganisationAssurance) for any progress on this.
#### 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information
All information in the certificate is verified, see Relying Party Statement, &#167;4.5.2.
#### 3.2.5. Validation of authority
The authorisation to obtain a certificate is established as follows:
**Addresses.** The member claims authority over a domain or email address when adding the address, [&#167;4.1.2](#p4.1.2). (Control is tested by means described in [&#167;4.2.2](#p4.2.2).)
**Individuals.** The authority to participate as a Member is established by the CAcert Community Agreement ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)). Assurances are requested by means of the signed CAP form.
**Organisations.** The authority for Organisation Assurance is established in the COAP form, as signed by an authorised representative of the organisation. The authority for the Organisation Administrator (O-Admin) is also established on the COAP form. See Organisation Assurance Policy.
#### 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation
CAcert does not currently issue certificates to subordinate CAs (except its own, see the table 1.4.5.b) or other PKIs. Other CAs may become Members, and are then subject to the same reliance provisions as all Members.
### 3.3. Re-key Requests
Via the Member's account.
### 3.4. Revocations Requests
Via the Member's account. In the event that the Member has lost the password, or similar, the Member emails the support team who either work through the lost-password questions process or file a dispute.
4\. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
---------------------------------------------------
The general life-cycle for a new certificate for an Individual Member is:
1. Member adds claim to an address (domain/email). (Person, Server)
2. System probes address for control. (Person, Server)
3. Member creates key pair.
4. Member submits CSR with desired options (Anonymous Certificate, SSO, Root Certificate).
5. System validates and accepts CSR based on known information: claims, assurance, controls, technicalities.
6. System signs certificate.
7. System makes signed certificate available to Member.
8. Member accepts certificate.
(Some steps are not applicable, such as anonymous certificates.)
With the new web application:
1. Member uses web application to generate key pair of a selected strength, i.e. the private key and the CSR containing the corresponding public key.
2. Member swaps to his/her account on the CAcert WoT.
3. Member adds claim to an address(es)/domain(s) from the account by mean of selection from the list of his/her approved ones. (Person, Server)
4. Member submits CSR generated by the web application, and more CSR options (Member’s Name in Certificate, SSO).
5. System validates and acepts the CSR.
6. System selects the proper Subordinate CA Root, and signs the certificate.
7. Member swaps back to the web application and submits the certificate just created/signed.
8. Member sets a password for the private key enciphering.
9. Web application assembles the PKCS12 format (encrypted private key + certificate + root path).
10. Web application makes the PKCS12 file available to the Member.
11. Member accepts and downloads the PKCS12 file, and installs it on his/her system/browser/Email client.
### 4.1. Certificate Application
#### 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application
Members may submit certificate applications. On issuance of certificates, Members become Subscribers.
#### 4.1.2. Adding Addresses
The Member can claim ownership or authorised control of a domain or email address on the online system. This is a necessary step towards issuing a certificate. There are these controls:
* The claim of ownership or control is legally significant and may be referred to dispute resolution.
* Each unique primary address can be handled by one account only.
* When the Member makes the claim, the certificate application system automatically initiates the check of control, as below.
#### 4.1.3. Preparing CSR
Members generate their own key-pairs, or use the web application. The CAcert Community Agreement ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)) obliges the Member as responsible for security. See CCA2.5, &#167;9.6.
The Certificate Signing Request (CSR) is prepared by the Member, or the web application, for presentation to the automated system. The acceptable format is PEM.
### 4.2. Certificate application processing
The CA's certificate application process is completely automated. Requests, approvals and rejections are handled by the website system. Each application should be processed in less than a minute.
Where certificates are requested for more than one purpose, the requirements for each purpose must be fulfilled.
#### 4.2.1. Authentication
The Member logs in to his/her account on the CAcert website and thereby authenticates himself/herself with username and passphrase or with his/her CAcert client-side digital certificate.
#### 4.2.2. Verifying Control
In principle, at least two controls are placed on each address.
**Email-Ping.** Email addresses are verified by means of an _Email-Ping test_:
* The system generates a cookie (a random, hard-to-guess code) and formats it as a string.
* The system sends the cookie to the Member in an Email as an URL link.
* Once the Member receives the Email, s/he enters the cookie into the website, using the link from the Email.
* The entry of the code verifies control of that email account.
**Email Control.** Email addresses for client certificates are verified by passing the following checks:
1. An Email-ping test is done on the email address.
2. ~The Member must have signed a CAP form or equivalent,~ ~and been awarded at least one Assurance point~~.~
**Domain Control.** Domains addresses for server certificates are verified by passing two of the following checks:
1. An Email-ping test is done on an email address chosen from _whois_ or interpolated from the domain name.
2. The system generates a cookie which is then placed in DNS by the Member.
3. The system generates a cookie which is then placed in HTTP headers or a text file on the website by the Member.
4. Statement by at least 2 Assurers about ownership/control of the domain name.
5. The system generates a cookie which is then placed in whois registry information by the Member.
Notes.
* Other methods can be added from time to time by CAcert.
* Static cookies should remain for the duration of a certificate for occasional re-testing.
* Dynamic tests can be repeated at a later time of CAcert's choosing.
* Domain control checks may be extended to apply to email control in the future.
* As of the time of writing, only a singular Email-ping is implemented in the technical system.
* A further approved check is the 1 pt Assurance.
* Practically, this would mean that certificates can only be issued under Audit Roots to Members with 1 point.
* Criteria DRC C.7.f, A.2.q, A.2.i indicate registry whois reading. Also A.2.h.
* Current view is that this will be resolved in BirdShack.
#### 4.2.3. Options Available
The Member has options available:
* Each Email address that is verified is available for Person Certificates.
* Each Domain address that is verified is available for Server Certificates.
* If the Member is unassured then only the -unassured Subordinate CA Root is available.
* If the Member is Assured then both -assured and -unassured Subordinate CA Roots are available.
* If a Member’s Name is assured then it may be put in a Person certificate or an OpenPGP signature.
#### 4.2.4. Person Certificate Procedures
For an individual Person certificate, the following is required:
* The email address is claimed and added.
* The email address is ping-tested.
* ~For the~ ~Person-unassured Subordinate CA Root~~,~ ~the Member must have at least one point of Assurance and have signed a CAP form.~
* For the Person-assured Subordinate CA Root, the Member must have at least fifty points of Assurance.
* To include a Member’s Name, the Name must be assured to at least fifty points.
#### 4.2.5. Server Certificate Procedures
For a Server certificate, the following is required:
* The domain is claimed and added.
* The domain is checked twice as above.
* ~For the Server-unassured Subordinate CA Root, the Member must have at least one point of Assurance and have signed a CAP form.~
* For the Server-assured Subordinate CA Root, the Member must have at least fifty points of Assurance.
#### 4.2.6. Client Certificate Procedure
For a Client certificate, the following is required:
* For the Client-assured Subordinate CA Root, the Member must have at least fifty points of Assurance.
* ???
#### 4.2.7. Code-signing Certificate Procedures
Code-signing certificates are made available to Assurers only. They are processed in a similar manner to Person certificates.
#### 4.2.8. Organisation Domain Verification
Organisation Domains are handled under the Organisation Assurance Policy and the Organisation Handbook.
* As of time of writing, there is no Handbook for Organisation Assurers or for the Organisation, and the policy needs rework; so (audit) roots will not have OA certs ....
* [Drafts](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDrafts/OrganisationAssurance) for ongoing story.
### 4.3. Certificate issuance
#### 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance
**Key Sizes.** Members may request keys of any size permitted by the key algorithm. Many older hardware devices require small keys.
**Algorithms.** CAcert currently supports the RSA and the ECC algorithms for X.509 keys. X.509 signing uses the SHA256 message digest algorithm. OpenPGP Signing uses RSA signing over RSA and DSA keys.
**Process for Certificates:** All details in each certificate are verified by the website issuance system. Issuance is based on a 'template' system that selects profiles for certificate lifetime, size, algorithm.
1. The CSR is verified.
2. Data is extracted from CSR and verified:
* Name &#167;3.1,
* Email address [&#167;4.2.2](#p4.2.2),
* Domain address [&#167;4.2.2](#p4.2.2).
3. Certificate is generated from template.
4. ~Data is copied from CSR.~ No data about the user is copied from CSR. That data is copied from the user’s account.
5. Certificate is signed.
6. Certificate is stored ~as well as~ and a notification is mailed.
**Process for OpenPGP key signatures:** All details in each Sub-ID are verified by the website issuance system. Issuance is based on the configuration that selects the profile for signature lifetime, size, algorithm following the process:
1. The public key is verified.
2. Data is extracted from the key and verified (Name, Emails). Only the combinations of data in Table 4.3.1 are permitted.
3. OpenPGP Key Signature is generated.
4. Key Signature is applied to the key.
5. The signed key is stored and a notification is mailed.
| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Verified Name | Unverified Name | Empty Name |
| Verified email | v | x | v |
| Unverified email | x | x | x |
| Empty email | v | x | x |
Table 4.3.1. Permitted Data in Signed OpenPgp Keys
#### 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate
Once signed, the certificate is made available via the Member's account, and a notification is emailed to the Member. It is also archived internally.
