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<h1>Security Policy for CAcert Systems</h1>
<p><a href="PolicyOnPolicy.html"><img src="Images/cacert-wip.png" id="graphics1" alt="CAcert Security Policy Status == wip" align="bottom" border="0" height="33" width="90"></a>
<br>
Creation date: 2009-02-16<br>
Status: <i>work-in-progress</i>
</p>
<h2><a name="1">1.</a> INTRODUCTION</h2>
<h3><a name="1.1">1.1.</a> Motivation and Scope </h3>
<p>
This Security Policy sets out the policy
for the secure operation of the CAcert critical computer systems.
These computer systems include:
</p>
<ol><li>
Physical hardware mounting the logical services
</li><li>
Webserver + database (core server(s))
</li><li>
Signing service (signing server)
</li><li>
Support interface
</li><li>
Source code (changes and patches)
</li></ol>
<h4><a name="1.1.1">1.1.1.</a> Effected Personnel </h4>
<p>
These roles and teams are effected:
</p>
<ul><li>
Hardware Controllers (Oophaga)
</li><li>
Direct Hardware Access Systems Administrators
(as listed in Oophaga Appendix B Access List)
</li><li>
Application Administrators
(online access to critical systems at Unix level)
</li><li>
Support Team
(online access via administration interfaces)
</li><li>
Software Development Team
(approval of application code)
</li></ul>
<h4><a name="1.1.1">1.1.2.</a> Out of Scope </h4>
<p>
Non-critical systems are not covered by this manual,
but may be guided by it, and impacted where they are
found within the security context.
Architecture is out of scope, see CPS#6.2.
</p>
<h3><a name="1.2">1.2.</a> Principles </h3>
<p>
Important principles of this Security Policy are:
</p>
<ul><li>
<i>dual control</i> -- at least two individuals must control a task
</li><li>
<i>four eyes</i> -- at least two individuals must be present during a task,
one to execute and one to observe.
</li><li>
<i>redundancy</i> -- no single individual is the only one authorized
to perform a task.
</li><li>
<i>escrow</i> -- where critical information (backups, passwords)
is kept with other parties
</li><li>
<i>logging</i> -- where events are recorded in a file
</li><li>
<i>separation of concerns</i> -- when a core task is split between
two people from different areas
</li><li>
<i>Audit</i> -- where external reviewers do checks on practices and policies
</li></ul>
<p>
Each task or asset is covered by a variety of protections
deriving from the above principles.
</p>
<h3><a name="1.3">1.3.</a> Definition of Terms</h3>
<dl>
<dt><i>Access Engineer</i> </dt>
<dd>
A Member who manages the critical hardware,
including maintenance, access control and physical security.
See &sect;1.1.
</dd>
<dt><i>Software Developer </i> </dt>
<dd>
A Member who reviews patches for security and workability,
signs-off on them, and incorporates them into the repository.
See &sect;7.
</dd>
<dt><i>Support ???</i> <span class="q"> noun needed here</span> </dt>
<dd>
A Member who mans the support list,
and has access to restricted
data through the online interface.
See &sect;8.
</dd>
<dt><i>Systems Administrator</i> </dt>
<dd>
A Member who manages a critial system, and has access
to security-sensitive functions or data.
</dd>
</dl>
<h3><a name="1.4">1.4.</a> Documents and Version control</h3>
<h4><a name="1.4.1">1.4.1.</a> The Security Policy Document </h4>
<p>
This Security Policy is part of the configuration-control specification
for audit purposes (DRC).
It is under the control of Policy on Policy for version purposes.
</p>
<p>
This policy document says what is done, rather than how to do it.
</p>
<h4><a name="1.4.2">1.4.2.</a> The Security Manual (Practices) Document </h4>
<p>
This Policy explicitly defers detailed security practices to the
<a href="http://wiki.cacert.org/wiki/SecurityManual">Security Manual</a>
("SM"),
The SM says how things are done.
As practices are things that vary from time to time,
including between each event of practice,
the SM is under the direct control of the Systems Administration team.
It is located and version-controlled on the CAcert wiki.
</p>
<p>
Section Headings are the same in both documents.
Where Section Headings are empty in one document,
they are expected to be documented in the other.
</p>
<h4><a name="1.4.3">1.4.3.</a> The Security Procedures </h4>
<p>
The team leaders may from time to time
explicitly defer single, cohesive components of the
security practices into separate procedures documents.
Each procedure should be managed in a wiki page under
their control, probably at
<a href="http://wiki.cacert.org/wiki/SystemAdministration/Procedures">
SystemAdministration/Procedures</a>.
Each procedure must be referenced explicitly in the Security Manual.
</p>
<h2><a name="2">2.</a> PHYSICAL SECURITY</h2>
<h3><a name="2.1">2.1.</a> Facility </h3>
<p>
CAcert shall host critical servers in a highly secure facility.
There shall be independent verification of the physical and
access security.
</p>
<h3><a name="2.2">2.2.</a> Physical Assets </h3>
<ul class="q"><li>
Big question here is whether Oophaga falls inside SP/SM or not.<br>
Answered: <b>IN</b>.
</li><li>
2nd Big Question is whether Oophaga is in SP or in SM.<br>
Answered: <b>in the SM.</b>
</li></ul>
<h4><a name="2.2.1">2.2.1.</a> Computers </h4>
<p>
Computers shall be inventoried before being put into service.
Inventory list shall be available to all
Access Engineeers and all Systems Administrators.
List must be subject to change control.
</p>
<p>
Units shall have nickname clearly marked on front and rear of chassis.
Machines shall be housed in secured facilities (cages and/or locked racks).
</p>
<h4><a name="2.2.1.1">2.2.1.1</a> Acquisition </h4>
<p>
Acquisition of new equipment that is subject to a
pre-purchase security risk must be done from a
vendor that is regularly and commercially in business.
Precautions must be taken to prevent equipment being
prepared in advance.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.2.2">2.2.2.</a> Cables </h4>
<p class="error">
Drop 2.2.2.
</p>
<p class="q">
Cabling to all equipment shall be labeled at both ends
with identification of end points.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.2.3">2.2.3.</a> Media </h4>
<h4><a name="2.2.3.1">2.2.3.1</a> Provisioning </h4>
<p>
Storage media (disk drives, tapes, removable media)
are inventoried upon acquisition
and tracked in their use.
</p>
<p>
New storage media (whether disk or removable) shall be
securely wiped and reformatted before use.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.2.3.2">2.2.3.2</a> Storage </h4>
<p>
Removable media shall be securely stored at all times,
including when not in use.
Drives that are kept for reuse are wiped securely before storage.
Reuse can only be within critical systems.
</p>
<p>
When there is a change to status of media,
a report is made to the log specifying the new status.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.2.3.3">2.2.3.3</a> Retirement </h4>
<p>
Storage media that is exposed to critical data and is
to be retired from service shall be destroyed or otherwise secured.
The following steps are to be taken:
</p>
<ol><li>
The media is securely destroyed, <b>or</b>
</li><li>
the media is to be securely erased,
and stored securely.
</li></ol>
<p>
Records of secure erasure and method of final disposal
shall be tracked in the asset inventory.
Where critical data is involved,
2 system administrators must sign-off on each step.
</p>
<h3><a name="2.3">2.3.</a> Physical Access </h3>
<p>
In accordance with the principle of dual control,
at least two persons authorized for access must
be on-site at the same time for physical access to be granted.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.3.1">2.3.1.</a> Access Authorisation </h4>
<p>
Access to physical equipment must be authorised.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.3.2">2.3.2.</a> Access Profiles </h4>
<p>
The Security Manual must present the different access profiles.
At least one CAcert systems administrator will be present for
logical access to CAcert critical servers.
Only the most basic and safest of accesses should be done with
one CAcert systems administrator present.
</p>
</p>
Only Systems Administrators are authorised to access the data.
All others must not access the data.