### 4.4. Certificate acceptance
#### 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
There is no need for the Member to explicitly accept the certificate. In case the Member does not accept the certificate, the certificate ~has to~ can be revoked and made again.
#### 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA
CAcert does not currently publish the issued certificates in any repository. In the event that CAcert will run a repository, the publication of certificates and signatures there will be at the Member's options. However note that certificates that are issued and delivered to the Member are presumed to be published. See &#167;2.2.
#### 4.4.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
There are no external entities that are notified about issued certificates.
### 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage
All Members (subscribers and relying parties) are obliged according to the CAcert Community Agreement ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)) See especially 2.3 through 2.5.
#### 4.5.1. Subscriber Usage and Responsibilities
Subscribers should use keys only for their proper purpose, as indicated by the certificate, or by wider agreement with others.
#### 4.5.2. Relying Party Usage and Responsibilities
Relying parties (Members) may rely on the following.
**Relying Party Statement**
Certificates are issued to Members only.
All information in a certificate is verified.
The following notes are in addition to the Relying Party Statement, and can be seen as limitations on it.
##### 4.5.2.a Methods of Verification
The term Verification as used in the Relying Party Statement means one of
| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Type | How | Authority | remarks |
| Assurance | under CAcert Assurance Programme (CAP) | Assurance Policy ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)) | only information assured to 50\+ points under CAP is placed in the certificate |
| Evaluation | under automated domain and email checks | this CPS | see &#167;4.2.2 |
| Controlled | programs or "profiles" that check the information within the CSR | this CPS | see &#167;7.1 |
##### 4.5.2.b Who may rely
**Members may rely.** Relying parties are Members, and as such are bound by this CPS and the CAcert Community Agreement ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)). The licence and permission to rely is not assignable.
**Suppliers of Software.** CAcert roots may be distributed in software, and those providers may enter into agreement with CAcert by means of the Third Party Vendor - Disclaimer and Licence (wip). This licence brings the supplier in to the Community to the extent that ...WIP comment: they agree to dispute resolution within CAcert's forum.
* Just exactly what the 3PV-DaL says is unclear.
* The document itself is more a collection of ideas.
**NRPs may not rely.** If not related to CAcert by means of an agreement that binds the parties to dispute resolution within CAcert's forum, a person is a Non-Related-Person (NRP). An NRP is not permitted to rely and is not a Relying Party. For more details, see the Root Distribution License ([COD14](https://www.cacert.org/policy/RootDistributionLicense.html)).
##### 4.5.2.c The Act of Reliance
**Decision making.** Reliance means taking a decision that is in part or in whole based on the information in the certificate. A Relying Party may incorporate the information in the certificate, and the implied information such as Membership, into her decision-making. In making a decision, a Relying Party should also:
* include his/her own overall risk equation,
* include the general limitations of the Assurance process, certificates, and wider security considerations,
* make additional checks to provide more information,
* consider any wider agreement with the other Member, and
* use an appropriate protocol or custom of reliance (below).
**Examining the Certificate.** A Relying Party must make her own decision in using each certificate. He/she must examine the certificate, a process called _validation_. Certificate-related information includes, but is not limited to:
* Name,
* expiry time of certificate,
* current certificate revocation list (CRL),
* certificate chain and the validity check of the certificates in the chain,
* issuer of certificate (CAcert),
* Subordinate CA certificate is intended for reliance (-assured, -organisation ~and Class 3~)
* purpose of certificate.
**Keeping Records.** Records should be kept, appropriate to the import of the decision. The certificate should be preserved. This should include sufficient evidence to establish who the parties are (especially, the certificate relied upon), to establish the transaction in question, and to establish the wider agreement that defines the act.
**Wider Protocol.** In principle, reliance will be part of a wider protocol (customary method in reaching and preserving agreement) that presents and preserves sufficient of the evidence for dispute resolution under CAcert's forum of Arbitration. The protocol should be agreed amongst the parties, and tuned to the needs. This CPS does not define any such protocol. In the absence of such a protocol, reliance will be weakened; a dispute without sufficient evidence may be dismissed by an Arbitrator.
**As Compared to Usage**. Reliance goes beyond Usage. The latter is limited to letting the software act as the total and only Validation Authority. When relying, the Member also augments the algorithmic processing of the software with his/her own checks of the business, technical and certificate aspect.
##### 4.5.2.d Risks and Limitations of Reliance
**Roots and Naming.** Where the ~Class 1 root~ -unassured Subordinate CA certificate is used, this Subscriber may be a new Member including one with zero points. Where the Name is not provided, this indicates it is not available. In these circumstances, reliance is not defined, and Relying parties should take more care. See Table 4.5.2.
| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | _Statements of Reliance for Members_ | | |
| _Kind of Subordinate CA certificate_ | **Anonymous** (all Members) | **Named** (Assured Members only) | |
| **Unassured Member** **-unassured** Sub CA cert | **Do not rely.** Relying party must use other methods to check. | Do not rely. Although the named Member has been Assured by CAcert, reliance is not defined with -unassured Subordinate CA certificate. (issued for compatibility only). | |
| **Assured Member** **-assured** Sub CA cert | Do not rely on the Name (being available). The Member has been Assured by CAcert, but reliance is undefined. | The Member named in the certificate has been Assured by CAcert. | |
Table 4.5.2. Statements of Reliance
**Software Agent.** When relying on a certificate, relying parties should note that your software is responsible for the way it shows you the information in a certificate. If your software agent hides parts of the information, your sole remedy may be to choose another software agent.
**Malware.** When relying on a certificate, relying parties should note that platforms that are vulnerable to viruses or trojans or other weaknesses may not process any certificates properly and may give deceptive or fraudulent results. It is your responsibility to ensure you are using a platform that is secured according to the needs of the application.
##### 4.5.2.e When something goes wrong
In the event that an issue arises out of the Member's reliance, his/her sole avenue is **to file dispute under DRP**. See [&#167;9.13](#p9.13). For this purpose, the certificate (and other evidence) should be preserved.
**Which person?** Members may install certificates for other individuals or in servers, but the Member to whom the certificate is issued remains the responsible person. E.g., under Organisation Assurance, an organisation is issued a certificate for the use by individuals or servers within that organisation, but the Organisation is the responsible person.
**Software Agent.** If a Member is relying on a CAcert Root CA certificate embedded in the software as supplied by a vendor, the risks, liabilities and obligations of the Member do not automatically transfer to the vendor.
### 4.6. Certificate renewal
A certificate can be renewed at any time. The procedure of certificate renewal is the same as for the initial certificate issuance. The Member has to keep the private key corresponding to the original certificate.
### 4.7. Certificate re-key
Certificate "re-keyings" are not offered nor supported. A new certificate with a new key has to be requested and issued instead, and the old one revoked.
### 4.8. Certificate modification
Certificate "modifications" are not offered nor supported. A new certificate has to be requested and issued instead.
### 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension
#### 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation
Certificates may be revoked under the following circumstances:
1. As initiated by the Subscriber through his/her online account.
2. As initiated in an emergency action by a support team member. Such action will immediately be referred to dispute resolution for ratification.
3. Under direction from the Arbitrator in a duly ordered ruling from a filed dispute.
4. As performed by a Support Engineer when deleting the Member’s account.
These are the only four circumstances under which a revocation occurs.
#### 4.9.2. Who can request revocation
As above.
#### 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request
The Subscriber logs in to his/her online account through the website at https://www.cacert.org/ .
In any other event such as lost passwords or fraud, a dispute should be filed by email at &lt; support AT cacert DOT org &gt;
#### 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period
No stipulation.
#### 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
The revocation is automated in the Web Interface for subscribers, and is handled generally in less than a minute.
A filed dispute that requests a revocation should be handled within a five business days, however the Arbitrator has discretion.
#### 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
Each revoked certificate is recorded in the certificate revocation list (CRL). Relying Parties must check a certificate via the OCSP server, thus against the most recent CRL issued, in order to validate the certificate for the intended reliance.
#### 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency (if applicable)
A new CRL is issued after every certificate revocation.
#### 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable)
The maximum latency between revocation and issuance of the CRL is 1 hour.
#### 4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
OCSP is available at http://ocsp.cacert.org/ .
#### 4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements
Relying parties must check up-to-date status before relying.
#### 4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
None.
#### 4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise
Subscribers are obliged to revoke certificates at the earliest opportunity.
#### 4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension
Suspension of certificates is not available.
#### 4.9.14. Who can request suspension
Not applicable.
#### 4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request
Not applicable.
#### 4.9.16. Limits on suspension period
Not applicable.
### 4.10. Certificate status services
#### 4.10.1. Operational characteristics
OCSP is available at http://ocsp.cacert.org/ .
#### 4.10.2. Service availability
OCSP is made available on an experimental basis.
#### 4.10.3. Optional features
No stipulation.
### 4.11. End of subscription
Certificates include expiry dates.