All are responsible for protecting the data
from access by those not authorised.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.3.3">2.3.3.</a> Access Logging </h4>
<p>
All physical accesses are logged and reported to all.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.3.4">2.3.4.</a> Emergency Access </h4>
<p>
There is no procedure for emergency access.
If emergency access is gained,
this must be reported and justified immediately.
See DPR.
</p>
<h4><a name="2.3.5">2.3.5.</a> Physical Security codes & devices </h4>
<p>
All personel who are in possession of physical security
codes and devices (keys) are to be authorised and documented.
</p>
<h2><a name="3">3.</a> LOGICAL SECURITY</h2>
<h3><a name="3.1">3.1.</a> Network </h3>
<h4><a name="3.1.1">3.1.1.</a> Infrastructure </h4>
<p>
Current and complete diagrams of the physical and logical CAcert network infrastructure shall be maintained by systems administration team leader. These diagrams should include cabling information, physical port configuration details, and expected/allowed data flow directions, as applicable. Diagrams should be revision controlled, and must be updated when any change is made.
</p>
<h5> 3.1.1.1. External connectivity </h5>
<p>
Only such services as are required for normal operation should be visible externally; systems and servers which do not require access to the Internet for their normal operation must not be granted that access.
</p>
<h5> 3.1.1.2. Internal connectivity </h5>
<p>
System and server connections internal to the CAcert infrastructure should be kept to the minimum required for routine operations. Any new connectivity desired must be requested and approved by CAcert system administration team leader and then must be reflected in the appropriate infrastructure diagram(s).
</p>
<h4><a name="3.1.2">3.1.2.</a> Operating Configuration </h4>
<h5> 3.1.2.1. Ingress </h5>
<p>
All ports on which incoming traffic is expected shall be documented; traffic to other ports must be blocked. Unexpected traffic must be logged as an exception.
</p>
<h5> 3.1.2.2. Egress </h5>
<p>
All ports to which outbound traffic is initiated shall be documented; traffic to other ports must be blocked. Unexpected traffic must be logged as an exception.
</p>
<h4><a name="3.1.3">3.1.3.</a> Intrusion detection </h4>
<p>
Logs should be examined regularly (by manual or automatic means) for unusual patterns and/or traffic; anomalies should be investigated as they are discovered and should be reported to appropriate personnel in near-real-time (e.g. text message, email) and investigated as soon as possible. Suspicious activity which may indicate an actual system intrusion or compromise should trigger the incident response protocol described in section 5.1.
</p>
<h3><a name="3.2">3.2.</a> Operating System </h3>
<p>
Any operating system used for critical server machines must be available under an OSI-approved open source software license.
</p>
<h4> 3.2.1. Disk Encryption </h4>
<p>
Any operating system used for critical server machines must support software full-disk or disk volume encryption, and this encryption option must be enabled for all relevant disks/volumes when the operating system is first installed on the machine.
</p>
<h4> 3.2.2. Operating configuration </h4>
<p>
Servers must enable only the operating system functions required to support the necessary services. Options and packages chosen at OS install shall be documented, and newly-installed systems must be inspected to ensure that only required services are active, and their functionality is limited through configuration options. Any required application software must follow similar techniques to ensure minimal exposure footprint.
</p>
<p>
Documentation for installing and configuring servers with the appropriate software packages and configurations will be maintained by the system administrators in the wiki.
</p>
<h4> 3.2.3. Patching </h4>
<p class="q">A.1.i, A.1.k:</p>
<p>
Software used on production servers must be kept current with respect to patches affecting software security. Patch application is governed by CCS and must be approved by the systems administration team leader, fully documented in the logs and reported by email to the systems administration list on completion (see &sect;4.2).
</p>
<h5> 3.2.3.1. “emergency” patching </h5>
<p>
Application of a patch is deemed an <i>emergency</i>
when a remote exploit for a weakness in the particular piece
of software has become known
(on servers allowing direct local user access,
an emergent local exploit may also be deemed to be an emergency).
Application of patches in this case may occur as soon as possible,
bypassing the normal configuration-change process.
The systems administration team leader must either approve the patch,
instruct remedial action, or refer the case to dispute resolution.
</p>
<p>
<b>
Declaration of an emergency patching situation should not occur with any regularity.
</b>
Emergency patch events must be documented within the regular summaries to Board.
</p>
<h3> 3.3. Application </h3>
<p>
Software development takes place on various test systems (not a critical system). See &sect;7. Once offered by Software Development (team), system administration team leader has to approve the installation of each release or patch.
</p>
<p>
Any changes made to source code must be referred back to software development.
</p>
<h3> 3.4. Access control </h3>
<p>
General user access to CAcert services shall normally be conducted through a web-based application interface. Features are made available according to Assurance Points and direct permissions.
</p>
<p>
Direct Permissions are managed by the Application to enable special online administrators from the Support Team access to certain functions.
</p>
<h4> 3.4.1. Authorisation </h4>
<p>
The access control lists are:
</p>
<ul><li>
Console Access List,
for physical access by System Administrators.
</li><li>
SSH Access List,
for access to Unix-level facilities of the online webserver.
</li><li>
Support Access List,
for access to the online support interface features.
</li></ul>
<p>
All changes to the above lists are approved by the board of CAcert.
</p>
<h4> 3.4.2. Authentication </h4>
<p>
A strong method of authentication is used and documented.
</p>
<h4> 3.4.3. Removing access </h4>
<p>
Termination actions must be documented,
including resignation, arbitration, or determination
by team or board.
</p>
<h2> <a name="4">4.</a> OPERATIONAL SECURITY </h2>
<h3> <a name="4.1">4.1.</a> System administration </h3>
<p>
Primary systems administration tasks
shall be conducted under four eyes principle.
These shall include backup performance verification,
log inspection,
software patch identification and application,
account creation and deletion,
and hardware maintenance.
</p>
<p>
System administrators must pass a background check
and comply with all applicable policies in force.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.1.1">4.1.1.</a> Privileged accounts and passwords </h4>
<p>
Access to Accounts
(root and user via SSH or console)
must be strictly controlled.
Passwords and passphrases entered into the systems will be kept private
to CAcert sysadmins in all cases.
</p>
<h5> <a name="4.1.1.1">4.1.1.1.</a> Authorized users </h5>
<p>
Only system administrators designated on the Access List
shall be authorized to access accounts.
</p>
<p class="q">Assumes above that there is no reason to have access
to a Unix-level account on the critical machines unless on the Access List.</p>
<h5> <a name="4.1.1.2">4.1.1.2.</a> Access to Systems</h5>
<p>
All remote communications for systems administration purposes is encrypted,
logged and monitored.
</p>
<h5> <a name="4.1.1.3">4.1.1.3.</a> Changing </h5>
<p>
Passwords must be kept secure.
The procedure for changing passwords should be documented.
</p>
<h5> <a name="4.1.1.4">4.1.1.4.</a> Outsourcing </h5>
<p>
Systems administration team leader may outsource non-critical
components such as DNS servers.
Outsourcing should be to Members who are Assurers,
who have the appropriate technical knowledge,
and are in good contact with team leader.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.1.2">4.1.2.</a> Required staff response time </h4>
<p>
Response times should be documented.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.1.3">4.1.3.</a> Change management procedures </h4>
<p>
All changes made to system configuration must be recorded.
</p>
<h3> <a name="4.2">4.2.</a> Logging </h3>
<h4> <a name="4.2.1">4.2.1.</a> Coverage </h4>
<p>
All sensitive events should be logged.
Logs should be deleted after an appropriate amount of time.
</p>
<p class="q">
'''Move to SM:'''
Logs shall be maintained for:
</p>
<ul>
<li> anomalous network traffic, </li>
<li> system activities and events, </li>
<li> application (certificate, web, mail, and database) events, </li>
<li> '''make generic''': "Comms Module" requests for certificate signing on both the cryptographic module (signing server) and the main online server, </li>
<li> login and root access, </li>
<li> configuration changes. </li>
</ul>
<h4> <a name="4.2.2">4.2.2.</a> Access and Security </h4>
<p>
Access to logs must be restricted.