### 4.12. Key escrow and recovery
#### 4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices
CAcert does not generate nor escrow subscriber private keys. Keys generated by web-frontend/application are processed in users browser only and not transferred to CAcert.
#### 4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
No stipulation.
5\. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS
--------------------------------------------------
### 5.1. Physical controls
Refer to Security Policy ([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
* Site location and construction - SP2.1
* Physical access - SP2.3
#### 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning
Refer to Security Policy 2.1.2 ([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
#### 5.1.4. Water exposures
Refer to Security Policy 2.1.4 ([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
#### 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection
Refer to Security Policy 2.1.4 ([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
#### 5.1.6. Media storage
Refer to Security Policy 4.3 ([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
#### 5.1.7. Waste disposal
No stipulation.
#### 5.1.8. Off-site backup
Refer to Security Policy 4.3 ([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
### 5.2. Procedural controls
#### 5.2.1. Trusted roles
**Technical teams:**
* User support personnel
* Systems Administrators -- critical and non-critical
* Softare Developers
* controllers of keys
Refer to Security Policy 9.1 ([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html))
**Assurance:**
* Assurers
* Any others authorised under COD13
Refer to Assurance Policy ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html))
* **Governance:**
* Directors (members of the CAcert Inc. committee, or "Board")
* Internal Auditor
* Arbitrator
#### 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task
CAcert operates to the principles of _four eyes_ and _dual control_. All important roles require a minimum of two persons. The people may be tasked to operate with an additional person observing (_four eyes_), or with two persons controlling (_dual control_).
#### 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role
All important roles are generally required to be assured at least to the level of Assurer, as per AP. Refer to Assurance Policy ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)).
**Technical.** Refer to Security Policy 9.1 ([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html)).
#### 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties
Roles strive in general for separation of duties, either along the lines of _four eyes principle_ or _dual control_.
### 5.3. Personnel controls
#### 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Role** | **Policy** | **Comments** |
| Assurer | [COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html) | Passes Challenge, Assured to 100+ points. |
| Organisation Assurer | [COD11](https://www.cacert.org/policy/OrganisationAssurancePolicy.html) | Trained and tested by two supervising OAs. |
| Technical | SM => COD08 | Teams responsible for testing. |
| Arbitrator | [COD7](https://www.cacert.org/policy/DisputeResolutionPolicy.html) | Experienced Assurers. |
Table 5.3.1. Controls on Roles
#### 5.3.2. Background check procedures
Refer to Security Policy 9.1.3 ([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html)).
#### 5.3.3. Training requirements
No stipulation.
#### 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements
No stipulation.
#### 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence
No stipulation.
#### 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions
Any actions that are questionable - whether uncertain or grossly negligent - may be filed as a dispute. The Arbitrator has wide discretion in ruling on loss of points, retraining, or termination of access or status. Refer to Dispute Resolution Policy ([COD7](https://www.cacert.org/policy/DisputeResolutionPolicy.html)).
#### 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements
No stipulation.
#### 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel
No stipulation.
### 5.4. Audit logging procedures
Refer to Security Policy 4.2, 5 ([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html)).
### 5.5. Records archival
The standard retention period is 7 years. Once archived, records can only be obtained and verified by means of a filed dispute. Following types of records are archived:
| | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Record** | **Nature** | **Exceptions** | **Documentation** |
| Member | username, primary and added addresses, security questions, Date of Birth | resigned non-subscribers: 0 years. | Security Policy and Privacy Policy |
| Assurance | CAP forms | "at least 7 years." as per subsidiary policies | Assurance Policy 4.5 |
| Organisation Assurance | COAP forms | as per subsidiary policies | Organisation Assurance Policy |
| certificates and revocations | for reliance | 7 years after termination | this CPS |
| critical roles | background check worksheets | under direct Arbitrator control | Security Policy 9.1.3 |
Table 5.5. Documents and Retention
### 5.6. Key changeover
Refer to Security Policy 9.2 ([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html)).
### 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery
Refer to Security Policy 5, 6 ([COD8](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Policies/SecurityPolicy.html)). (Refer to [&#167;1.4](#p1.4) for limitations to service.)
### 5.8. CA or RA termination
#### 5.8.1 CA termination
~If CAcert should terminate its operation or be taken over by another organisation, the actions will be conducted according to a plan approved by the CAcert Inc. Board.~
In the event of operational termination, the Root CA certificate, all Subordinate CA certificates, and all private Member information will be secured. The Root CA Certificate and Subordinate CA certificates will be handed over to a responsible party for the sole purpose of issuing revocations. Member information will be securely destroyed.
The CA cannot be transferrred to another organisation.
~In the event of takeover, the Board will decide if it is in the interest of the Members to be converted to the new organisation. Members will be notified about the conversion and transfer of the Member information. Such takeover, conversion or transfer may involve termination of this CPS and other documents. See &#167;9.10.2. Members will have reasonable time in which to file a related dispute after notification (at least one month). See &#167;9.13.~
* The ability to transfer is not given in any of CCA, PP or AP!
* The Board does not have the power to terminate a policy, that is the role of policy group!
* The right to transfer was against the principles of the CAcert? What about the document at [Shutting down CAcert.md - Nextcloud](https://nextcloud.cacert.org/CAcert%20board/CAcert%20-%20Committee%20Meetings/Shutting%20down%20CAcert.md) ?
* Check Association Statutes....
~New root keys and certificates will be made available by the new organisation as soon as reasonably practical.~
#### 5.8.2 RA termination
When an Assurer desires to voluntarily terminates his/her responsibilities, he/she does this by filing a dispute, and following the instructions of the Arbitrator.
In the case of involuntary termination, the process is the same, save for some other party filing the dispute.
6\. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
-------------------------------
### 6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation
#### 6.1.1. Key Pair Generation
Subscribers generate their own Key Pairs. If the Web application is used (recommended), it generates Key Pairs following the Subscriber given parameter (key length).
#### 6.1.2. Subscriber Private key security
There is no technical stipulation on how Subscribers generate and keep safe their private keys, however, CCA 2.5 provides for general security obligations. See [&#167;9.6](#p9.6). If the Web application is used, the output is a PKCS12-formated file with a private key encrypted by a password entered by Subscriber.
#### 6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer
Members login to their online account. Public Keys are delivered by cut-and-pasting them into the appropriate window. Public Keys are delivered in signed-CSR form for X.509 and in self-signed form for OpenPGP. If the Web application is used, the X.509 certificate in signed-CSR form is also a part of the output PKCS12 file.
#### 6.1.4. CA Public Key delivery to Relying Parties
The CA root certificates are distributed by these means:
* Published on the website of CAcert, in both HTTP and HTTPS.
* Included in Third-Party Software such as Browsers, Email-Clients. Such suppliers are subject to the Third Party Vendor Agreement.
Third Party Vendor Agreement is early wip, only
#### 6.1.5. Key sizes
No limitation is placed on Subscriber key sizes.
CAcert X.509 root and intermediate keys are currently 4096 bits. X.509 Root and Subordinate CA certificates use RSA and sign with the SHA256 message digest algorithm. See [&#167;4.3.1](#p4.3.1).
OpenPGP Signing uses both RSA and DSA (1024 bits).
CAcert adds larger keys and hashes in line with general cryptographic trends, and as supported by major software suppliers.
* ~old Class 3 SubRoot is signed with MD5~
* ~likely this will clash with future plans of vendors to drop acceptance of MD5~
* Is this a concern?
* to users who have these certs, a lot?
* to audit, not much?
#### 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
No stipulation.
#### 6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes
* This section probably needs to detail the key usage bits in the certs.
CAcert Root and Subordinate CA certificates are general purpose. Subordinate CA certificate keys may sign all of the general purposes – person (+code), client, server,.
The website controls the usage purposes that may be signed. This is effected by means of the 'template' system.
### 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls
#### 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
Subordinate CA certificate keys are stored on a single machine which acts as a Cryptographic Module, or _signing server_. It operates a single daemon for signing only. The signing server has these security features:
* It is connected only by one dedicated (serial USB) link to the online account server. It is not connected to the network, nor to any internal LAN (ethernet), nor to a console switch.
* The protocol over the dedicated link is a custom, simple request protocol that only handles certificate signing requests.
* The daemon is designed not to reveal the key.
* The daemon incorporates a dead-man switch that monitors the one webserver machine that requests access.
* The daemon shuts down if a bad request is detected.
* The daemon resides on an encrypted partition.
* The signing server can only be (re)started with direct systems administration access.
* Physical Access to the signing server is under dual control.
See &#167;5. and the Security Policy 9.3.1.
(Hardware-based, commercial and standards-based cryptographic modules have been tried and tested, and similar have been tested, but have been found wanting, e.g., for short key lengths and power restrictions.)
1. What document is responsible for architecture? CPS? SM? [website](https://wiki.cacert.org/HELP/7)? SM punts it to CPS, so above stays.
2. There is no criteria on Architecture.
3. Old questions moved to SM.
4. See [CAcert Root key protection](https://wiki.cacert.org/HELP/7) which should be deprecated by this CPS.
### 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management
#### 6.3.1. Public key archival
Subscriber certificates, including public keys, are stored in the database backing the online system. They are not made available in a public- or subscriber-accessible archive, see &#167;2. They are backed-up by CAcert's normal backup procedure, but their availability is a subscriber responsibility.
#### 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
The operational period of a certificate and its key pair depends on the Assurance status of the Member, see [&#167;1.4.5](#p1.4.5) and Assurance Policy ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)).
The CAcert (top-level) Root certificate has a 30 year expiry. Subordinate CA certificates have 10 years, and are to be rolled over more quickly. The keysize of the root certificates are chosen in order to ensure an optimum security to CAcert Members based on current recommendations from the [cryptographic community](http://www.keylength.com/) and maximum limits in generally available software. At time of writing this is 4096 bits.
### 6.4. Activation data
No stipulation.
### 6.5. Computer security controls
Refer to Security Policy.
### 6.6. Life cycle technical controls
Refer to SM7 "Software Development".
### 6.7. Network security controls
Refer to SM3.1 "Logical Security - Network".
### 6.8. Time-stamping
Each server synchronises with NTP. No "timestamping" service is currently offered.
* How does the signing server syncronise if only connected over serial?
* How is timestamping done on records?
7\. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES
---------------------------------------
CAcert defines all the meanings, semantics and profiles applicable to issuance of certificates and signatures in its policies, handbooks and other documents. Meanings that may be written in external standards or documents or found in wider conventions are not incorporated, are not used by CAcert, and must not be implied by the Member or the Non-related Person.
### 7.1. Certificate profile
#### 7.1.1. Version number(s)
What versions of PGP are signed? v3? v4?
Issued X.509 certificates are of v3 form. The form of the PGP signatures depends on several factors, therefore no stipulation.
#### 7.1.2. Certificate extensions
Note: **BOLD** items come from user’s acounts.
Person certificates include the following extensions:
* basicConstraints=CA:FALSE (critical)
* keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyEncipherment,keyAgreement (critical)
* extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection,clientAuth,msEFS,msSGC,nsSGC
* authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org
* crlDistributionPoints=URI:&lt;crlUri&gt; where &lt;crlUri&gt; is replaced with the URI where the certificate revocation list relating to the certificate is found
* subjectAltName=**(as per [&#167;3.1.1.](#p3.1.1))**.
* subject DN may contain the **user’s personal name(s)** in CN=
* what about Client Certificates Adobe Signing extensions ? (for documents, the Person certificates don’t need the codeSigning attribute)
* SubjectAltName should become critical if DN is removed http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.6
Client certificates include the following extensions:
* basicConstraints=CA:FALSE (critical)
* keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyEncipherment,keyAgreement (critical)
* extendedKeyUsage=TLS Web Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2),msSGC,nsSGC
* authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org
* crlDistributionPoints=URI:&lt;crlUri&gt; where &lt;crlUri&gt; is replaced with the URI where the certificate revocation list relating to the certificate is found
* subjectAltName=**(as per [&#167;3.1.1.](#p3.1.1))**.
Server certificates include the following extensions:
* basicConstraints=CA:FALSE (critical)
* keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyEncipherment,keyAgreement (critical)
* extendedKeyUsage=clientAuth,serverAuth,nsSGC,msSGC
* authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org
* crlDistributionPoints=URI:&lt;crlUri&gt; where &lt;crlUri&gt; is replaced with the URI where the certificate revocation list relating to the certificate is found
* subjectAltName=**(as per [&#167;3.1.1.](#p3.1.1))**.
Person Code-Signing certificates include the following extensions:
* basicConstraints=CA:FALSE (critical)
* keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyEncipherment,keyAgreement (critical)
* extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection,clientAuth,**codeSigning**,msCodeInd,msCodeCom,msEFS,msSGC,nsSGC
* authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org
* crlDistributionPoints=URI:&lt;crlUri&gt; where &lt;crlUri&gt; is replaced with the URI where the certificate revocation list relating to the certificate is found
* subjectAltName=**(as per [&#167;3.1.1.](#p3.1.1))**.
* subject DN may contain the **user’s personal name(s)** in CN=
* what about subjectAltName for Code-signing
All, more detailed certificate patterns can be seen in the Appendix A.
OpenPGP key signatures currently do not include extensions. In the future, a serial number might be included as an extension.
#### 7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers
No stipulation.
#### 7.1.4. Name forms
Refer to [&#167;3.1.1](#p3.1.1).
#### 7.1.5. Name constraints
Refer to [&#167;3.1.1](#p3.1.1).
#### 7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier
The following OIDs are defined and should be incorporated into certificates:
| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| OID | Type/Meaning | Comment |
| 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.4.5 | Certification Practice Statement | (this present document) |
Versions are defined by additional numbers appended such as .1.
#### 7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension
No stipulation.
#### 7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics
No stipulation.
#### 7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension
No stipulation.
### 7.2. CRL profile
#### 7.2.1. Version number(s)
CRLs are created in X.509 v2 format.
#### 7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions
No extensions.
### 7.3. OCSP profile
#### 7.3.1. Version number(s)
The OCSP responder operates in Version 1.
#### 7.3.2. OCSP extensions
No stipulation.
### 7.4. Root CA certificate and Subordinate CA certificates
**7.4.1. Cacert’s DN**
| | |
| --- | --- |
| L=Genève PostalCode=1208 STREET=Clos Belmont 2 | (Location) |
| O=CAcert Inc. | (Organization) |
| C=CH | (Country) |
| CN=CAcert {Root\|PersonA\|PersonU\|ClientA\|ClientU\|ServerA\|ServerU} CA &lt;year&gt; | (Common Name) |
| OU=http://www.cacert.org | (Org.Unit) |
(Note: OU for CAcert was used in old certificates, but it is considered as deprecated now.)
**7.4.2. Root CA certificate – RSA encrypting** (ECC encrypting see Appendix B)
* \* Cert version: 3 (X.509v3)
* \* Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes (CAB recommendation)
* \* Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
* \* Signature Algorithm Hash: (sha256) implied by the signature algorithm
* \* Issuer DN: C=&lt;country&gt;,L=&lt;Location&gt;,O=&lt;organization&gt;,CN=&lt;Common_Name&gt; (see above)
* \* Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = 20 years (CAB recommendation)
* \* Subject DN: as this is the Root CA, this item is equal to the Issuer DN item
* \* Subject Public Key Info
* \* Public Key Algorithm: RSAEncryption *(implied by the public key)*
* \* RSA Public-Key: (4096 bit), then the Modulus value, Exponent 65537 (0x10001)
* \* Public Key Parameters: 05 00
* \* X509v3 Extensions
* \* X509v3 Key Usage (critical)
* \* Certificate (only subordinate CA certificates) Signing, CRL Signing; Offline CRL Signing
* \* X509v3 Basic Constraints (critical)
* \* Certificate of a CA: true
* \* Path length restriction: none
* \* X509v3 Subject Key Identifier (20 Byte ID)
* \* Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
* \* Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
* (fingerprint is dependent on the used hash algorithm, a certificate's TBSCertificate structure can be hashed/fingerprinted using any hash algorithm. 20 Bytes is what a SHA1 hash produces, it can be longer or shorter for other algorithms and is not directly included in the certificate)
**7.4.3. Subordinate CA certificates – RSA encrypting** (ECC encrypting see Appendix B)
There are 2 sets suggested per 3 Subordinate CA certificates each. The 1st set is used for CAcert \*assured\* members, the 2nd set is used for CAcert members who are \*unassured\* yet.
A **Member status** is classified as follows (APs, see COD13 - Assurance Policy #2.3):
\* Status ***unassured***: 0 to 49 Assurance Points (APs).
\* Status ***assured***: 50 to 100+ APs.
\* Status ***Assurer***: 100+ APs and the \*Assurer Challenge\* test passed.
(Some differences can also be done for an user having the Assurer status.)
**Set #1**: 3 subordinate CA certificates for issuing certs for assured members:
(1) Person-assured; (2) Client-assured; (3) Server-assured
**Set #1a:** 3 subordinate CA certificates for issuing certs for organizations:
These are basically identical to the set #1, only differ in their Subject DN
there are parameters L=, O=, C=, CN=, and OU= concerning the organization
which the subordinate CA certificate is issued for.
**Set #2**: 3 subordinate CA certificates for issuing certs for unassured members:
(1) Person-unassured; (2) Client-unassured; (3) Server-unassured
Every set consists of 3 Subordinate CA certs: Person, Client, and Server.
"**Person**" is designed for real people. It provides person name, Email address(es) as SAN, and possibly the document/code signing ability.
"**Client**" is designed to be used for machines that act as a client and needs to authenticate to other systems, client certificates contain SAN DNS names and may contain a single host name in the Subject DN Common Name (CN) field. SAN are possible.
"**Server**" is designed to be used for machines that need to authenticate to relying parties, server certificates contain SAN DNS names and may contain a single host name in the Subject DN Common Name (CN) field. SAN are possible.