The security of the logs should be documented.
The records retention should be documented.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.2.3">4.2.3.</a> Automated logs </h4>
<p>
Logging should be automated,
and use should be made of appropriate system-provided automated tools.
Automated logs should be reviewed periodically;
suspicious events should be flagged and investigated in a timely fashion.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.2.4">4.2.4.</a> Operational (manual) logs </h4>
<p>
Configuration changes, no matter how small, must be logged.
Access to this log shall be restricted.
</p>
<p>
All physical visits will be logged and a report provided by the accessor.
</p>
<h3> <a name="4.3">4.3.</a> Backup </h3>
<p>
The procedure for all backups must be documented,
according to the following sub-headings.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.1">4.3.1.</a> Type </h4>
<p>
Backups must be taken for operational
and for disaster recovery purposes ("offline").
Disaster recovery backups must be offline and remote.
Operational backups may be online and local.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.2">4.3.2.</a> Frequency </h4>
<h4> <a name="4.3.3">4.3.3.</a> Storage </h4>
<p>
Backups must be protected to the same level as the critical systems themselves.
Offline backups should be distributed.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.4">4.3.4.</a> Retention period and Re-use </h4>
<h4> <a name="4.3.5">4.3.5.</a> Encryption </h4>
<p>
Backups must be encrypted and must only be transmitted via secured channels.
Off-site backups must be dual-encrypted using divergent methods.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.6">4.3.6.</a> Verifying Backups </h4>
<p>
Two CAcert system administrators must be
present for verification of a backup.
Four eyes principle must be maintained when the key and backup are together.
For any other purpose than verification of the success of the backup, see next.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.7">4.3.7.</a> Key Management </h4>
<p>
The encryption keys must be stored securely by the
CAcert systems administrators.
Paper documentation must be stored with manual backups.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.3.8">4.3.8.</a> Reading Backups </h4>
<p>
Conditions and procedures for examining the backups for purposes
other than for verification must be documented
and must be under Arbitrator control.
</p>
<h3> <a name="4.4">4.4.</a> Data retention </h3>
<h4> <a name="4.4.1">4.4.1.</a> User data </h4>
<p>
Termination of user data is under direction of the Arbitrator.
See CCA.
</p>
<h4> <a name="4.4.2">4.4.2.</a> System logs </h4>
<h4> <a name="4.4.3">4.4.3.</a> Incident reports </h4>
<p>
The systems administration team leader is to maintain incident reports securely.
Access to incident reports is restricted.
</p>
<h3> <a name="4.5">4.5.</a> Cycling </h3>
<h2><a name="5">5.</a> INCIDENT RESPONSE</h2>
<h3> <a name="5.1">5.1.</a> Incidents </h3>
<p>
Incidents and sources of important events and logging should be documented.
</p>
<h3> <a name="5.2">5.2.</a> Detection </h3>
<p>
The standard of monitoring, alerting and reporting must be documented.
</p>
<h3> <a name="5.3">5.3.</a> Immediate Action </h3>
<h4> <a name="5.2.1">5.2.1.</a> Severity and Priority </h4>
<p>
On discovery of an incident,
an initial assessment of severity and priority must be made.
</p>
<h4> <a name="5.2.2">5.2.2.</a> Communications </h4>
<p>
An initial report should be sent to systems administrators
and wider interested parties.
</p>
<p>
A communications forum should be established for direct
support of high priority or high severity incidents.
</p>
<h4> <a name="5.2.3">5.2.3.</a> Oversight </h4>
<p>
A process of escalation of oversight should be eastablished.
</p>
<h3> <a name="5.4">5.4.</a> Investigation </h3>
<p>
Incidents must be investigated.
The investigation must be documented.
Evidence must be secured if the severity is high.