**7.4.3.1. "Person-assured" & "Person-unassured Subordinate CA certificates (Subroots, Intermediate Roots)**
Cert version: 3 (X.509v3)
Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Algorithm Hash: sha256
Issuer DN: C=&lt;Country&gt;,L=&lt;Location&gt;,O=&lt;Organization&gt;,CN=&lt;Common_Name&gt;; if org., OU=&lt;Org.Unit&gt;
Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = 5 years
Subject DN (if the Organization Assurer, see the comment to the Set #1a above):
C= (see 7.4.1. above)
L= (see 7.4.1. above)
O= (see 7.4.1. above)
for "Person-assured": CN=CAcert Person-assured CA &lt;year&gt;
for "Person-unassured": CN=CAcert Person-unassured CA &lt;year&gt;
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm: RSAEncryption
RSA Public-Key: (3072 bit), then the Modulus value, Exponent 65537 (0x10001)
Public Key Parameters: 05 00 (i.e. NULL, see RFC 4055 # 1.2)
X509v3 Extensions
X509v3 Key Usage (critical)
General Subordinate CA certificate purposes:
Digital Signature, Certificate Signing, CRL Signing
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
Code signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) (for "Person-assured" only)
Email protection (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)
OCSP signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9)
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: (20 Byte ID)
Authority Key ID (20 Bytes ID, equal to the Subject Key ID of the Root CA certificate)
Authority Information Access (AIA):
OCSP (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) - URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org/
CA Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
URI:http://www.cacert.org/certs/rsa\_root\_&lt;year&gt;.crt (Root CA cert. file)
X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.2.3.1 (18506 = org. number, here: CAcert; 2.3.1 = CPS)
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
Full Name:
URI:http://crl.cacert.org/&lt;CRL_file&gt;:
for "Person-assured": rsa\_personA\_&lt;year&gt;.crl
for "Person-unassured": rsa\_personU\_&lt;year&gt;.crl
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
**7.4.3.2. "Client-assured" & "Client-unassured" Subordinate CA certificates**
Cert version: 3 (X.509v3)
Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Algorithm Hash: sha256
Issuer DN: C=&lt;country&gt;,L=&lt;Location&gt;,O=&lt;Organization&gt;,CN=&lt;Common_Name&gt;,OU=&lt;Org.Unit&gt;
Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = 5 years
Subject DN (if the Organization Assurer, see the comment to the Set #1a above):
C= (see 7.4.1. above)
L= (see 7.4.1. above)
O= (see 7.4.1. above)
for "Client-assured": CN=CAcert Client-assured CA &lt;year&gt;
for "Client-unassured": CN=CAcert Client-unassured CA &lt;year&gt;
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm: RSAEncryption
RSA Public-Key: (3072 bit), then the Modulus value, Exponent 65537 (0x10001)
Public Key Parameters: 05 00 (NULL)
X509v3 Extensions
X509v3 Key Usage (critical)
General Subordinate CA certificate purposes:
Digital Signature, Certificate Signig, CRL Signing
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
OCSP Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9)
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: (20 Byte ID)
Authority Key ID (20 Bytes ID, equal to the Subject Key ID of the Root CA certificate)
Authority Information Access (AIA):
OCSP (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) - URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org/
CA Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
URI:http://www.cacert.org/certs/rsa\_root\_&lt;year&gt;.crt (Root CA cert. file)
X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.2.3.1 (18506 = org. number, here: CAcert; 2.3.1 = CPS)
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
Full Name:
URI:http://crl.cacert.org/&lt;CRL_file&gt;:
for "Client-assured": rsa\_clientA\_&lt;year&gt;.crl
for "Client-unassured": rsa\_clientU\_&lt;year&gt;.crl
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
**7.4.3.3. "Server-assured" & "Server-unassured" Subordinate CA certificates**
Cert version: 3 (X.509v3)
Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Algorithm Hash: sha256
Issuer DN: C=&lt;Country&gt;,L=&lt;Location&gt;,O=&lt;Organization&gt;,CN=&lt;Common_Name&gt;,OU=&lt;Org.Unit&gt;
Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = 5 years
Subject DN (derived from Issuer, varies in Subject: CN=name-reflecting-purpose)
(if the Organization Assurer, see the comment to the Set #1a above)
C= (see 7.4.1. above)
L= (see 7.4.1. above)
O= (see 7.4.1. above)
for "Server-assured": CN=CAcert Server-assured CA &lt;year&gt;
for "Server-unassured": CN=CAcert Server-unassured CA &lt;year&gt;
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm: RSAEncryption
RSA Public-Key: (3072 bit), then the Modulus value, Exponent 65537 (0x10001)
Public Key Parameters: 05 00 (= NULL)
X509v3 Extensions
X509v3 Key Usage (critical)
General Subordinate CA certificate purposes:
Digital Signature, Certificate Signing, CRL Signing
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)
OCSP Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9)
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: (20 Byte ID)
Authority Key ID (20 Bytes ID, equal to the Subject Key ID of the Root CA certificate)
Authority Information Access (AIA):
OCSP (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) - URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org/
CA Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
\- URI:http://www.cacert.org/certs/rsa\_root\_&lt;year&gt;.crt (Root CA cert. file)
X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.2.3.1 (18506 = org. number, here: CAcert; 2.3.1 = CPS)
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
Full Name:
URI:http://crl.cacert.org/&lt;CRL_file&gt;:
for "Server-assured": rsa\_serverA\_&lt;year&gt;.crl
for "Server-unassured": rsa\_serverU\_&lt;year&gt;.crl
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
8\. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS
------------------------------------------
There are two major threads of assessment:
* **Systems Audit**. Analyses the CA for business and operations security. This is conducted in two phases: documents for compliance with criteria, and operations for compliance with documentation.
* **Code Audit**. Analyses the source code. This is conducted at two levels: Security concepts at the web applications level, and source code security and bugs review.
See the Audit page at [wiki.cacert.org/Audit/](https://wiki.cacert.org/Audit/) for more information.
### 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment
The first audits started in late 2005, and since then, assessments have been an ongoing task. Even when completed, they are expected to be permanent features.
* **Systems Audit**. The first phase of the first audit is nearing completion. The second phase starts in earnest when documentation is in effect, at lease as DRAFT under PoP. As the second phase is dependent on this CPS and the Security Policy, they will be in effect as DRAFT at least before the first audit is completed. Only prior and completed audits can be reported here.
* **Code Audit**. A complete review of entire source code has not yet been completed.
### 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor
**Systems Auditors.** CAcert uses business systems auditors with broad experience across the full range of business, information systems and security fields. In selecting a business systems auditor, CAcert looks for experience that includes but is not limited to cryptography, PKI, governance, auditing, compliance and regulatory environments, business strategy, software engineering, networks, law (including multijurisdictional issues), identity systems, fraud, IT management.
**Code Auditors.** See Security Policy, sections 7, 9.1.
### 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity
Specific internal restrictions on audit personnel:
* Must be Assured by CAcert Assurers and must be background checked.
* Must not have been active in any (other) role in CAcert. Specifically, must not be an Assurer, a member of the association, or in any other defined role or office.
* Although the Auditor may be expected to undertake various of the activities (Assurance, Training) during the process of the audit, any results are frozen until resignation as auditor is effected.
* The Auditor is required to declare to CAcert all potential conflicts of interest on an ongoing basis.
Specific external restrictions on audit personnel:
* Should have a verifiable and lengthy history in user privacy and user security.
* Must not have worked for a competitive organisation.
* Must not have worked for national security, intelligence, LEO or similar agencies.
An Auditor may convene an audit team. The same restrictions apply in general to all members of the team, but may be varied. Any deviations must be documented and approved by the CAcert Inc. Board.
### 8.4. Topics covered by assessment
Systems Audits are generally conducted to criteria. CAcert requires that the criteria are open:
* Published. The criteria must be reviewable by all interested parties.
* Understandable. They should be understandable, in that they provide the sufficient information in a readable form for interested parties to follow the gist and importance. (Arcane security criteria may stretch this requirement.)
* Complete. There must be sufficent background information that the whole story is there. Especially, criteria that refer to undocumented practices or conventions deliberately kept secret must be avoided.
* Applicable. The criteria should relate directly and unambiguously to a need of the identified interested parties (Members, Relying Parties, Subscribers, Assurers).
See David Ross Criteria (where? The link doesn’t work, rossde.com doesn’t exist!) for the current criteria. If Auditor determines that a criteria fails to follow the meet the above requirements, then the criteria should be reworked to conform, or should be dropped (both with explanatory notes).
### 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency
See the current [Audit Done list](https://wiki.cacert.org/Audit/Done) for work completed, and [Audit Todo list](https://wiki.cacert.org/AuditToDo) for work in progress.
Auditor may issue directives instructing changes, where essential to audit success or other extreme situations. Directives should be grounded on criteria, on established minimum or safe practices, or clearly described logic. Adequate discussion with Community (e.g., CAcert Inc. Board and with Policy Group) should precede any directive. They should be presented to the same standard as the criteria, above.
The [wiki.cacert.org/AuditDirectives](https://wiki.cacert.org/AuditDirectives) documents issued directives and actions.
### 8.6. Communication of results
Current and past Audit information is available at [wiki.CAcert.org/Audit/](https://wiki.cacert.org/Audit/). CAcert runs an open disclosure policy and Audit is no exception.
This CPS and other documents are subject to the process in Policy on Policy ([COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html)). Audits cover the overall processes more than any one document, and documents may vary even as Audit reports are delivered.
9\. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS
------------------------------------
### 9.1. Fees
The current fees structure is posted at [wiki.cacert.org/Price](https://wiki.cacert.org/Price). Changes to the fees structure will be announced from time to time on the [blog](https://blog.cacert.org/). CAcert retains the right to charge fees for services. All fees are non-refundable.
### 9.2. Financial responsibility
Financial risks are dealt with primarily by the Dispute Resolution Policy ([COD7](https://www.cacert.org/policy/DisputeResolutionPolicy.html)).
#### 9.2.1. Insurance coverage
No stipulation.
#### 9.2.2. Other assets
No stipulation.
#### 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities
No stipulation.
### 9.3. Confidentiality of business information
#### 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information
CAcert has a policy of transparency and openness. The default posture is that information is public to the extent possible, unless covered by specific policy provisions (for example, passwords) or rulings by Arbitrator.
### 9.4. Privacy of personal information
Privacy is covered by the CCA (COD9) and the Privacy Policy ([COD5](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PrivacyPolicy.html)).
#### 9.4.1. Privacy plan
No stipulation.
#### 9.4.2. Information treated as private
Member's Date of Birth and "Lost Password" questions are treated as fully private.
#### 9.4.3. Information not deemed private
To the extent that information is put into an issued certificate, that information is not deemed private, as it is expected to be published by the Member as part of routine use of the certificate. Such information generally includes Names, domains, email addresses, and certificate serial numbers.
Under Assurance Policy ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)) the Member's status (as Assured, Assurer, etc) is available to other Members.
Information placed in forums outside the online system (wiki, blogs, policies, etc) is not deemed private, and is generally deemed to be published as contributions by Members. See CCA1.3 (COD9).
#### 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information
CAcert is a privacy organisation and takes privacy more seriously. Any privacy issue may be referred to dispute resolution.
#### 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information
Members are permitted to rely on certificates of other Members. As a direct consequence of the general right to rely, Members may read and store the certificates and/or the information within them, where duly presented in a relationship, and to the extent necessary for the agreed relationship.
#### 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
Any disclosure pursuant to process from foreign courts (or similar) is controlled by the Arbitrator.
#### 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances
None.
### 9.5. Intellectual property rights
CAcert is committed to the philosophy of an open and free Internet, broadly as encapsulated by open and free source. However, due to the strict control provisions imposed by the audit criteria (CCS), and the general environment and role of CAs, and the commitment to security of Members, some deviations are necessary.
#### 9.5.1. Ownership and Licence
Assets that fall under the control of CCS must be transferred to CAcert. See PoP 6.2 ([COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html#6.2)), CCA 1.3 ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#1.3)). That is, CAcert is free to use, modify, distribute, and otherwise conduct the business of the CA as CAcert sees fit with the asset.
#### 9.5.2. Brand
The brand of CAcert is made up of its logo, name, trademark, service marks, etc. Use of the brand is strictly limited by the Board, and permission is required. See [m20070917.5](https://wiki.cacert.org/TopMinutes-20070917).
#### 9.5.3. Documents
CAcert owns or requires full control over its documents, especially those covered by CCS. See PoP 6.2 ([COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html#6.2)). Contributors transfer the rights, see CCA 1.3 ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#1.3)). Contributors warrant that they have the right to transfer.
Documents are generally licensed under free and open licence. See [wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDrafts/DocumentLicence](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDrafts/DocumentLicence). Except where explicitly negotiated, CAcert extends back to contributors a non-exclusive, unrestricted perpetual licence, permitting them to to re-use their original work freely. See PoP 6.4 ([COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html#6.4)), CCA 1.3 ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#1.3)).
#### 9.5.4. Code
CAcert owns its code or requires full control over code in use by means of a free and open licence. See CCS.
See the (new, wip) [SourceCodeManifesto](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/Software/BirdShack/Documents/SourceCodeManifesto.html). Maybe this can replace these two paras?
CAcert licenses its code under GPL. CAcert extends back to contributors a non-exclusive, unrestricted perpetual licence, permitting them to to re-use their original work freely.
#### 9.5.5. Certificates and Roots
CAcert asserts its intellectual property rights over certificates issued to Members and over roots. See CCA 4.4 ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#4.4)), CCS. The certificates may only be used by Members under [COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#4.4), and, by others under the licences offered, such as Root Distribution License ([COD14](https://www.cacert.org/policy/RootDistributionLicense.html)).
### 9.6. Representations and warranties
**Members.** All Members of the Community agree to the CAcert Community Agreement ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)), which is the primary document for representations and warranties. Members include Subscribers, Relying Parties, Registration Agents and the CA itself.
**RAs.** Registration Agents are obliged additionally by Assurance Policy, especially 3.1, 4.1 ([COD13](https://www.cacert.org/policy/AssurancePolicy.html)).
**CA.** The CA is obliged additionally by the CCS.
**Third Party Vendors.** Distributors of the roots are offered the wip 3rd-Party Vendors - Disclaimer and Licence (3PV-DaL => CODx) and are offered wip the same deal as Members to the extent that they agree to be Members in the Community. wip
### 9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties
Persons who have not accepted the above Agreements are offered the Root Distribution License ([COD14](https://www.cacert.org/policy/RootDistributionLicense.html)). Any representations and warranties are strictly limited to nominal usage. In essence, NRPs may USE but must not RELY.
In today's aggressive fraud environment, and within the context of CAcert as a community CA, all parties should understand that CAcert and its Subscribers, Assurers and other roles provide service on a Best Efforts basis. See [&#167;1.4](#p1.4). CAcert seeks to provide an adequate minimum level of quality in operations for its Members without undue risks to NRPs. See [Principles](https://svn.cacert.org/CAcert/principles.html).
CAcert on behalf of the Community and itself makes no Warranty nor Guarantee nor promise that the service or certificates are adequate for the needs and circumstances.
### 9.8. Limitations of liability
### 9.8.1 Non-Related Persons
CAcert on behalf of related parties (RAs, Subscribers, etc) and itself disclaims all liability to NRPs in their usage of CA's certificates. See [COD4](https://www.cacert.org/policy/RootDistributionLicense.html).
### 9.8.2 Liabilities Between Members
Liabilities between Members are dealt with by internal dispute resolution, which rules on liability and any limits. See [&#167;9.13](#9.13).
### 9.9. Indemnities
No stipulation.
### 9.10. Term and termination
#### 9.10.1. Term
No stipulation.
#### 9.10.2. Termination
Members file a dispute to terminate their agreement. See [&#167;9.13](#p9.13) and CCA 3.3 ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#3.3)).
Documents are varied (including terminated) under [COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html).
For termination of the CA, see [&#167;5.8.1](#p5.8.1).
#### 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival
No stipulation.
### 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants
All participants are obliged to keep their listed primary email addresses in good working order. See CCA 3.5 ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#3.5)).
### 9.12. Amendments
Amendments to the CPS are controlled by [COD1](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PolicyOnPolicy.html). Any changes in Member's Agreements are notified under CCA 3.4 ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html#3.4)).
### 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions
CAcert provides a forum and facility for any Member or other related party to file a dispute.
* The CAcert Dispute Resolution Policy ([COD7](https://www.cacert.org/policy/DisputeResolutionPolicy.html)) includes rules for dispute resolution.
* Filing is done via email to &lt; support AT cacert DOT org &gt;
Members agree to file all disputes through CAcert's forum for dispute resolution. The rules include specific provisions to assist non-Members, etc, to file dispute in this forum.
### 9.14. Governing law
The governing law is that of **New South Wales, Australia**. Disputes are generally heard before the Arbitrator under this law. Exceptionally, the Arbitrator may elect to apply the law of the parties and events, where in common, but this is unlikely because it may create results that are at odds with the Community.
### 9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law
### 9.15.1 Digital Signature Law
The Commonwealth and States of Australia have passed various Electronic Transactions Acts that speak to digital signatures. In summary, these acts follow the "technology neutral" model and permit but do not regulate the use of digital signatures.
This especially means that the signatures created by certificates issued by CAcert are not in and of themselves legally binding human signatures, at least according to the laws of Australia. See [&#167;1.4.3](#p1.4.3). However, certificates may play a part in larger signing applications. See [&#167;1.4.1](#p1.4.1) for "digital signing" certificates. These applications may impose significant obligations, risks and liabilities on the parties.
### 9.15.2 Privacy Law
See the Privacy Policy ([COD5](https://www.cacert.org/policy/PrivacyPolicy.html)).