</p>
<h3> <a name="5.5">5.5.</a> Response </h3>
<h3> <a name="5.6">5.6.</a> Report </h3>
<p>
A report should be appended to the documentation of the investigation,
and distributed in the act of closing the investigation.
</p>
<p>
Incidents are not normally kept secret or confidential.
Ony under a defined exception under policy,
or under the oversight of the Arbitrator,
may confidentiality be maintained.
The knowledge of the existence of the event must not be kept
secret, nor the manner in which it is kept confidential.
</p>
<h2><a name="6">6.</a> DISASTER RECOVERY</h2>
<p>
Disaster Recovery is the responsibility of the Board of CAcert Inc.
</p>
<h3> <a name="6.1"> 6.1. </a> Business Processes </h3>
<p>
Board must develop and maintain documentation on Business Processes.
From this list, Core Processes for business continuity / disaster recovery
purposes must be identified.
</p>
<h3> <a name="6.2"> 6.2. </a> Recovery Times </h3>
<p>
Board should identify standard process times for all processes,
and must designate Maximum Acceptable Outages
and Recovery Time Objectives for the Core Processes.
</p>
<h3> <a name="6.3"> 6.3. </a> Plan </h3>
<p>
Board must have a basic plan to recover.
</p>
<h3> <a name="6.4"> 6.4. </a> Key Persons List </h3>
<p>
Board must maintain a key persons List with all the
contact information needed.
</p>
<h2><a name="7">7.</a> SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT</h2>
<p class="q">
Change name of this to Software Assessment.
</p>
<p>
Software development team is responsible
for the security of the code.
</p>
<h3> <a name="7.1"> 7.1. </a> Authority </h3>
<p>
The source code is under CCS.
Additions to the team are approved by Board
</p>
<h3> <a name="7.2"> 7.2. </a> Tasks </h3>
<p>
The primary tasks are:
</p>
<ol><li>
Keep the code secure in its operation,
</li><li>
Fix security bugs, including incidents,
</li><li>
Audit, Verify and sign-off proposed patches,
</li><li>
Guide Systems Administration team in inserting patches,
</li><li>
Provide guidance for architecture,
</li></ol>
<p>
Software Development is not primarily tasked to write the code.
In principle, anyone can submit code changes for approval.
</p>
<h3> <a name="7.3"> 7.3. </a> Repository </h3>
<p>
The application code and patches are maintained
in a central repository that is run by the
software development team.
</p>
<h3> <a name="7.4"> 7.4. </a> Review </h3>
<p>
At the minimum,
patches are signed off by the team leader
or his designated reviewer.
Each software change should be reviewed
by a person other than the author.
Author and signers-off must be logged.
The riskier the source is, the more reviews have to be done.
</p>
<h3> <a name="7.5"> 7.5. </a> Test and Bugs </h3>
<p>
Software Development team maintains a test system.
Each patch should be built and tested.
Test status of each patch must be logged.
</p>
<p>
Software Development team maintains a bug system.
Primary communications should go through this system.
Management access should be granted to all software developers,
and systems administrators.
Bug submission access should be provided to
any Member that requests it.
</p>
<h3> <a name="7.6"> 7.6. </a> Handover </h3>
<p>
Once signed off, software development (team leader)
coordinates with systems administration (team leader)
to offer the upgrade.
Upgrade format is to be negotiated,
but systems administration naturally has the last word.
Software development people are not to have access
to the critical systems, providing a dual control
at the teams level.
</p>
<p>
If compilation and/or other processing of the
application source code in the version control system
is necessary to deploy the application,
detailed installation instructions should also be
maintained in the version control system and offered to the
system administrators.
</p>
<p>
Systems administrators copy the patches securely
from the software development onto the critical machine.
See &sect;3.3.
</p>
<h2><a name="8">8.</a> SUPPORT</h2>
<h3> <a name="8.1"> 8.1. </a> Authority </h3>
<p>
The software interface gives features to Support personnel.
Access to the special features is under tight control.
Additions to the team are approved by Board,
and the software features are under CCS.
</p>