### 9.15.3 Legal Process from External Forums
CAcert will provide information about its Members only under legal subpoena or equivalent process from a court of competent jurisdiction. Any requests made by legal subpoena are treated as under the Dispute Resolution Policy See [&#167;9.13](#p9.13) and [COD7](https://www.cacert.org/policy/DisputeResolutionPolicy.html). That is, all requests are treated as disputes, as only a duly empanelled Arbitrator has the authorisation and authority to rule on the such requests.
A subpoena should include sufficient legal basis to support an Arbitrator in ruling that information be released pursuant to the filing, including the names of claimants in any civil case and an indication as to whether the claimants are Members or not (and are therefore subject to Dispute Resolution Policy).
### 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions
#### 9.16.1. Entire agreement
All Members of the Community agree to the CAcert Community Agreement ([COD9](https://www.cacert.org/policy/CAcertCommunityAgreement.html)). This agreement also incorporates other key documents, being this CPS, DRP and PP. See CCA 4.2.
The Configuration-Control Specification is the set of policies that rule over the Community, of which the above documents are part. See COD2. Documents that have reached full POLICY status are located at [www.cacert.org/policy/](https://www.cacert.org/policy/). Although detailed practices may be found in other places on the website and on the wiki, the CCS documents that have reached DRAFT and POLICY status are the ruling documents.
2nd half of this section can be transfered over to PoP, only a reference to PoP 5.4 to remain (see [Changes to PoP p20130223](https://wiki.cacert.org/PolicyDecisions#p20130223))
#### 9.16.2. Assignment
The rights within CCA may not be ordinarily assigned.
#### 9.16.3. Severability
No stipulation.
#### 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
The Arbitrator will specify fees and remedies, if any.
#### 9.16.5. Force Majeure
No stipulation.
Appendix A: RSA End Certificate Patterns
----------------------------------------
These are issued by (signed with) Subordinate CA certificates only. Some properties are constant for those certs, some differ according to the respective Subordinate CA certificate only, and some depends on the user's data. That's why it seems to be a good idea to design the patterns for certs issued.
**The pattern "Person-assured"**
Cert version: 3 (X.509v3)
Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes; source: Signer
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Algorithm Hash: sha256
Issuer DN: equal to the "Person-assured" Subordinate CA certificate's Subject; source: "Person-assured" Subordinate CA certificate Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = 1 year (CAB recommandation)
Subject DN: CN = real_name of the user, E = Email address(es); source: user's account
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm: RSAEncryption
RSA Public-Key: (3072 bit), then the Modulus value, Exponent 65537 (0x10001); source: CSR
Public Key Parameters: 05 00 (NULL)
X509v3 Extensions
X509v3 Key Usage (critical):
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment, Key Agreement
X509v3 Extended Key Usage: (source: "Person-assured" Subordinate CA certificate, and the user's account)
TLS Web Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
Code signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3); TRUE/FALSE, source: user's account
Email protection (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: (20 Byte ID); source: CSR
Authority Key ID (20 Bytes ID, equal to the Subject Key ID of the "Person-assured" Subordinate CA certificate)
Authority Information Access (AIA):
OCSP (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) - URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org/
CA Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
\- URI:http://www.cacert.org/certs/rsa\_personA\_&lt;year&gt;.crt ("Person-assured" Subordinate CA certificate file)
X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.2.3.1 (18506 = org. number, here: CAcert; 2.3.1 = CPS)
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
Full Name:
URI:http://crl.cacert.org/rsa\_personA\_&lt;year&gt;.crl ("Person-assured" Subordinate CA certificate CRL file)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
For 1 or more verified (and selected by the user) Email address(es) a SAN string will be added; (source: user's account & user's selection).
**The pattern "Person-unassured"**
Cert version: 3 (X.509v3)
Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes; source: Signer
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Algorithm Hash: sha256
Issuer DN: equal to the "Person-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate's Subject; source: "Person-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate
Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = ~6 months
Subject DN: CN = "CAcert WoT User" OR "&lt;user's name&gt; (unassured)", E = Email address(es); source: user's account
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm: RSAEncryption
RSA Public-Key: (3072 bit), then the Modulus value, Exponent 65537 (0x10001); source: CSR
Public Key Parameters: 05 00 (NULL)
X509v3 Extensions
X509v3 Key Usage (critical):
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment, Key Agreement
X509v3 Extended Key Usage: (source: "Person-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate)
TLS Web Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
Email protection (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: (20 Byte ID); source: CSR
Authority Key ID (20 Bytes ID, equal to the Subject Key ID of the "Person-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate)
Authority Information Access (AIA):
OCSP (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) - URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org/
CA Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
\- URI:http://www.cacert.org/certs/rsa\_personU\_&lt;year&gt;.crt ("Person-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate file)
X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.2.3.1 (18506 = org. number, here: CAcert; 2.3.1 = CPS)
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
Full Name:
URI:http://crl.cacert.org/rsa\_personU\_&lt;year&gt;.crl ("Person-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate CRL file)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
For 1 or more verified (and selected by the user) Email address(es) a SAN string will be added; (source: user's account & user's selection).
**The pattern "Client-assured"**
Cert version: 3 (X.509v3)
Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes; source: Signer
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Algorithm Hash: sha256
Issuer DN: equal to the "Client-assured" Subordinate CA certificate's Subject; source: "Client-assured" Subordinate CA certificate
Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = 1 year (CAB recommandation)
Subject DN: CN = client's FQDN; source: user's account
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm: RSAEncryption
RSA Public-Key: (3072 bit), then the Modulus value, Exponent 65537 (0x10001); source: CSR
Public Key Parameters: 05 00 (NULL)
X509v3 Extensions
X509v3 Key Usage (critical):
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment, Key Agreement
X509v3 Extended Key Usage: (source: "Client-assured" Subordinate CA certificate)
TLS Web Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: (20 Byte ID); source: CSR
Authority Key ID (20 Bytes ID, equal to the Subject Key ID of the "Client-assured" Subordinate CA certificate)
Authority Information Access (AIA):
OCSP (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) - URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org/
CA Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
\- URI:http://www.cacert.org/certs/rsa\_clientA\_&lt;year&gt;.crt ("Client-assured" Subordinate CA certificate file)
X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.2.3.1 (18506 = org. number, here: CAcert; 2.3.1 = CPS)
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
Full Name:
URI:http://crl.cacert.org/rsa\_clientA\_&lt;year&gt;.crl ("Client-assured" Subordinate CA certificate CRL file)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
For 1 or more verified (and selected by the user) domains -> FQDNs a SAN string will be added; (source: user's account & user's selection).
**The pattern "Client-unassured"**
Cert version: 3 (X.509v3)
Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes; source: Signer
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Algorithm Hash: sha256
Issuer DN: equal to the "Client-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate's Subject; source: "Client-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate
Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = ~6 months
Subject DN: CN = client's FQDN; source: user's account
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm: RSAEncryption
RSA Public-Key: (3072 bit), then the Modulus value, Exponent 65537 (0x10001); source: CSR
Public Key Parameters: 05 00 (NULL)
X509v3 Extensions
X509v3 Key Usage (critical):
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment, Key Agreement
X509v3 Extended Key Usage: (source: "Client-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate)
TLS Web Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: (20 Byte ID); source: CSR
Authority Key ID (20 Bytes ID, equal to the Subject Key ID of the "Client-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate)
Authority Information Access (AIA):
OCSP (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) - URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org/
CA Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
\- URI:http://www.cacert.org/certs/rsa\_clientU\_&lt;year&gt;.crt ("Client-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate file)
X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.2.3.1 (18506 = org. number, here: CAcert; 2.3.1 = CPS)
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
Full Name:
URI:http://crl.cacert.org/rsa\_clientU\_&lt;year&gt;.crl ("Client-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate CRL file)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
For 1 or more verified (and selected by the user) domains -> FQDNs a SAN string will be added; (source: user's account & user's selection).
**The pattern "Server-assured"**
Cert version: 3 (X.509v3)
Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes; source: Signer
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Algorithm Hash: sha256
Issuer DN: equal to the "Server-Assurer" Subordinate CA certificate's Subject; source: "Server-Assurer" Subordinate CA certificate
Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = 1 year (CAB recommandation)
Subject DN: CN = server's FQDN; source: user's account
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm: RSAEncryption
RSA Public-Key: (3072 bit), then the Modulus value, Exponent 65537 (0x10001); source: CSR
Public Key Parameters: 05 00 (NULL)
X509v3 Extensions
X509v3 Key Usage (critical):
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment, Key Agreement
X509v3 Extended Key Usage: (source: "Server-Assurer" Subordinate CA certificate)
TLS Web Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: (20 Byte ID); source: CSR
Authority Key ID (20 Bytes ID, equal to the Subject Key ID of the "Server-assured" Subordinate CA certificate)
Authority Information Access (AIA):
OCSP (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) - URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org/
CA Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
\- URI:http://www.cacert.org/certs/rsa\_serverA\_&lt;year&gt;.crt ("Server-assured" Subordinate CA certificate file)
X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.2.3.1 (18506 = org. number, here: CAcert; 2.3.1 = CPS)
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
Full Name:
URI:http://crl.cacert.org/rsa\_serverA\_&lt;year&gt;.crl ("Server-Assurer" Subordinate CA certificate CRL file)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
For 1 or more verified (and selected by the user) domains -> FQDNs a SAN string will be added; (source: user's account & user's selection).
**The pattern "Server-unassured"**
Cert version: 3 (X.509v3)
Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes; source: Signer
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Algorithm Hash: sha256
Issuer DN: equal to the "Server-nonAssurer" Subordinate CA certificate's Subject; source: "Server-nonAssurer" Subordinate CA certificate
Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = ~6 months
Subject DN: CN = server's FQDN; source: user's account
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm: RSAEncryption
RSA Public-Key: (3072 bit), then the Modulus value, Exponent 65537 (0x10001); source: CSR
Public Key Parameters: 05 00 (NULL)
X509v3 Extensions
X509v3 Key Usage (critical):
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment, Key Agreement
X509v3 Extended Key Usage: (source: "Server-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate)
TLS Web Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: (20 Byte ID); source: CSR
Authority Key ID (20 Bytes ID, equal to the Subject Key ID of the "Server-unassured" Subordinate CA certificate)
Authority Information Access (AIA):
OCSP (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) - URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org/
CA Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
\- URI:http://www.cacert.org/certs/rsa\_serverU\_&lt;year&gt;.crt ("Server-nonAssurer" Subordinate CA certificate file)
X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.2.3.1 (18506 = org. number, here: CAcert; 2.3.1 = CPS)
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
Full Name:
URI:http://crl.cacert.org/rsa\_serverU\_&lt;year&gt;.crl ("Server-nonAssurer" Subordinate CA certificate CRL file)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
For 1 or more verified (and selected by the user) domains -> FQDNs a SAN string will be added; (source: user's account & user's selection).
Appendix B: ECC Root CA Certificate and ECC Subordinate CA certificates
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
**The ECC Tree has CN=CAcert ECC {Root|PersonA|PersonU|ClientA|ClientU|ServerA|ServerU} CA &lt;year&gt; (Common Name)**
**Properties of the ECC Root CA Certificate**
Cert version: 3 (0x2: X.509v3)
Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes (CAB recommandation)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Signature Algorithm Hash: sha256
Issuer: C=&lt;Country&gt;,L=&lt;Location&gt;,O=&lt;organization&gt;,CN=CAcert ECC Root CA &lt;year&gt; (Common Name for ECC will be: CN=CAcert ECC {Root|PersonA|PersonU|ClientA|ClientU|ServerA|ServerU} CA &lt;year&gt;
Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = 20 years (CAB recommandation)
Subject DN: as this is the Root ECC CA cert, this item is equal to the Issuer DN item
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (521 bit), then the pub value
ASN1 OID: secp521r1
NIST CURVE: P-521
Public Key Parameters: ECDSA_P521
X509v3 Extensions
X509v3 Key Usage (critical)
Certificate (only Subordinate CA certificates) Signing, CRL Signing; Offline CRL Signing
X509v3 Basic Constraints (critical)
Certificate of a CA: true
Path length restriction: none
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier (20 Byte ID)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
(fingerprint is dependent on the used hash algorithm, a certificate's TBSCertificate structure can be hashed/fingerprinted using any hash algorithm. 20 Bytes is what a SHA1 hash produces, it can be longer or shorter for other algorithms and is not directly included in the certificate)
**Properties of the ECC "Person-assured" & "Person-unassured" Subordinate CA certificates (Intermediate Roots)**
Cert version: 3 (X.509v3)
Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Signature Algorithm Hash: sha256
Issuer DN: C=&lt;Country&gt;,L=&lt;Location&gt;,O=&lt;Organization&gt;,CN=&lt;ECC Root's Common_Name&gt;; if org., OU=&lt;Org.Unit&gt;
Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = 5 years
Subject DN: (if the Organization Assurer, see the comment to the 7.4.3., Set #1a)
C= (see 7.4.1.)
L= (see 7.4.1.)
O= (see 7.4.1.)
for "Person-assured": CN=CAcert ECC Person-assured CA &lt;year&gt;
for "Person-unassured: CN=CAcert ECC Person-unassured CA &lt;year&gt;
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (384 bit), then the ASN1 OID: secp384r1, and NIST CURVE: P-384
Public Key Parameters: ECDSA_P384
X509v3 Extensions
X509v3 Key Usage (critical)
General Subordinate CA certificate purposes:
Digital Signature, Certificate Signing, CRL Signing
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
Code signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) (for "Person-assured" only)
Email protection (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)
OCSP signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9)
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: (20 Byte ID)
Authority Key ID (20 Bytes ID, equal to the Subject Key ID of the ECC Root CA cert.)
Authority Information Access (AIA):
OCSP (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) - URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org/
CA Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
\- URI:http://www.cacert.org/certs/ecc\_root\_&lt;year&gt;.crt (ECC Root CA certificate file)
X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.2.3.1 (18506 = org. number, here: CAcert; 2.3.1 = CPS)
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
Full Name:
URI:http://crl.cacert.org/&lt;CRL_file&gt;:
for "Person-assured": ecc\_personA\_&lt;year&gt;.crl
for "Person-unassured": ecc\_personU\_&lt;year&gt;.crl
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
**Properties of the ECC "Client-assured" & "Client-unassured" Subordinate CA certificates (Intermediate Roots)**
Cert version: 3 (X.509v3)
Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Signature Algorithm Hash: sha256
Issuer DN: C=&lt;country&gt;,L=&lt;Location&gt;,O=&lt;Organization&gt;,CN=&lt;ECC Root's Common_Name&gt;; if org., OU=&lt;Org.Unit&gt;
Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = 5 years
Subject DN: (if the Organization Assurer, see the comment to the 7.4.3., Set #1a)
C= (see 7.4.1.)
L= (see 7.4.1.)
O= (see 7.4.1.)
for "Client-assured": CN=CAcert ECC Client-assured CA &lt;year&gt;
for "Client-unassured": CN=CAcert ECC Client-unassured CA &lt;year&gt;
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
RSA Public-Key: (384 bit), then the ASN1 OID: secp384r1, and NIST CURVE: P-384
Public Key Parameters: ECDSA_P384
X509v3 Extensions
X509v3 Key Usage (critical)
General Subordinate CA certificate purposes:
Digital Signature, Certificate Signig, CRL Signing
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
OCSP Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9)
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: (20 Byte ID)
Authority Key ID (20 Bytes ID, equal to the Subject Key ID of the ECC Root CA cert.)
Authority Information Access (AIA):
OCSP (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) - URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org/
CA Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
\- URI:http://www.cacert.org/certs/ecc\_root\_&lt;year&gt;.crt (ECC Root CA cert. file)
X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.2.3.1 (18506 = org. number, here: CAcert; 2.3.1 = CPS)
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
Full Name:
URI:http://crl.cacert.org/&lt;CRL_file&gt;:
for "Client-assured": ecc\_clientA\_&lt;year&gt;.crl
for "Client-unassured": ecc\_clientU\_&lt;year&gt;.crl
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
**Properties of the ECC "Server-assured" & "Server-unassured" Subordinate CA certificates (Intermediate Roots)**
Cert version: 3 (X.509v3)
Serial number: random number, length is 16 Bytes
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Signature Algorithm Hash: sha256
Issuer DN: C=&lt;Country&gt;,L=&lt;Location&gt;,O=&lt;Organization&gt;,CN=&lt;ECC Root's Common_Name&gt;; if org., OU=&lt;Org.Unit&gt;
Validity (Not Before & Not After), Duration = 5 years
Subject DN (derived from Issuer, varies in Subject: CN=name-reflecting-purpose)
(if the Organization Assurer, see the comment to the 7.4.3., Set #1a)
C= (see 7.4.1.)
L= (see 7.4.1.)
O= (see 7.4.1.)
for "Server-assured": CN=CAcert ECC Server-assured CA &lt;year&gt;
for "Server-unassured": CN=CAcert ECC Server-unassured CA &lt;year&gt;
Subject Public Key Info
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
RSA Public-Key: (384 bit), then the ASN1 OID: secp384r1, and NIST CURVE: P-384
Public Key Parameters: ECDSA_P384
X509v3 Extensions
X509v3 Key Usage (critical)
General Subordinate CA certificate purposes:
Digital Signature, Certificate Signing, CRL Signing
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Server Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)
OCSP Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9)
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: (20 Byte ID)
Authority Key ID (20 Bytes ID, equal to the Subject Key ID of the ECC Root CA cert.)
Authority Information Access (AIA):
OCSP (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) - URI:http://ocsp.cacert.org/
CA Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
\- URI:http://www.cacert.org/certs/ecc\_root\_&lt;year&gt;.crt (ECC Root CA certificate file)
X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.18506.2.3.1 (18506 = org. number, here: CAcert; 2.3.1 = CPS)
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
Full Name:
URI:http://crl.cacert.org/&lt;CRL_file&gt;:
for "Server-assured": ecc\_serverA\_&lt;year&gt;.crl
for "Server-unassured": ecc\_serverU\_&lt;year&gt;.crl
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Fingerprint: 20 Bytes
---This is the end of the Policy---
-----------------------------------
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